Review by Kirkus Book Review
Vladimir Putin made the decision to make war on Ukraine. But, this study posits, the West helped push him to that brink. Haslam, a specialist in Soviet studies, analyzes why Putin took it upon himself to invade Ukraine in a war that is approaching three years old. "To focus purely on Vladimir Putin and his psychology is not enough, tempting as it is," writes Haslam. Instead, he names as one important proximate cause the expansion of NATO following the Cold War--whose end, he suggests, was met with untoward triumphalism on the part of the U.S., humiliating Russia in the bargain. Russia made approaches to the West to enter into more cooperative agreements, including, perhaps, the possibility of joining the European Union; rebuffed, Putin took on something of a siege mentality. Visibly weakened by the loss of its former constituent territories, the Russian Federation sensed its increasing vulnerability even as it witnessed NATO's entrance into former Eastern Bloc countries and military intervention in former Yugoslavia. This encroachment grew ever closer to Russia's "near abroad," as Russia, by Haslam's account, was increasingly slighted by being seen by the U.S. "as a defeated power of little or no account." Countries so positioned can be dangerous, as Putin demonstrated by attacking Ukraine--which, Haslam reminds, was top on the U.S. list of NATO expansion, a country without which "Russia could never re-emerge as an empire, which Russia had invariably been." These historical and political contingencies all have great explanatory value, though too often Haslam seems to suggest that the war in Ukraine is largely the fault of the U.S., when of course Putin could have decided to take another tack. Whatever the case and the causes, Haslam does conclude that "the Russian war has demonstrably failed in its objectives." A hard-edged study in geopolitical miscalculation on all sides. Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
