Iron and blood A military history of the German-speaking peoples since 1500

Peter H. Wilson

Book - 2023

From the author of the acclaimed The Thirty Years War and Heart of Europe, a masterful, landmark reappraisal of German military history, and of the preconceptions about German militarism since before the rise of Prussia and the world wars. German military history is typically viewed as an inexorable march to the rise of Prussia and the two world wars, the road paved by militarism and the result a specifically German way of war. Peter Wilson challenges this narrative. Looking beyond Prussia to German-speaking Europe across the last five centuries, Wilson finds little unique or preordained in German militarism or warfighting. German military history is typically viewed as an inexorable march to the rise of Prussia and the two world wars, the ...road paved by militarism and the result a specifically German way of war. Peter Wilson challenges this narrative. Looking beyond Prussia to German-speaking Europe across the last five centuries, Wilson finds little unique or preordained in German militarism or warfighting. Iron and Blood takes as its starting point the consolidation of the Holy Roman Empire, which created new mechanisms for raising troops but also for resolving disputes diplomatically. Both the empire and the Swiss Confederation were largely defensive in orientation, while German participation in foreign wars was most often in partnership with allies. The primary aggressor in Central Europe was not Prussia but the Austrian Habsburg monarchy, yet Austria's strength owed much to its ability to secure allies. Prussia, meanwhile, invested in militarization but maintained a part-time army well into the nineteenth century. Alongside Switzerland, which relied on traditional militia, both states exemplify the longstanding civilian element within German military power. Only after Prussia's unexpected victory over France in 1871 did Germans and outsiders come to believe in a German gift for warfare--a special capacity for high-speed, high-intensity combat that could overcome numerical disadvantage. It took two world wars to expose the fallacy of German military genius. Yet even today, Wilson argues, Germany's strategic position is misunderstood. The country now seen as a bastion of peace spends heavily on defense in comparison to its peers and is deeply invested in less kinetic contemporary forms of coercive power. --

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Subjects
Published
Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press 2023.
Language
English
Main Author
Peter H. Wilson (author)
Edition
First Harvard University Press edition, 2023.
Item Description
First published in the United Kingdom by Allen Lane, an important of Penguin Books, Penguin Random House, 2022.
Physical Description
xlix, 913 pages, 16 unnumbered pages of plates : illustrations (chiefly color), maps ; 24 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN
9780674987623
  • List of Illustrations
  • List of Maps
  • Note on Form
  • Acknowledgements
  • List of Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • Part I. Balancing War and Peace
  • 1. Warlords
  • 2. Forming Armies
  • 3. Going for a Soldier
  • Part II. Accepting War as Permanent
  • 4. Restraining the War Monster
  • 5. Permanent Armies
  • 6. From Extraordinary to Ordinary Burden
  • Part III. Professionalizing War
  • 7. Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns
  • 8. Professionalizing War
  • 9. Socialization of the Military
  • Part IV. Nationalizing War
  • 10. War and Nation-Building
  • 11. Nations in Arms
  • 12. Serving the Nation
  • Part V. Democratizing War
  • 13. Demagogues and Democrats
  • 14. From Total War to the End of War?
  • 15. Citizens in Uniform
  • Notes
  • Index
Review by Choice Review

This massive new tome calls for a reconceptualization of German military history from the 1500s to the end of WW II. Wilson (Univ. of Oxford, UK) focuses on the role of so-called militarism in the development of the political space known as Germany or the German lands. Though he agrees that militarism played a critical role in Germany's history, he also argues that militarism "was neither an end destination nor a single trajectory of development" (p. xlii). By placing German military history within a longer context, Wilson illustrates that there was no uniquely German way of war dominated by generals. He also removes the focus from Prussia, yielding interesting insights. Wilson's synthesis deftly handles the enormous historiography on German military history that would overwhelm lesser scholars. Organized into five parts, the book examines how leaders balanced war and peace, accepted war as permanent, professionalized war, nationalized war, and democratized war, respectively. The avalanche of information at times threatens to bury readers, but the author's clear and lively prose safely guides them to the top of the mountain where they can see the entirety of German military history in full panoramic view. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Advanced undergraduates through faculty. --Mark A. Mengerink, Lamar University

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

Oxford historian Wilson (The Thirty Years War) delivers an encyclopedic survey of the "German way of war" as it developed in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland from the 16th century to the present day. Pushing back against the notion that German-speaking states "followed a uniquely belligerent and authoritarian Special Path (Sonderweg) that deviated from the rest of Europe," Wilson contends that the horrific violence of the Thirty Years War (1618--1648) was "the inevitable consequence of the repeated failure of all parties to pay and supply their armies properly," and explains how the 18th-century Prussian king Frederick II's preference for "invading rapidly with overwhelming force" was influenced by his admiration for French king Louis XIV and Swedish monarch Charles XII. Prussia's victory over Napoleon III in 1871 and "widespread admiration" for Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz helped shape the notion, especially among outsiders, "that the Germans possessed a peculiar 'genius for war,' " but Wilson highlights plenty of missteps and failures, including Austria-Hungary's "over-hasty" declaration of war against Serbia in 1914 and Hitler's doomed invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Wilson's relentless march across five centuries' worth of military and political history is not for neophytes, but he successfully upends a regiment's worth of prevailing wisdom. It's a monumental achievement. (Feb.)

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