Russia upside down An exit strategy for the second Cold War

Weisberg (creator of the television show The Americans) puts forth an argument that both the United States and Russia are contributing to a new Cold War that benefits neither country and prevents the two major powers from aiding one another. Weisberg begins by briefly summarizing his pre-Hollywood career, including a stint in the CIA; he spends some time expounding on his initial feelings toward the former Soviet Union and how they changed during his career. The following chapters are an exploration of current Russian political and social realities. Weisberg concludes by proposing clear avenues that each nation could follow to ease tensions and become global partners, or at least not adversaries. For the United States, these include joining Russia in fighting terrorism, ending sanctions against Russia, and halting human-centered espionage programs (which goes for Russia too); Weisberg bases this last suggestion on his experience in the CIA and the time he spent in St. Petersburg studying Russian. For Russia he suggests lowering the volume of its paranoia, withdrawing support from far-right leaders of other nations, and opening communication across internal political parties. VERDICT Fans of The Americans, readers interested in U.S.-Russia policy, and anyone wishing to learn more about the topic will enjoy this insightful, thought-provoking book.--Jason L. Steagall, Arapahoe Community Coll., Littleton, CO

A cogent assessment of Russia from a former CIA officer and creator of the TV show The Americans. Coming of age in the 1970s, Weisberg was taught that the Soviet Union was communist and politically repressive and the U.S. was the opposite. Then the Soviet Union collapsed, and the new Russia embraced Christianity and capitalism but remained repressive--although less so. Relations improved but then deteriorated into what many call a second cold war. Weisberg, a levelheaded analyst, maintains that the rise of an assertive Russia under Putin convinced American leaders that the evil empire had returned. The author adds that American politicians regularly proclaim that people throughout the world yearn for democracy, although the efforts to spread it have been uniformly disastrous. To Russians, democracy arrived in the 1990s with crime, anarchy, and severe economic hardship. Taking office in 1999, Putin reasserted government authority. The stability and prosperity that followed came with significant restrictions on freedom but also made him very popular. Unlike his Soviet predecessors, Putin kept his ambitions local, but the U.S. didn't see it that way. Though promising otherwise, the U.S. swept former satellites into NATO, reviving Soviet fears of being surrounded by enemies. Despite unedifying American policies in Cuba and Latin America, U.S. officials denounced Russian bullying of its neighbors and supported heavy economic sanctions. Readers outraged at Russian cyberattacks may be surprised to learn that America has long been doing the same. Russian historians emphasize that America was largely founded by slave owners. When they claim that America conducted a genocidal slaughter of Native peoples, Americans often respond that Stalin killed millions--not exactly evidence of moral purity on either side. Weisberg clearly knows his stuff, and while his suggestions on how to fix matters may be too sensible to appeal to patriots from either nation, readers will have no doubt that our current approach is not working. Perceptive insights into a consistently dysfunctional international relationship. Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.