Review by Booklist Review
World War l could have ended in 1916 with a serious secret effort by Germany to arrange a compromise peace. Initiated by the chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who was appalled by the war's colossal casualties and feared domestic revolution if it continued, extension of the olive branch began with an August message conveyed by the ambassador to America, Johann von Bernstorff, requesting President Wilson's mediation and conceding what Germany expected would be Britain and France's minimal condition: evacuation of Belgium and France. Examining the diplomatic exchanges this move provoked and the players in Berlin, Washington, and London who debated them, Zelikow ably dramatizes their thoughts and actions. A crucial figure was Edward House, a private citizen who was Wilson's conduit to Bernstorff and the British cabinet. Neither House nor Wilson realized what financial leverage they had over Britain's war situation, and Wilson never pressed the Allies to negotiate. Equally dismissive was Germany's military leadership. Despite the immense literature about World War I, there is, Zelikow attests, no history until now about this tragic impasse, making this supremely well-written work essential.
From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Historian and former diplomat Zelikow (coauthor, To Build a Better World) meticulously chronicles the five-month period from late 1916 to early 1917, when Britain, Germany, and the U.S. tried to negotiate an end to WWI. Focusing on the period immediately preceding the collapse of the Russian monarchy and America's entry into the war, Zelikow examines the shuttle diplomacy and secret cables sent between British prime minister H.H. Asquith, German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, and their top diplomats. Zelikow highlights David Lloyd George's rise to the British premiership in December 1916 and public calls for a fight to "the finish" as one of the major hindrances to an agreement, as well as Germany's "catastrophic" decision in early 1917 to push for unrestricted U-boat warfare, which in turn caused Wilson to cut diplomatic ties with the German empire. In Zelikow's view, Wilson's action was a betrayal of his "peace without victory" mantra, and ultimately forced the U.S. to go to war. Deeply researched and scathingly critical of the war's foremost political figures, this history offers an intriguing look at what might have been. (Mar.)
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Review by Library Journal Review
For the better part of 1916, the administration of Woodrow Wilson sought to convene a peace conference to end World War I. Since the conference never took place, and the United States joined the war in April 1917, the story of the aborted peace conference faded from historical consciousness. Zelikow (history, governance, Univ. of Virginia; To Build a Better World) carries out a meticulous examination of this series of largely forgotten negotiations. Interestingly, the initial impetus for negotiated peace originated with German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, whose request to President Wilson to act as mediator came at a time when a few members of the British government were also looking for a path to negotiated peace. Zelikow argues that the failure of the peace initiative was due not only to the intransigence of belligerents, but also to the often-chaotic diplomatic actions of President Wilson and his confidant Colonel Edward M. House. VERDICT This thought-provoking history is based on vast primary sources, and while the narrative sometimes bogs down in excessive detail, Zelikow's sharp account brings World War I into focus and raises a number of fascinating "what if" scenarios. Recommended for all extensive history collections.--Frederic Krome, Univ. of Cincinnati Clermont Coll.
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Review by Kirkus Book Review
An expert but disturbing account of a noble diplomatic failure. Zelikow, who served as a diplomat for every presidential administration from Reagan to Obama, shines fresh light on a major historical crossroads. He shows how, had the war ended in 1916, it was possible that the 20th century would have proceeded without communist Russia or Nazi Germany. A mostly successful politician, Woodrow Wilson's efforts were hobbled by an incompetent State Department and ignorance of diplomacy. His foreign policy advice came mostly from his friend Edward "Colonel" House, a wealthy Texan who traveled widely and, unlike Wilson, got along with everyone. With the fighting stalemated, Wilson sent House to Europe to propose peace. Neither side wanted to offend the U.S., and while most sought to end the fighting, no one dared commit publicly. Wilson was encouraged to schedule a conference, but he never demanded it. Zelikow is convincing in his disagreement with numerous historians who maintain that negotiations were impossible because neither side would compromise. In reality, powerful British leaders and the German chancellor took the idea seriously. Zelikow's skillful account of the following year makes for frustrating reading: Wilson could have forced a conference but didn't. In November 1916, when a financially exhausted Britain proposed selling bonds without collateral in America, Wilson vetoed it, producing panic. One British official, remarked, "If Wilson desired to put a stop to the war…such an achievement is in his power." On Jan. 22, 1917, Wilson delivered his famous "peace without victory" speech. Though the reaction from the press was "overwhelmingly positive," it consisted of high-sounding platitudes lacking action items. Readers may be surprised to learn that Germany's Jan. 31 note announcing unrestricted submarine warfare also included a summary of peace terms, urging Wilson's action. Offended by the first note, Wilson broke off relations, a decision the author believes was ill-advised. In the two months before America declared war, Wilson continued to muse about achieving peace, but the chance for negotiation with Germany had passed. Outstanding revisionist history demonstrating what could have been a far more peaceful 20th century. Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
