Review by Choice Review
The Bomb, a popular history of US nuclear strategy, offers a brisk narrative that introduces key ideas without becoming a jargon-laden treatise. Kaplan, a journalist, addresses how policy makers sought to build an effective but not unduly threatening nuclear deterrent force, while simultaneously considering how the force could be used militarily should deterrence fail. To this end he juxtaposes the political guidance on nuclear strategy with the targeting plans designed by the military, arguing that a wide divergence developed between the two from the early 1960s through the early 1990s as military planners resisted directives to produce options for limited nuclear strikes. In Kaplan's account, bureaucratic interests in large budgets initially drove this resistance, until it became institutionalized into a rigid and unthinking process. Coverage of the post-Cold War administrations is more superficial, likely due to pertinent materials remaining classified. For example, rather than emphasize specific strategic nuclear guidance provided during the Clinton and George W. Bush eras, Kaplan devotes a chapter to the US response to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. A left-of-center political viewpoint is evident, but not overpowering, throughout the book. Summing Up: Recommended. General readers through graduate students. --Clifton W. Sherrill, Troy University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Booklist Review
This balanced recounting of American nuclear strategizing, by the knowledgeable author of The Wizards of Armageddon (1983), is chillingly matter-of-fact in its recounting of political leaders discussing millions of deaths, destruction of cities, and, frankly, the unthinkable. Starting with Hiroshima and John Foster Dulles' doctrine of massive retaliation dictated by the U.S. government's Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), the text covers all the presidents in the history of the nuclear era, as well as cabinet secretaries, advisors (like Henry Kissinger), and military men, and spans the often-macabre trade-offs under analysis, from deterrence to some form of limited response ( trading New York for Paris ) to annihilation. Its scope covers thinking spurred by the so-called missile gap, the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, and other international factors. In later years, Kaplan points out, much of the emphasis has shifted from the Cold War rhetoric of the U.S. vs. Russia to other threats, including North Korea, and he brings the discussion up to date by addressing President Trump, who has made the issue of presidential stability, or the lack thereof, a new element in the ongoing dialogue. A frightening but necessary treatment of nuclear policy.--Mark Levine Copyright 2019 Booklist
From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Slate columnist Kaplan (Dark Territory) charts the fraught relationship between U.S. leaders and America's nuclear arsenal in this thorough and frequently terrifying account. Drawing on interviews and recently declassified materials, Kaplan documents developments in nuclear arms policy since the Truman administration, including Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's 1962 announcement of the "assured destruction" doctrine (the ability to absorb a first strike and still be able to launch an overwhelming response). The philosophy of nuclear deterrence kept the Cold War from heating up, but initiated an arms race and would have required U.S. presidents to launch nearly 2,000 nuclear weapons in response to an attack. Kaplan writes that Richard Nixon was "visibly horrified" to inherit a plan outlining his strike options in the Soviet Union and China. According to Kaplan, the challenge of planning a response that is "large enough to terrify" yet small enough to classify as "limited" has yet to be resolved. He credits Ronald Reagan with approaching a "grand peace" in the 1980s, but disconcertingly notes that in 2018 lawmakers were so concerned about the possibility that President Trump might launch a nuclear first strike against North Korea that they held the first hearing on the matter in 41 years. Kaplan synthesizes a wealth of material into lucid, easy-to-follow anecdotes that reveal the complex nature of planning for nuclear war. Readers with the stomach for pondering Armageddon will find this well-written history to be full of insights. (Jan.)
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Review by Library Journal Review
Kaplan (The Wizards of Armageddon) presents a taut, detailed history of how nuclear war has been both made possible and avoided since the invention and use of the atomic bomb during World War II. Readers will find much to like (or dislike) in Kaplan's analysis and characterizations of key American decision-makers, notably generals, defense personnel, and presidents. But such is the story that Kaplan intends to tell: how various decisions, personalities, politics, and bureaucratic processes have kept the possibility of nuclear conflict alive in our world, but most importantly, have also prevented such horror from taking place. He begins with the last moments of World War II, focusing on the Army Air Forces and the birth of Strategic Air Command, and brings the narrative forward to the present day. Kaplan's work is supported by a variety of government documents and research interviews, and while this is a strength of the work, Kaplan has a tendency to recite some documents, when summarizing might suffice. VERDICT Overall, a well-written and compulsively readable account that will keep military history and Cold War buffs up past their bedtime.--Philip Shackelford, South Arkansas Community Coll., El Dorado
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Review by Kirkus Book Review
A comprehensive review of American nuclear policy from the Truman administration to the present.Slate national-security columnist Kaplan (Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War, 2016, etc.) draws on original documents, many only recently declassified, to build a detailed, incisive picture of how U.S. presidents have thought about their most troubling responsibility: pushing "the button" that could end civilization. Equally important players are the top brass in the military who desire more and bigger bombs and the vehicles to deliver them. One theme becomes clear: For the most part, presidents are uncomfortable with nuclear warfare while the military is eager to amass the weapons. Regardless, as soon as a rival power has gained access to nuclear weapons, every administration has had to consider the circumstances under which they might need to be employed. For most of the early history of the bomb, the key strategic decisions were orchestrated by Air Force Gen. Curtis Lemay, whose Strategic Air Command controlled most of the bombers and missiles. But in almost every administration, there were those who dared to oppose him, usually by pointing to the Soviet arsenal and exaggerating the threat it posed. Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense under John F. Kennedy, brought in his "Whiz Kids," who triedwith limited successto rein in the Pentagon budget. Richard Nixon, on the other hand, tried to bluff the North Vietnamese into making concessions on the theory that if they thought he was crazy enough to use the weapons, they might back down. Jimmy Carter, firmly convinced of the immorality of nuclear war, also triedwith even less success. Surprisingly, it was Ronald Reagan who took advantage of the Soviet Union's internal troubles to achieve the first big cut in nuclear weapons. Further gains were made by Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, although the Pentagon and congressional hawks kept both from paring back the arsenal. In the last chapter, the Pulitzer-winning journalist covers Donald Trump's posturing about the issue.A well-written, exhaustively researched history of American leaders' efforts to manage their nuclear arsenal. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
