Appeasement Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the road to war

Review by New York Times Review

THE NICKEL BOYS, by Colson Whitehead. (Doubleday, $24.95.) Whitehead, a Pulitzer winner for "The Underground Railroad," continues to explore America's racist legacy in this powerful novel about a serious student who dreams that college might lead him out of the Jim Crow South. Instead, he's wrongly arrested and sent to a brutal reform school modeled on a real institution. MY PARENTS: An Introduction/THIS DOES NOT BELONG TO YOU, by Aleksandar Hemon. (MCD/Farrar, Straus & Giroux, $28.) In a two-part memoir, Hemon shows how Bosnia and its wartime strife have shaped a life of exile for his family in Canada. APPEASEMENT: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War, by Tim Bouverie. (Tim Duggan, $30.) This book about Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy in the 1930s is most valuable as an examination of the often catastrophic consequences of failing to stand up to threats to freedom, whether at home or abroad. THE CROWDED HOUR: Theodore Roosevelt, the Rough Riders, and the Dawn of the American Century, by Clay Risen. (Scribner, $30.) This fast-paced narrative traces the rise of Roosevelt into a national figure and something of a legend against the backdrop of the emergence of the United States as a world power. THE ICE AT THE END OF THE WORLD: An Epic Journey Into Greenland's Buried Past and Our Perilous Future, by Jon Gertner. (Random House, $28.) Gertner approaches Greenland via the explorers and scientists obsessed with it, then uses the country to illuminate the evidence for climate change. GRACE WILL LEAD US HOME: The Charleston Church Massacre and the Hard, Inspiring Journey to Forgiveness, by Jennifer Berry Hawes. (St. Martin's, $28.99.) This magisterial account of the 2015 hate crime and its aftermath, by a Pulitzer-winning local reporter, delivers a heart-rending portrait of life for the survivors and a powerful meditation on the meaning of mercy. MOSTLY DEAD THINGS, by Kristen Arnett. (Tin House, $25.) The "red mess" that Arnett's narrator finds in the family's taxidermy workshop early in this debut novel is not the inside of a deer - it's her dad, who has committed suicide. The book balances grief with humor and lush, visceral details. LANNY, by Max Porter. (Graywolf, $24.) In this rich, cacophonous novel of English village life - equal parts fairy tale, domestic drama and fable - a mischievous boy goes missing. NOUNS & VERBS: New and Selected Poems, by Campbell McGrath. (Ecco/HarperCollins, $24.99.) McGrath, who has spent decades exploring America and its appetites, is an especially exuberant poet; his work celebrates chain restaurants, rock music and the joyful raucous stupidity of pop culture. The full reviews of these and other recent books are on the web: nytimes.com/books

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [August 4, 2019]

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Review by Booklist Review

Drawing on a number of unpublished collections of private papers, Bouverie's history of 1930s British politics and diplomacy creates a greatly nuanced and complex picture of appeasement. Special attention is given to the effects of the amateur diplomats, men and women of influence who initially acted on their own accord to sway opinion. Later they were used by members of government to act as back channels, often doing end runs around the official diplomatic efforts, giving European dictators mixed impressions and conflicting information. While Bouverie's account details a compelling initial case for appeasement, it is far from being an apologia for the prime minister Chamberlain, who claimed that his 1938 meeting with Hitler would ensure peace. Much is made of those dissenters who proved correct (Churchill, most famously), and of several instances where Germany could have been stopped long before the annexation of the Sudetenland. The result is a portrait of a government and foreign policy so inept that you can almost hear the Benny Hill theme in the background. Bouverie's narrow and deep focus, coupled with his accessible writing style, earns a space in the crowded field of WWII titles.--Jennifer Rothschild Copyright 2010 Booklist

From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.

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Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

In this meticulous work, British journalist Bouverie provides a blow-by-blow recounting of Britain's accommodation to Nazi Germany's rearmament, beginning with the obvious observation that "the desire to avoid a second world war was perhaps the most understandable and universal wish in human history." He convincingly argues that the failure of strong, consistent diplomatic efforts greatly contributed to the century's great conflagration. Many British establishment figures of the time come in for fair and sometimes harsh criticism as Bouverie charts the descent toward war. Conservative Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Foreign Secretary John Simon, and, of course, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, architect of the 1938 Munich agreement that caved to Hitler's expansionism because it promised "peace for our time," receive deserved criticism. So do the many upper-class, right-leaning "amateur diplomats" who tried to build relations with Hitler. According to Bouverie, they wanted to believe that Hitler's objectives were modest and feared that rearmament was unaffordable and would escalate tensions. Bouverie manages to convey how outside the mainstream Churchill's anti-Hitler views were for much of the mid-1930s, and how dimly his WWI record was viewed by his foes in the Conservative Party. His reconstruction is both clear-eyed and well-paced. This intelligent study of British prewar diplomacy will keep readers rapt. (June)

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Review by Library Journal Review

Could Hitler have been halted before rampaging Europe? Why did England believe they could manage the Third Reich without military force? These are questions Bouverie (Appeasing Hitler) answers thoroughly and decisively in this latest work. Appeasement, per the book's title, was a notion that Germany in the 1930s could simply be controlled. Bouverie meticulously details the rise and aggression of Hitler through the lens of British politicians, diplomats, and powerbrokers. The author argues that some foresaw Hitler for the despot he was, but many, most notably British prime minister Neville Chamberlain, could not fathom that Hitler's motives were so malevolent and cruel. Readers get a full view of this extensive failure from backroom dealings to the floor of parliament. Many know of how Chamberlain's successor, Winston Churchill, rose to glory in helping to defeat Hitler. Bouverie's history looks at individuals shying away from making difficult decisions in order to see what was right in front of them, with the goal of pinpointing the reasons why England waited so long to act. VERDICT History readers, particularly of the 20th century, will appreciate Bouverie's relentless pursuit of answers to the question, "Why?"--Keith Klang, Port Washington P.L., NY

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Review by Kirkus Book Review

Illuminating study of the complex political calculus underlying Britain's effort to avoid armed conflict with Nazi Germany in the late 1930s.Most of the conservative leadership in Britain was aware from the start, if only dimly, that Hitler and his Nazis posed an existential threat to world order. Yet, after the bloodletting of World War I, writes Bouverie in this accomplished debut, there was no appetite for war, so that "the idea of a preventive war' to halt German rearmament was...beyond the realm even of discussion." Even though most members of the political class found official Nazi anti-Semitism appalling, "there was a tendency amongst some to find excuses for it." As a result, Britain stood by, acceding to German demands up to and including the annexation of a portion of Czechoslovakia with a large ethnic German population. As the author notes, that act of aggression was greeted enthusiastically by some Sudeten Germans but certainly not by the leftists, Jews, and members of other ethnic minorities who lived there. Hitler promised Britain's prime minister that if his government met Germany's " limited' colonial demands," there would be no further friction, but then came the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of World War II. Examining a trove of unexplored documents, Bouverie turns a gimlet eye on excuses proffered in the aftermath, such as the thought that the year of peace bought by the appeasement of 1938 gave Britain time to prepare for war; as he notes, it also bought Germany an extra year to build up its forces against the numerically superior French and British armies. The author faults Chamberlain, too, for having "treated the United States with frigid disdain" when a stronger alliance might have averted some of Hitler's mischief, though he does not doubt the purity of Chamberlain's intentions to preserve the British Empire and keep the peace.A story with many moving parts and players that's expertly told, one that sheds new light on the first glimmerings of total war. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

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***This excerpt is from an advance uncorrected copy proof*** PROLOGUE The desire to avoid a second world war was perhaps the most understandable and universal wish in history. More than 16.5 million people died during the First World War. The British lost 723,000; the French 1.7 million; the Russians 1.8 million; the British Empire 230,000; the Germans over 2 million. Twenty thousand British soldiers died on the first day of the Battle of the Somme, while the ossuary at Douaumont contains the bones of some 130,000 French and German soldiers--a mere sixth of those killed during the 302-day Battle of Verdun. Among the survivors there was scarcely a soul that was not affected. Almost everyone had a father, husband, son, brother, cousin, fiancé or friend killed or maimed. When it was over, not even the victors could feel victorious. The Cenotaph, unveiled on Whitehall on June 19, 1919, was no Arc de Triomphe but a symbol of loss. Every Armistice Day, thousands of Britons shuffled past it in mournful silence, while, on both sides of the Channel, schools, villages, towns and railway stations commemorated friends and colleagues with their own memorials. In the years that followed the mantra was as consistent as it was determined: "Never again!" But it did happen again. Despite the best of intentions and efforts aimed at both conciliation and deterrence, the British and French found themselves at war with the same adversary a mere twenty-one years after the "war to end all wars." The purpose of this book is to contribute to our understanding of how this happened. The debate over appeasement--the attempt by Britain and France to avoid war by making "reasonable" concessions to German and Italian grievances during the 1930s--is as enduring as it is contentious. Condemned, on the one hand, as a "moral and material disaster," responsible for the deadliest conflict in history, it has also been described as "a noble idea, rooted in Christianity, courage and common-sense." Between these two polarities lies a mass of nuance, sub-arguments and historical skirmishes. History is rarely clear-cut, and yet the so-called lessons of the period have been invoked by politicians and pundits, particularly in Britain and the United States, to justify a range of foreign interventions--in Korea, Suez, Cuba, Vietnam, the Falklands, Kosovo and Iraq (twice)--while, conversely, any attempt to reach an accord with a former antagonist is invariably compared with the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement. When I began researching this book, in the spring of 2016, the specter of Neville Chamberlain was being invoked by American conservatives as part of their campaign against President Obama's nuclear deal with Iran, while today the concept of appeasement is gaining new currency as the West struggles to respond to Russian revanchism and aggression. A fresh consideration of this policy as it was originally conceived and executed feels, therefore, timely as well as justified. There is, of course, already a considerable body of literature on this subject--though neither as extensive nor as up to date as is sometimes assumed. Indeed, while books on the Second World War have multiplied over the last twenty years, the build-up and causes of that catastrophe have been relatively neglected. Furthermore, while there have been many excellent books on appeasement, most of them have tended to focus on a particular event, such as Munich, or a particular person, such as Neville Chamberlain. What I wanted to do, by contrast, was to write a book which covered the entire period--from Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor to the end of the "Phoney War"--to see how the policy developed and attitudes changed. I also wanted to consider a broader canvas than that merely encompassing the principal protagonists. The desire to avoid war by reaching a modus vivendi with the dictator states extended well beyond the confines of government and, therefore, while the characters of Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Daladier and Roosevelt are central to this story, I have also examined the actions of lesser-known figures, in particular the amateur diplomats. Finally, I wanted to write a narrative history which captured the uncertainty, drama and dilemmas of the period. Thus, while there is commentary and analysis throughout, my main purpose was to construct a chronological narrative, based on diaries, letters, newspaper articles and diplomatic dispatches, which guides the reader through these turbulent years. In pursuit of this, I have been fortunate to have had access to over forty collections of private papers--several of which yielded exciting new material. Not wishing to disrupt my narrative, I have not highlighted these finds in the text but, where possible, have favored unpublished over published sources in respect of both length and frequency. A book on international relations naturally has an international scope. Yet this is primarily a book about British politics, British society, British diplomacy. Strange as it may now seem, Britain was still nominally the most powerful country in the world in the 1930s--the proud center of an empire covering a quarter of the globe. That America was the coming power was obvious. But the United States had retreated into isolationism in the aftermath of the First World War, while France--the only other power capable of curtailing German ambitions--chose to surrender the diplomatic and military initiative in favor of British leadership. Thus, while the British would have preferred not to become entangled in the problems of the Continent, they realized that they were, and were perceived as, the only power capable of providing the diplomatic, moral and military leadership necessary to halt Hitler and his bid for European hegemony. Within Britain, the choices that would affect not only that country but potentially the entire world were made by a remarkably small number of people. As such, the following pages may seem like the ultimate vindication of the "high-politics" school of history. Yet these men (and they were almost exclusively men) were not acting in a vacuum. Acutely conscious of political, financial, military and diplomatic constraints--both real and imagined--Britain's political leaders were no less considerate of public opinion. In an age when opinion polls were in their infancy this was a naturally amorphous concept. Yet exist it did--divined from letters to newspapers, constituency correspondence and conversations--and was treated with the utmost seriousness. For the majority of the 1930s the democratically elected leaders of Britain and France were convinced that their populations would not support a policy which risked war, and acted accordingly. But what if war was unavoidable? What if Hitler proved insatiable? And what if the very desire to avoid it made war more likely? Excerpted from Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War by Tim Bouverie All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.

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