The return of Marco Polo's world War, strategy, and American interests in the twenty-first century

Robert D. Kaplan, 1952-

Book - 2018

"A bracing assessment of U.S. foreign policy and world disorder over the past two decades, anchored by a major new Pentagon-commissioned essay about changing power dynamics among China, Eurasia, and America--from the renowned geopolitical analyst and bestselling author of The Revenge of Geography and The Coming Anarchy. In the late thirteenth century, Marco Polo began a decades-long trek from Venice to China. The strength of that Silk Road--the trade route between Europe and Asia--was a foundation of Kublai Khan's sprawling empire. Now, in the early twenty-first century, the Chinese regime has proposed a land-and-maritime Silk Road that duplicates exactly the route Marco Polo traveled. In the major lead essay, recently released by... the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment, Robert D. Kaplan lays out a blueprint of the world's changing power politics that recalls the late thirteenth century. As Europe fractures from changes in culture and migration, Eurasia coheres into a single conflict system. China is constructing a land bridge to Europe. Iran and India are trying to link the oil fields of Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. America's ability to influence the power balance in Eurasia is declining. This is Kaplan's first collection of essays since his classic The Coming Anarchy was published in 2000. Drawing on decades of firsthand experience as a foreign correspondent and military embed for The Atlantic, as well as encounters with preeminent realist thinkers, Kaplan outlines the timeless principles that should shape America's role in a turbulent world: a respect for the limits of Western-style democracy; a delineation between American interests and American values; an awareness of the psychological toll of warfare; a projection of power via a strong navy; and more. From Kaplan's immediate thoughts on President Trump ("On Foreign Policy, Donald Trump Is No Realist," 2016) to a frank examination of what will happen in the event of war with North Korea ("When North Korea Falls," 2006), The Return of Marco Polo's World is a vigorous and honest reckoning with the difficult choices the United States will face in the years ahead."--

Saved in:

2nd Floor Show me where

327.73/Kaplan
1 / 1 copies available
Location Call Number   Status
2nd Floor 327.73/Kaplan Checked In
Subjects
Genres
Essays
Published
New York : Random House [2018]
Language
English
Main Author
Robert D. Kaplan, 1952- (author)
Edition
First edition
Physical Description
xiv, 280 pages ; 25 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN
9780812996791
  • Preface and Acknowledgments
  • Strategy
  • 1. The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response
  • 2. The Art of Avoiding War
  • 3. The Tragedy of U.S. Foreign Policy
  • 4. Elegant Decline: The Navy's Rising Importance
  • 5. When North Korea Falls
  • War and Its Costs
  • 6. Rereading Vietnam
  • 7. Iraq: The Counterfactual Game
  • 8. The Wounded Home Front
  • 9. No Greater Honor
  • Thinkers
  • 10. In Defense of Henry Kissinger
  • 11. Samuel Huntington: Looking the World in the Eye
  • 12. Why John Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things)
  • Reflections
  • 13. On Foreign Policy, Donald Trump Is No Realist
  • 14. The Post-Imperial Moment
  • 15. Fated to Lead
  • 16. The Great Danger of a New Utopianism
  • Marco Polo Redux
  • 17. Traveling China's New Silk Road
  • Index
Review by New York Times Review

THE 1990S: Remember them? The decade began with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It ended with the Dow bursting past the 10,000 mark. In between, we got victory in the gulf, the creation of the European Union and the World Trade Organization, NATO enlargement, an American budget surplus, peace in Northern Ireland, Google, victory in the Balkans and (Charles Barkley aside) a world firmly united in wanting to be "like Mike." Good times. Or so they seemed. In 1994, Robert D. Kaplan, a foreign correspondent who had cut his teeth covering the Balkans, the Iran-Iraq war and the famine in Ethiopia, wrote an influential essay in The Atlantic warning of "The Coming Anarchy." If, as Francis Fukuyama thought, we had entered a "posthistorical" era of bourgeois comfort and democratic legitimacy, it was an era whose bounties relatively few shared. The rest, Kaplan wrote, "will be stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till and space to survive in." History has not vindicated every aspect of Kaplan's thesis - Pakistan and India, for instance, haven't fallen apart, despite the essay's suggestion that they might, and most measures of human welfare continue to show progress. But his general pessimism about the world that lay in wait in the 21st century now looks remarkably prescient, at least next to the Pollyannaish forecasts of techno-optimists, democracy promoters and globalization enthusiasts. That's reason to welcome "The Return of Marco Polo's World," an eclectic collection of elegant and humane essays, all but one of which previously appeared in The Atlantic and other publications over the past dozen or so years. Kaplan's interests run wide: the ethnic tangles of Central Asia; the political thought of Samuel Huntington; the unsung heroism of Medal of Honor winners; the prospect of war on the Korean Peninsula. Above all there is his fascination with the decisive impact of geography on the calculations, ambitions and illusions of statesmen and societies. Take the Mediterranean. For half a millennium, it mostly separated not only two continents but also two civilizations: Christendom and Islam. Yet the collapse of political order throughout much of the Maghreb has reminded millions of Africans that the Middle Sea isn't so wide after all. Thousands have drowned trying to cross it; many more have succeeded, with cumulative effects on what we used to think of as European society. "We are back to a much older cartography that recalls the High Middle Ages, in which 'the East' did not begin in any one particular place because regions overlapped and were more vaguely defined," Kaplan writes. "The dichotomy of the Orient and the Occident is breaking down the world over, even as subtle gradations continue to persist." What's true in the Mediterranean basin is true in other places, too - and in other ways. Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine (and the West's de facto acquiescence in it) is the most visible evidence of the flimsiness of the post-Cold War's national borders. But what about covert Russian influence peddling in places like Bulgaria; or overt influence peddling through the Russia Today "news" channel; or cyberoperations, via Twitter and Facebook, to disrupt and undermine Western elections? After the Cold War, many of us naively assumed that the communications revolution would be the vehicle through which the West would spread its values, attitudes and tastes to the rest of the world. We forgot that the revolution worked in the opposite direction as well: that for every Google executive fighting for political liberalization in Cairo, there might also be an alienated young Islamist in the West learning how to build a bomb by reading Inspire, A1 Qaeda's slick online magazine. Kaplan never loses sight of this fluidity: "The smaller the world actually becomes because of the advance of technology," he writes, "the more permeable, complicated and overwhelming it seems, with its numberless, seemingly intractable crises that are all entwined." That is the world's reality - crooked, unexpected, ironic and often tragic - and it leads Kaplan to his capital-R Realist foreign-policy inclinations. It's a subject he explores in chapter-length profiles of Henry Kissinger, Huntington and the University of Chicago's John J. Mearsheimer (whose 2001 magnum opus, "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," was later overshadowed by his tendentious and bigoted screed, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," written with Stephen M. Walt). Kaplan makes clear that, at its best, Realism provides American statesmen with a middle path between what Kissinger once called "the disastrous oscillations between overcommitment and isolation." This is what guided the Nixon administration as it sought to get out of Vietnam in a way that preserved America's reputation as a reliable ally, while also securing a balance of power (through the opening with China) that would help see the United States through the Cold War. That Kissinger was willing to do this in ways that scandalized moralistic American liberals is more than fine by Kaplan. "Ensuring a nation's survival sometimes leaves tragically little room for private morality," he argues. "The rare individuals who have recognized the necessity of violating such morality, acted accordingly and taken responsibility for their actions are among the most necessary leaders for their countries, even as they have caused great unease among generations of wellmeaning intellectuals who, free of the burden of real-world bureaucratic responsibility, make choices in the abstract and treat morality as an inflexible absolute." There is much truth in that observation: Foreign policy is not merely a subset of ethics. Yet Realism also has limits that its practitioners can fail to appreciate. If it offers a powerful caution against overdosing on the kind of idealism that led us into nation-building exercises in Vietnam and Iraq, it can also keep statesmen from grasping their opportunities. Many Realists were scandalized by Ronald Reagan's belief that the Cold War could be won. He proved to be right, in part because he understood the moral dimensions of the struggle against Communism better than they did; and in part, too, because sometimes there really is a good case for optimism. Realists can also fail to grasp the power of ideology to shape the behavior of states, often in ways that deform or disregard their own interests. Iran, for instance, has no rational reason to threaten Israel, with which it shares ancient cultural bonds and current enemies. Yet Tehran threatens Israel as a matter of theological conviction, Realpolitik be damned. It is the very rationalism of much of what goes by the name Realism that undermines its claims to understand the world as it really is. Kaplan gets this: "A student of Shakespeare," he writes, "would have grasped Vladimir Putin's character long before an international relations wonk." Geography may be the immutable fact of geopolitics, but geopolitics is still politics, and thus a human story. This makes one of Kaplan's final chapters, on the dangers of a new utopianism, all the more chilling. We may think we've put Orwell's "Big Brother" behind us, but the psychological conditions that gave rise to fascism and Communism are very much with us today. "The very idea that some sermon or blog or tweet has gone viral is a sad reflection on the state of individualism in the 21st century," he says. "The electronic swarm is a negation of loneliness that prepares the way for the new ideologies of totalitarianism." It's a dark prophecy from an observer with a depressingly accurate record of predictions. When it comes to curbing our enthusiasms, Kaplan's achievement is to throw so much shade with so much verve. That Kissinger did things that scandalized moralistic American liberals is more them fíne by Kapiem. BRET Stephens is a columnist for The Times.

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [August 30, 2019]
Review by Booklist Review

In his new collection of essays, best-selling foreign-affairs scholar and travel-writer Kaplan (Earning the Rockies, 2017) considers geopolitical developments since the end of the Cold War and urges a reinvigorated realpolitik in response to emerging foreign policy challenges. His bleak but lucid core thesis is that the power dynamics of the future may look less like those of the Eurocentric twentieth century and more like those of the distant past. Wealth and influence, he argues, will be increasingly concentrated in Asia as the supercontinent of Eurasia becomes the all-important battlespace of trade and conflict, and empire will reassert its primacy as the organizing principle of world affairs. Vulnerable to environmental and migratory pressures, and whipsawed by constant technological change, democratic nation-states will struggle to manage the basics of governance. Anarchy and utopianism, not tyranny by the state, will be the greatest threats. On adjacent fronts, Kaplan offers reverent yet nuanced profiles of Henry Kissinger and Samuel Huntington, and, in Rereading Vietnam, a thoughtful appraisal of some war memoirs. An astute, powerfully stated, and bracing presentation.--Driscoll, Brendan Copyright 2018 Booklist

From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

This volume compiles 16 major essays on America's foreign policy from national security commentator Kaplan (Earning the Rockies). All but one were originally published in outlets such as the Atlantic and National Interest. The title essay was originally written for the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment. In the first section, entitled "Strategy," Kaplan argues that, since the end of the Cold War, the globe's map has fundamentally changed: "Europe disappears, Eurasia coheres." The result is an "increasingly crowded and interconnected world" whose linkages are becoming so complex that the U.S. will be unable to exert pressure in the ways it has since WWII. Kaplan applies and supports these ideas in case studies of Vietnam and Iraq, asserting that the extravagant cost of maintaining maritime supremacy in the new world structure is leading to the "elegant decline" of America's military might. Further sections delve into the experience of soldiers ("War and Its Costs"), appreciatively profile political scientists ("Thinkers"), and comment on the developments of the last few years ("Reflections" and "Marco Polo Redux"). Such wide horizons, and Kaplan's decision not to update the previously published essays, preclude a central line of argument. The result is instead an overview of thoughtful, multilayered positions and perspectives evolving through changing circumstances. Agent: Gail Hochman, Brandt & Hochman Literary Agents. (Mar.) © Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.


Review by Library Journal Review

Atlantic contributing editor and member of the U.S. Navy's Executive Panel, -Kaplan (The Coming Anarchy) explains through 16 essays the world's changing balance of power as a result of cultural shifts, migration, and the redistribution and availability of resources. The essays are largely focused on American interests and involvement on the world political stage, possible U.S. military involvement, and recommendations for preserving power. Kaplan makes some insightful observations, and his command and understanding of world historical precedent makes many of these writings truly fascinating. His recommendations are generally hawkish (or "realist"), highlighting the need for a strong and conspicuous Navy, as well as professing the inevitability of war. However, regardless of one's political leanings or thoughts regarding the necessity of war, Kaplan's recommendations are firmly backed by historical citations and a keen understanding of the current political landscape. All in all, this is much more a book about military strategy and positioning than politics, although the author does touch on (then president-elect) Donald Trump's posturing as a "foreign policy realist" before demonstrating why he is in fact nothing of the sort. VERDICT Recommended for readers of political science, world history, military history, current affairs, and American history. [See Prepub Alert, 9/25/17.]-Benjamin Brudner, Curry Coll. Lib., Milton, MA © Copyright 2018. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review

The veteran political affairs journalist returns with a collection of essays that have been published in the Atlantic, the Washington Post, the National Interest, and other venues.Thoughtful, unsettling, but not apocalyptic analyses of world affairs flow steadily off the presses, and this is a superior example. Over the years, Kaplan (Earning the Rockies: How Geography Shapes America's Role in the World, 2017), a senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, has written several. Except for a long, insightful first chapter, these essays appeared between one and 15 years ago, so they say nothing about the post-Trump world, but few have aged poorly. Marco Polo claimed to travel from Italy to China across central Asia, returning over the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. To Kaplan, this journey encompassed the great Eurasian land mass whose faded empires (Turkey, Iran), rising imperial powers (Russia, China), and failed states (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, etc.) have replaced Europe as the area most critical to American interests. Although aware, American leaders still continue to get it wrong. After apologizing for getting it wrong himselfhe supported invasions of Iraq and AfghanistanKaplan devotes most essays to explaining the proper approach. A "realist" la his hero, Henry Kissinger, Kaplan maintains that Americans must lead the world only because, if we don't, another great power will step in. He emphasizes that today's greatest international threat is not tyranny but anarchy. Nations need effective government more than free elections; in its absence, American efforts to promote democracy through military (Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam) or quasi-military means (Libya, Syria) always fail.Enough time has passed for some of Kaplan's forecasts to develop crackse.g., China has not yet stumbledbut much rings true, and all are presented with enough verve and insight to tempt readers to set it aside to reread in a few years. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

STRATEGY 1. The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S. Military Response As Europe Disappears, Eurasia Coheres. The supercontinent is becoming one fluid, comprehensible unit of trade and conflict, as the Westphalian system of states weakens and older, imperial legacies--Russian, Chinese, Iranian, Turkish--become paramount. Every crisis from Central Europe to the ethnic-Han Chinese heartland is now interlinked. There is one singular battle space. What follows is an historical and geographical guide to it. The Dispersion of the West Never before in history did Western civilization reach such a point of geopolitical concision and raw power as during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. For well over half a century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) condensed a millennia-long tradition of political and moral values--the West, in shorthand--into a robust military alliance. NATO was a cultural phenomenon before it was anything. Its spiritual roots reach back to the philosophical and administrative legacies of Greece and Rome, to the emergence of Christendom in the early Middle Ages, and to the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--from which the ideas of the American Revolution emerged. Of course, key nations of the West fought as an alliance in the First and Second World Wars, and those emergency contingencies constituted forerunners to NATO's more secure and elaborate structures. Such structures, in turn, were buttressed by a continent-wide economic system, culminating in the European Union (EU). The EU gave both political support and quotidian substance to the values inherent in NATO--those values being, generally, the rule of law over arbitrary fiat, legal states over ethnic nations, and the protection of the individual no matter his race or religion. Democracy, after all, is less about elections than about impartial institutions. The end of the Long European War, 1914-89, saw those values reign triumphant, as communism was finally defeated and NATO and the EU extended their systems throughout Central and Eastern Europe, from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south. And it categorically was a long European war, as wartime deprivations, political and economic, existed in Soviet satellite states until 1989, when the West triumphed over Europe's second totalitarian system, just as it did over the first in 1945. Civilizations often prosper in opposition to others. Just as Christendom achieved form and substance in opposition to Islam after the latter's conquest of North Africa and the Levant in the seventh and eighth centuries, the West forged a definitive geopolitical paradigm in opposition to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. And because the aftershocks of the Long European War extended to the very end of the twentieth century, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and chaos inside Russia, NATO and the EU remained as relevant as ever, with NATO demonstrating its expeditionary capability in the case of Yugoslavia, and the EU building inroads into the former Warsaw Pact to take advantage of Russia's infirmity. This era was called the Post Cold War--that is, it was defined in terms of what came before it and what still continued to influence it. The Long European War, which lasted three-quarters of a century, influences events still, and constitutes my entry point for describing a new world far beyond Europe that the U.S. military now must grapple with. And because Europe's current predicament constitutes an introduction to that new world, I begin with it. It was the monumental devastation of two world wars that led European elites, beginning in the late 1940s, to reject the past altogether, with all of its inherent cultural and ethnic divisions. Only the abstract ideals of the Enlightenment were preserved, which in turn led to political engineering and economic experimentation, so that the specific moral response to the human suffering of 1914-18 and 1939-45 was the establishment of generous social-welfare states, which meant highly regulated economies. As for the national-political conflicts that gave birth to the two world wars, they would not be repeated because, in addition to other aspects of supranational cooperation, European elites imposed a single monetary unit on much of the continent. Except in the most disciplined northern European societies, however, those social-welfare states have proven unaffordable, just as the single currency has caused the weaker economies of southern Europe to pile up massive debt. Alas, the post-World War II attempt at moral redemption has led over time to an intractable form of economic and political hell. The irony deepens. Europe's dull and happy decades in the second half of the twentieth century were partially born of its demographic separation from the Muslim Middle East. This, too, was a product of the Cold War phase of the Long European War, when totalitarian prison-states in such places as Libya, Syria, and Iraq were propped up for decades by Soviet advice and support, and afterward took on a life of their own. For a long time Europe was lucky in this regard: It could reject power politics and preach human rights precisely because tens of millions of Muslims nearby were being denied human rights, and with them the freedom of movement. But those Muslim prison-states have all but collapsed (either on their own or by outside interference), unleashing a tide of refugees into debt-ridden and economically stagnant European societies. Europe now fractures from within as reactionary populism takes hold, and new borders go up throughout the continent to prevent the movement of Muslim refugees from one country to another. Meanwhile, Europe dissolves from without, as it is reunited with the destiny of Afro-Eurasia as a whole. All this follows naturally from geography and history. For centuries in early and middle antiquity, Europe meant the entire Mediterranean Basin, or Mare Nostrum ("Our Sea") as the Romans famously called it, which included North Africa until the Arab invasion of Late Antiquity. This underlying reality never actually went away: In the mid-twentieth century, the French geographer Fernand Braudel intimated that Europe's real southern border was not Italy or Greece, but the Sahara Desert, where caravans of migrants now assemble for the journey north. Europe, at least in the way that we have known it, has begun to vanish. And with it the West itself--at least as a sharply defined geopolitical force--also loses substantial definition. Of course, the West as a civilizational concept has been in crisis for quite some time. The very obvious fact that courses in Western civilization are increasingly rare and controversial on most college campuses in the United States indicates the effect of multiculturalism in a world of intensified cosmopolitan interactions. Noting how Rome only partially inherited the ideals of Greece, and how the Middle Ages virtually lost the ideals of Rome, the nineteenth-century liberal Russian intellectual Alexander Herzen observed that "[m]odern Western thought will pass into history and be incorporated in it, will have its influence and its place, just as our body will pass into the composition of grass, of sheep, of cutlets, and of men. We do not like that kind of immortality, but what is to be done about it?" Indeed, Western civilization is not being destroyed; rather, it is being diluted and dispersed. After all, how exactly does one define globalization? Beyond the breakdown of economic borders, it is the worldwide adoption of the American form of capitalism and management practices that, merging with the advance of human rights (another Western concept), has allowed for the most eclectic forms of cultural combinations, wearing down in turn the historical division between East and West. Having won the Long European War, the West, rather than go on to conquer the rest of the world, is now beginning to lose itself in what Reinhold Niebuhr called "a vast web of history." The decomposition that Herzen spoke of has begun. A New Strategic Geography As Europe disappears, Eurasia coheres. I do not mean to say that Eurasia is becoming unified, or even stable in the manner that Europe was during the Cold War and the Post Cold War--only that the interactions of globalization, technology, and geopolitics, with each reinforcing the other, are leading the Eurasian supercontinent to become, analytically speaking, one fluid and comprehensible unit. Eurasia simply has meaning in the way that it didn't use to. Moreover, because of the reunification of the Mediterranean Basin, evinced by refugees from North Africa and the Levant flooding Europe, and because of dramatically increased interactions across the Indian Ocean from Indochina to East Africa, we may now speak of Afro-Eurasia in one breath. The term "World-Island," early-twentieth-century British geographer Halford Mackinder's phrase for Eurasia joined with Africa, is no longer premature. The slowly vanishing West abets this development by depositing its seeds of unity into an emerging global culture that spans continents. Further encouraging this process is the erosion of distance by way of technology: new roads, bridges, ports, airplanes, massive container ships, and fiber-optic cables. It is important, though, to realize that all this constitutes only one layer of what is happening, for there are more troubling changes, too. Precisely because religion and culture are being weakened by globalization, they have to be reinvented in more severe, monochromatic, and ideological form by way of the communications revolution. Witness Boko Haram and the Islamic State, which do not represent Islam per se, but Islam igniting with the tyrannical conformity and mass hysteria inspired by the Internet and social media. As I have written previously, it isn't the so-called clash of civilizations that is taking place, but the clash of artificially reconstructed civilizations. And this only hardens geopolitical divides, which, as the collapse of Middle East prison states indicates, are in evidence not only between states but within states themselves. The combination of violent upheavals and the communications revolution in all its aspects--from cyber interactions to new transportation infrastructure--has wrought a more claustrophobic and ferociously contested world: a world in which territory still matters, and where every crisis interacts with every other as never before. This is all intensified by the expansion of megacities and absolute rises in population. No matter how overcrowded, no matter how much the underground water table and nutrients in the soil have been depleted, people will fight for every patch of ground. On this violent and interactive earth, the neat divisions of Cold War area studies and of continents and subcontinents are starting to be erased as the Long European War passes from living memory. Europe, North Africa, the Near East, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian subcontinent are destined to have less and less meaning as geopolitical concepts. Instead, because of the erosion of both hard boundaries and cultural differences, the map will manifest a continuity of subtle gradations, which begin in Central Europe and the Adriatic, and end beyond the Gobi Desert where the agricultural cradle of Chinese civilization begins. Geography counts, but legal borders will matter less so. This world will be increasingly bound by formal obligations that exist both above and below the level of government, a situation that recalls the functionality of feudalism. Just as the medieval Al-Andalus region in Spain and Portugal saw a rich confection of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian civilizations, where the Arabs ruled but forced conversions to Islam did not occur, this emerging world--outside of conflict zones, of course--will be one of tolerance and pungent cultural mixes, into which the liberal spirit of the West will dissolve and only in that way have its place. As for the regional conflicts, they almost always will have global implications, owing to how every part of the earth is now increasingly interwoven with every other part. To wit, local conflicts involving Iran, Russia, and China over the decades have led to terrorist and cyber attacks on Europe and the Americas. Geographical divisions will be both greater and lesser than in the twentieth century. They will be greater because sovereignties will multiply; that is, a plethora of city-states and region-states will emerge from within existing states themselves to achieve more consequence, even as a supranational organization like the EU wanes and one like ASEAN is destined to have little meaning in a world of intimidation and power. Geographical divisions also will be lesser because the differences--and particularly the degree of separation--between regions like Europe and the Middle East, the Middle East and South Asia, and South Asia and East Asia will decline. The map will become more fluid and baroque, in other words, but with the same pattern repeating itself. And this same pattern will be encouraged by both the profusion and hardening of roads, railways, pipelines, and fiber-optic cables. Obviously, transportation infrastructure will not defeat geography. Indeed, the very expense of building such infrastructure in many places demonstrates the undeniable fact of geography. Anyone in the energy exploration business, or who has participated in a war game involving the Baltic states or the South China Sea, knows just how much old-fashioned geography still matters. At the same time, critical transportation infrastructure constitutes yet another factor making geography--and, by inference, geopolitics in our era--more oppressive and claustrophobic. To be sure, connectivity, rather than simply leading to more peace, prosperity, and cultural uniformity as techno-optimists like to claim, will have a much more ambiguous legacy. With more connectivity, the stakes for war will be greater, and the ease in which wars can proliferate from one geographic area to another will also be greater. Corporations will be the beneficiaries of this new world, but being (for the most part) unable to provide security, they will ultimately not be in control. Nothing is more illustrative of this process than the Chinese government's attempts to build a land bridge across Central and West Asia to Europe, and a maritime network across the Indian Ocean from East Asia to the Middle East. These land and sea conduits may themselves be interlinked, as China and Pakistan, as well as Iran and India, hope to join the oil and natural gas fields of distant, landlocked Central Asia with the Indian Ocean to the south. China is branding these infrastructure projects "One Belt, One Road"--in effect, a new Silk Road. The medieval Silk Road was not a single route but a vast and casual trading network, tenuously linking Europe with China both overland and across the Indian Ocean. (The Silk Road was only named as such--the Seidenstrasse--in the late nineteenth century by a German geographer, Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen.) The relative eclectic and multicultural nature of the Silk Road during the Middle Ages meant, according to historian Laurence Bergreen, that it was "no place for orthodoxy or single-mindedness." Medieval travelers on the Silk Road encountered a world that was, furthermore, "complex, tumultuous, and menacing, but nonetheless porous." Consequently, with each new traveler's account, Europeans saw the world not as "smaller and more manageable," but as "bigger and more chaotic." This is a perfect description of our own time, in which the smaller the world actually becomes because of the advance of technology, the more permeable, complicated, and overwhelming it seems, with its numberless, seemingly intractable crises that are all entwined. The late-thirteenth-century Venetian merchant Marco Polo, who traveled the length and breadth of the Silk Road, is most famously associated with this world. And the route he traveled provides as good an outline as any for defining the geopolitics of Eurasia in the coming era. Excerpted from The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century by Robert D. Kaplan All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.