Rise and kill first The secret history of Israel's targeted assassinations

Ronen Bergman

Book - 2018

Presents an assessment of Israel's state-sponsored assassination programs that evaluates the protective beliefs that are instituted into every Israeli citizen, the role of assassination in the state's history, and the ethical challenges of Israel's policies on targeted killings.

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Subjects
Published
New York : Random House [2018]
Language
English
Hebrew
Main Author
Ronen Bergman (author)
Other Authors
Ronnie Hope (translator)
Edition
First edition
Physical Description
xxiv, 753 pages, 32 unnumbered pages of plates : illustrations (some color) ; 25 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 637-725) and index.
ISBN
9781400069712
  • A Note on the Sources
  • Prologue
  • 1. In Blood and Fire
  • 2. A Secret World is Born
  • 3. The Bureau for Arranging Meetings with God
  • 4. The Entire Supreme Command, With One Blow
  • 5. "As if the Sky Were Falling On Our Heads"
  • 6. A Series of Catastrophes
  • 7. "Armed Struggle is the Only Way to Liberate Palestine"
  • 8. Meir Dagan and his Expertise
  • 9. The Plo Goes International
  • 10. "I Have No Problem With Anyone That I've Killed"
  • 11. "Wrong Identification of a Target is Not a Failure. It's a Mistake."
  • 12. Hubris
  • 13. Death in the Toothpaste
  • 14. A Pack of Wild Dogs
  • 15. "Abu Nidal, Abu Shmidal"
  • 16. Black Flag
  • 17. The Shin Bet Coup
  • 18. Then Came a Spark
  • 19. Intifada
  • 20. Nebuchadnezzar
  • 21. Green Storm Rising
  • 22. The Age of the Drone
  • 23. Mughniyeh's Revenge
  • 24. "Just One Switch, Off and On"
  • 25. "Bring Us the Head of Ayyash"
  • 26. "Sly as a Snake, Naive as a Little Child"
  • 27. A Low Point
  • 28. All-Out War
  • 29. "More Suicide Bombers than Explosive Vests"
  • 30. "The Target Has Been Eliminated, But the Operation Failed"
  • 31. The Rebellion in Unit 8200
  • 32. Picking Anemones
  • 33. The Radical Front
  • 34. Killing Maurice
  • 35. Impressive Tactical Success, Disastrous Strategic Failure
  • Acknowledgments
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Index
Review by New York Times Review

one of the very first things I was taught when I joined the C.I.A. was that we do not conduct assassinations. It was drilled into new recruits over and over again. Today, it seems that all that is left of this policy is a euphemism. We don't call them assassinations anymore. Now, they are "targeted killings," most often performed by drone strike, and they have become America's go-to weapon in the war on terror. There have been many who have objected, claiming that the killings inspire more attacks on the United States, complicate our diplomacy and undermine our moral authority in the world. Yet the targeted killings drone on with no end in sight. Just counting the campaigns in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the Bush administration conducted at least 47 targeted killings by drones, while under the Obama administration that number rose to 542. America's difficult relationship with targeted killing and the dilemmas we may face in the future are beautifully illuminated by the longer story of Israel's experiences with assassination in its own endless war against terrorism. Israel has always been just a bit farther down this slippery slope than the United States. If we're willing, we can learn where the bumps are along the way by watching the Israelis careening ahead of us. Americans now have a terrific new introduction to that story with the publication of Ronen Bergman's "Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations." It's easy to understand why Bergman's book is already a best seller. It moves at a torrid pace and tells stories that would make Jason Bourne sit up and say " Wow! " It is smart, thoughtful and balanced, and the English translation is superb. It deserves all of the plaudits it has already received. A word of warning: Bergman is properly focused on the narrow story of Israel's targeted killings. Other aspects of its lifelong counterterrorism struggle are largely absent. For instance, Israel's "security barriers" against the West Bank and Gaza, highly controversial and highly successful, are not even mentioned. For those looking for a more comprehensive account, try Daniel Byman's outstanding "A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism," or Ami Pedahzur's older but still insightful "The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism." Yet the biggest thing (almost) left out of Bergman's book is that targeted killing offers no end to the terrorism. Targeted killings are a tactic, not a strategy. Only at the very end of "Rise and Kill First" is this problem confronted, and only because Bergman himself puts it squarely on the table before finishing his narrative. That's a compliment, not a criticism of Bergman, because it reflects the inability of Israel's own national security community to solve this problem, and too often even to acknowledge it. What Bergman demonstrates is that targeted killing can be a highly effective tactic to neutralize terrorist cells and can be part of a powerful operational approach to cripple terror groups. Israel's internal security agency, known as Shin Bet, believes that every successful killing of a suicide bomber saves 16 to 20 Israeli lives. But it does not offer a strategic answer to the problem of terrorism because it cannot defeat the broader movements that breed and feed the terrorist groups. Like some modern-day hydra, no matter how many heads Israel chops off, the beast always grows new ones - sometimes more dangerous than before. terrorism is a form of insurgency, and the way that nations have learned to defeat it is by applying what we now call counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. The core of a COIN strategy is to suppress the groups' military operations while addressing the underlying grievances that inspire the movement behind them. It is ultimately what is meant by the worn phrase "winning hearts and minds." Israel has a big problem here. Targeted killings, barriers and other security activities can suppress terror attacks, but it is not at all clear that Israel can ever win the hearts and minds of the Palestinians, the crucial foundation for Palestinian terrorist groups. It had the same problem with the Shiites of Lebanon and their support for Hezbollah. That's because the Israeli occupation is a central grievance of the Palestinians, as it was for Lebanon's Shiites. Israeli military officers have devoured the vast literature on COIN warfare, eagerly adapting its tactics and operational methods. However, ask an Israeli soldier or general about the strategic aspects of COIN and they almost invariably insist that it's wrong. They will claim that they tried to win hearts and minds in Gaza and the West Bank and it just didn't work because it just doesn't work. Only a few will acknowledge that the problem is not with COIN strategy, but with Israel's ability to execute the strategy without doing something that is politically ... hard. The deepest truth is that Israel so far has not tried the one thing that could address the underlying grievances that give life to its terrorist enemies, trading land for peace. Some of Israel's brightest counterterror minds know this. It is why the senior leadership of its defense and intelligence establishments are typically so committed to the peace process, as revealed by the 2012 Israeli documentary "The Gatekeepers." Today many Israelis are justifiably skeptical that they have a partner for peace. Many Palestinians are justifiably skeptical that Israel is a partner for peace. Regardless of whether you believe one side, the other, or both, it still means that the most obvious approach Israel might try to find a strategic end to the problem of terrorism is off the table. Israel's political right has insisted that there are one-state solutions that could address Palestinian grievances, but the plans they have presented so far seem fanciful, and the Israeli government has shown no inclination to try them. Some in the current Israeli government seem to believe that its new covert alliances with Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Iran will furnish a strategic path out - that the Arab states will persuade the Palestinians to give up and reconcile themselves to Israeli suzerainty. One can't be certain it won't work, but you shouldn't bet money that it will. Since Israel cannot or will not employ the core strategic approach of COIN, it is left with nothing but tactics, targeted killings high among them. It consigns Israel to endless repression, endless assassinations, endless criticism and endless racking internal debate like that which Bergman diligently recounts. All of this holds inevitable lessons for the United States. The most successful counterterror campaigns in American history rested on strategic efforts to undermine the popular movements behind the terrorist groups. In 2006-8, in Iraq, George W Bush's surge strategy crippled the Sunni Arab terrorist groups by helping Sunni Arabs defend themselves, granting them economic benefits and political power, and shutting down the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the Shiite militias. It was a virtuoso effort that eliminated the grievances of the Sunni community, at least until the United States and Nuri al-Maliki let them come roaring back after 2010. Yet when it comes to fighting terrorism in places like Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Niger and Libya, the tactics - starting with targeted killing by drone - are all we seem willing to employ. It consigns us to the same kind of endless war that the Israelis seem ready to bear. Yet how sure are we that America's people and political system are as inured to the forever war as Israel's claim to be? By the end of Bergman's book, targeted killing feels almost like a drug that Israel uses to treat the worst symptom (terrorism) of a terrible disease (Palestinian anger). It is a very effective drug, but it treats only the symptom and so offers no cure. It is also a very addictive one, in part because it is so effective at suppressing the symptoms. I fear that we are all becoming targetedkilling junkies, unable to kick the habit and unwilling to treat the disease that got us hooked in the first place. Assassinations can be a highly effective tactic to neutralize or cripple terrorist groups. KENNETH M. pollack is a resident scholar of the American Enterprise Institute.

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [August 30, 2019]

Chapter 1 In Blood and Fire On September 29, 1944, David Shomron hid in the gloom of St. George Street, not far from the Romanian Church in Jerusalem. A church building was used as officers' lodgings by the British authorities governing Palestine, and Shomron was waiting for one of those officers, a man named Tom Wilkin, to leave. Wilkin was the commander of the Jewish unit at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the British Mandate for Palestine, and he was very good at his job, especially the part that involved infiltrating and disrupting the fractious Jewish underground. Aggressive, yet also exceptionally patient and calculating, Wilkin spoke fluent Hebrew, and after thirteen years of service in Palestine, he had an extensive network of informants. Thanks to the intelligence they provided, underground fighters were arrested, their weapons caches were seized, and their planned operations, aimed at forcing the British to leave Palestine, were foiled. Which was why Shomron was going to kill him. Shomron and his partner that night, Yaakov Banai (code-named Mazal--"Luck"), were operatives with Lehi, the most radical of the Zionist underground movements fighting the British in the early 1940s. Though Lehi was the acronym for the Hebrew phrase "fighters for the freedom of Israel," the British considered it a terrorist organization, referring to it dismissively as the Stern Gang, after its founder, the romantic ultra-nationalist Avraham Stern. Stern and his tiny band of followers employed a targeted mayhem of assassinations and bombings--a campaign of "personal terror," as Lehi's operations chief (and later Israeli prime minister), Yitzhak Shamir, called it. Wilkin knew he was a target. Lehi already had tried to kill him and his boss, Geoffrey Morton, nearly three years earlier, in its first, clumsy operation. On January 20, 1942, assassins planted bombs on the roof and inside the building of 8 Yael Street, in Tel Aviv. Instead they ended up killing three police officers--two Jews and an Englishman--who arrived before Wilkin and Morton and tripped the charges. Later, Morton fled Palestine after being wounded in another attempt on his life--that one in retribution for Morton having shot Stern dead. None of those details, the back-and-forth of who killed whom and in what order, mattered to Shomron. The British occupied the land the Zionists saw as rightfully theirs--that was what mattered, and Shamir had issued a death sentence against Wilkin. For Shomron and his comrades, Wilkin was not a person but rather a target, prominent and high-value. "We were too busy and hungry to think about the British and their families," Shomron said decades later. After discovering that Wilkin was residing in the Romanian Church annex, the assassins set out on their mission. Shomron and Banai had revolvers and hand grenades in their pockets. Additional Lehi operatives were in the vicinity, smartly dressed in suits and hats to look like Englishmen. Wilkin left the officers' lodgings in the church and headed for the CID's facility in the Russian Compound, where underground suspects were held and interrogated. As always, he was wary, scanning the street as he walked and keeping one hand in his pocket all the time. As he passed the corner of St. George and Mea Shearim Streets, a youngster sitting outside the neighborhood grocery store got up and dropped his hat. This was the signal, and the two assassins began walking toward Wilkin, identifying him according to the photographs they'd studied. Shomron and Banai let him pass, gripping their revolvers with sweating palms. Then they turned around and drew. "Before we did it, Mazal [Banai] said, 'Let me shoot first,' " Shomron recalled. "But when we saw him, I guess I couldn't restrain myself. I shot first." Between them, Banai and Shomron fired fourteen times. Eleven of those bullets hit Wilkin. "He managed to turn around and draw his pistol," Shomron said, "but then he fell face first. A spurt of blood came out of his forehead, like a fountain. It was not such a pretty picture." Shomron and Banai darted back into the shadows and made off in a taxi in which another Lehi man was waiting for them. "The only thing that hurt me was that we forgot to take the briefcase in which he had all his documents," Shomron said. Other than that, "I didn't feel anything, not even a little twinge of guilt. We believed the more coffins that reached London, the closer the day of freedom would be." The idea that the return of the People of Israel to the Land of Israel could be achieved only by force was not born with Stern and his Lehi comrades. The roots of that strategy can be traced to eight men who gathered in a stifling one-room apartment overlooking an orange grove in Jaffa on September 29, 1907, exactly thirty-seven years before a fountain of blood spurted from Wilkin's head, when Palestine was still part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The flat was rented by Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, a young Russian who'd immigrated to Ottoman Palestine earlier that year. Like the others in his apartment that night--all emigrants from the Russian empire, sitting on a straw mat spread on the floor of the candlelit room--he was a committed Zionist, albeit part of a splinter sect that had once threatened to rend the movement. Zionism as a political ideology had been founded in 1896 when Viennese Jewish journalist Theodor Herzl published Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). He had been deeply affected while covering the trial in Paris of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish army officer unjustly accused and convicted of treason. In his book, Herzl argued that anti-Semitism was so deeply ingrained in European culture that the Jewish people could achieve true freedom and safety only in a nation-state of their own. The Jewish elite of Western Europe, who'd managed to carve out comfortable lives for themselves, mostly rejected Herzl. But his ideas resonated with poor and working-class Jews of Eastern Europe, who suffered repeated pogroms and continual oppression and to which some of them responded by aligning themselves with leftist uprisings. Herzl himself saw Palestine, the Jews' ancestral homeland, as the ideal location for a future Jewish state, but he maintained that any settlement there would have to be handled deliberately and delicately, through proper diplomatic channels and with international sanction, if a Jewish nation was to survive in peace. Herzl's view came to be known as political Zionism. Ben-Zvi and his seven comrades, on the other hand, were--like most other Russian Jews--practical Zionists. Rather than wait for the rest of the world to give them a home, they believed in creating one themselves--in going to Palestine, working the land, making the desert bloom. They would take what they believed to be rightfully theirs, and they would defend what they had taken. This put the practical Zionists in immediate conflict with most of the Jews already living in Palestine. As a tiny minority in an Arab land--many of them peddlers and religious scholars and functionaries under the Ottoman regime--they preferred to keep a low profile. Through subservience and compromise and bribery, these established Palestinian Jews had managed to buy themselves relative peace and a measure of security. But Ben-Zvi and the other newcomers were appalled at the conditions their fellow Jews tolerated. Many were living in abject poverty and had no means of defending themselves, utterly at the mercy of the Arab majority and the venal officials of the corrupt Ottoman Empire. Arab mobs attacked and plundered Jewish settlements, rarely with any consequences. Worse, as Ben-Zvi and the others saw it, those same settlements had consigned their defense to Arab guards--who in turn would sometimes collaborate with attacking mobs. Ben-Zvi and his friends found this situation to be unsustainable and intolerable. Some were former members of Russian left-wing revolutionary movements inspired by the People's Will (Narodnaya Volya), an aggressive anti-tsarist guerrilla movement that employed terrorist tactics, including assassinations. Disappointed by the abortive 1905 revolution in Russia, which in the end produced only minimal constitutional reforms, some of these socialist revolutionaries, social democrats, and liberals moved to Ottoman Palestine to reestablish a Jewish state. They all were desperately poor, barely scraping by, earning pennies at teaching jobs or manual labor in the fields and orange groves, often going hungry. But they were proud Zionists. If they were going to create a nation, they first had to defend themselves. So they slipped through the streets of Jaffa in pairs and alone, making their way to the secret meeting in Ben-Zvi's apartment. That night, those eight people formed the first Hebrew fighting force of the modern age. They decreed that, from then forward, everything would be different from the image of the weak and persecuted Jew all across the globe. Only Jews would defend Jews in Palestine. They named their fledgling army Bar-Giora, after one of the leaders of the Great Jewish Revolt against the Roman Empire, in the first century. On their banner, they paid homage to that ancient rebellion and predicted their future. "In blood and fire Judea fell," it read. "In blood and fire Judea will rise." Judea would indeed rise. Ben-Zvi would one day be the Jewish nation's second president. Yet first there would be much fire, and much blood. Bar-Giora was not, at first, a popular movement. But more Jews arrived in Palestine from Russia and Eastern Europe every year--35,000 between 1905 and 1914--bringing with them that same determined philosophy of practical Zionism. With more like-minded Jews flooding into the Yishuv, as the Jewish community in Palestine was called, Bar-Giora in 1909 was reconstituted into the larger and more aggressive Hashomer (Hebrew for "the Guard"). By 1912, Hashomer was defending fourteen settlements. Yet it was also developing offensive, albeit clandestine, capabilities, preparing for what practical Zionists saw as an inevitable eventual war to take control of Palestine. Hashomer therefore saw itself as the nucleus for a future Jewish army and intelligence service. Mounted on their horses, Hashomer vigilantes raided a few Arab settlements to punish residents who had harmed Jews, sometimes beating them up, sometimes executing them. In one case, a special clandestine assembly of Hashomer members decided to eliminate a Bedouin policeman, Aref al-Arsan, who had assisted the Turks and tortured Jewish prisoners. He was shot dead by Hashomer in June 1916. Hashomer did not recoil from using force to assert its authority over other Jews, either. During World War I, Hashomer was violently opposed to NILI, a Jewish spy network working for the British in Ottoman Palestine. Hashomer feared that the Turks would discover the spies and wreak vengeance against the entire Jewish community. When they failed to get NILI to cease operations or to hand over a stash of gold coins they'd received from the British, they made an attempt on the life of Yosef Lishansky, one of its members, managing only to wound him. In 1920, Hashomer evolved again, now into the Haganah (Hebrew for "Defense"). Though it was not specifically legal, the British authorities, who had been ruling the country for about three years, tolerated the Haganah as the paramilitary defensive arm of the Yishuv. The Histadrut, the socialist labor union of the Jews in Israel that was founded in the same year, and the Jewish Agency, the Yishuv's autonomous governing authority, established a few years later, both headed by David Ben-Gurion, maintained command over the secret organization. Ben-Gurion was born David Yosef Grün in Pło´nsk, Poland, in 1886. From an early age, he followed in his father's footsteps as a Zionist activist. In 1906, he migrated to Palestine and, thanks to his charisma and determination, soon became one of the leaders of the Yishuv, despite his youth. He then changed his name to Ben-Gurion, after another of the leaders of the revolt against the Romans. Haganah in its early years was influenced by the spirit and aggressive attitude of Hashomer. On May 1, 1921, an Arab mob massacred fourteen Jews in an immigrants' hostel in Jaffa. After learning that an Arab police officer by the name of Tewfik Bey had helped the mob get into the hostel, Haganah sent a hit squad to dispose of him, and on January 17, 1923, he was shot dead in the middle of a Tel Aviv street. "As a matter of honor," he was shot from the front and not in the back, according to one of those involved, and the intention was "to show the Arabs that their deeds are not forgotten and their day will come, even if belatedly." The members of Hashomer who led the Haganah at the outset were even willing to commit acts of violence against fellow Jews. Jacob de Haan was a Dutch-born Haredi--an ultra-Orthodox Jew--living in Jerusalem in the early 1920s. He was a propagandist for the Haredi belief that only the Messiah could establish a Jewish state, that God alone would decide when to return the Jews to their ancestral homeland, and that humans trying to expedite the process were committing a grave sin. In other words, de Haan was a staunch anti-Zionist, and he was surprisingly adept at swaying international opinion. To Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, by now a prominent Haganah leader, that made de Haan dangerous. So he ordered his death. On June 30, 1924--just a day before de Haan was to travel to London to ask the British government to reconsider its promise to establish a Jewish nation in Palestine--two assassins shot him three times as he emerged from a synagogue on Jaffa Road in Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion, however, took a dim view of such acts. He realized that in order to win even partial recognition from the British for Zionist aims, he would have to enforce orderly and more moderate norms on the semi-underground militia under his command. Hashomer's brave and lethal lone riders were replaced after the de Haan murder by an organized, hierarchical armed force. Ben-Gurion ordered Haganah to desist from using targeted killings. "As to personal terror, Ben-Gurion's line was consistently and steadily against it," Haganah commander Yisrael Galili testified later, and he recounted a number of instances in which Ben-Gurion had refused to approve proposals for hits against individual Arabs. These included the Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini and other members of the Arab Higher Committee, and British personnel, such as a senior official in the Mandate's lands authority who was obstructing Jewish settlement projects. Not everyone was eager to acquiesce to Ben-Gurion. Avraham Tehomi, the man who shot de Haan, despised the moderate line Ben-Gurion took against the British and the Arabs, and, together with some other leading figures, he quit Haganah and in 1931 formed the Irgun Zvai Leumi, the "National Military Organization" whose Hebrew acronym is Etzel, usually referred to in English as IZL or the Irgun. This radical right-wing group was commanded in the 1940s by Menachem Begin, who in 1977 was to become prime minister of Israel. Inside the Irgun, too, there were clashes, personal and ideological. Opponents of Begin's agreement to cooperate with Britain in its war against the Nazis broke away and formed Lehi. For these men, any cooperation with Britain was anathema. Excerpted from Rise and Kill First: The Inside Story and Secret Operations of Israel's Assassination Program All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.