How democracies die

Steven Levitsky

Book - 2018

"Donald Trump's presidency has raised a question that many of us never thought we'd be asking: Is our democracy in danger? Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have spent more than twenty years studying the breakdown of democracies in Europe and Latin America, and they believe the answer is yes. Democracy no longer ends with a bang--in a revolution or military coup--but with a whimper: the slow, steady weakening of critical institutions, such as the judiciary and the press, and the gradual erosion of long-standing political norms. The good news is that there are several exit ramps on the road to authoritarianism. The bad news is that, by electing Trump, we have already passed the first one. Drawing on decades... of research and a wide range of historical and global examples, from 1930s Europe to contemporary Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, to the American South during Jim Crow, Levitsky and Ziblatt show how democracies die--and how ours can be saved."--Dust jacket.

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New York : Crown [2018]
Main Author
Steven Levitsky (author)
Other Authors
Daniel Ziblatt, 1972- (author)
First edition
Physical Description
312 pages ; 22 cm
Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-300) and index.
  • Fateful alliances
  • Gatekeeping in America
  • The great Republican abdication
  • Subverting democracy
  • The guardrails of democracy
  • The unwritten rules of American politics
  • The unraveling
  • Trump against the guardrails
  • Saving democracy.
Review by New York Times Review

AN AMERICAN MARRIAGE, by Tayari Jones. (Algonquin, $16.95.) The lives of a young black couple in Atlanta are thrown into chaos after the husband, Roy, is imprisoned for a crime he didn't commit. As the couple grapple with their grief, they must also confront the failed hopes of a marriage and romantic love. The grave miscarriage of justice forms the core of Jones's deeply compassionate and heartbreaking novel. HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE, by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. (Broadway, $15.) Think beyond the coups d'état: The backslide from democracy into autocracy can be brought about by elected officials who upend the processes that empowered them. The authors, political scientists at Harvard, describe four criteria to identify authoritarian leaders. Donald Trump has met all of them. GRIST MILL ROAD, by Christopher J. Yates. (Picador, $18.) A gruesome act of violence connects three teenagers, who stay linked to one another for the rest of their lives. As more is revealed about the crime, this thriller raises questions of guilt, culpability and forgiveness. As our reviewer, Sarah Lyall, put it, "You have to work hard to follow the winding road Yates sends us down, and the drive is full of pleasantly unpleasant surprises." NO TIME TO SPARE: Thinking About What Matters, by Ursula K. Le Guin. (Mariner, $14.99.) Long revered as a master of fantasy writing, Le Guin turned to blogging late in life, writing about everything from feminism to aging to breakfast. This collection brings together some of her best blog posts. There's a lot that will delight fans of Le Guin, who died last year: "The pages sparkle with lines that make a reader glance up, searching for an available ear with which to share them," our reviewer, Melissa Febos, wrote. TEXT ME WHEN YOU GET HOME: The Evolution and Triumph of Modern Female Friendship, by Kayleen Schaefer. (Dutton, $16.) For generations, the importance of these relationships has been played down, taking a back seat to romantic partnerships and family bonds. Drawing on the evolution of female friendships in popular culture and her own experiences, Schaefer puts camaraderie among women on a pedestal. THE GHOST NOTEBOOKS, by Ben Dolnick. (Vintage, $16.) Facing career burnout and a stalled relationship, a young couple leave New York City for Hibernia, a tiny town upstate. As they settle into their new home, a historic house with a secret dark past, their romance becomes a ghost story: The relationship soon begins to unravel, and it's not clear whether psychosis or malevolent spiritual forces are to blame.

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [March 11, 2019]
Review by Kirkus Book Review

A provocative analysis of the parallels between Donald Trump's ascent and the fall of other democracies.Following the last presidential election, Levitsky (Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America, 2003, etc.) and Ziblatt (Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy, 2017, etc.), both professors of government at Harvard, wrote an op-ed column titled, "Is Donald Trump a Threat to Democracy?" The answer here is a resounding yes, though, as in that column, the authors underscore their belief that the crisis extends well beyond the power won by an outsider whom they consider a demagogue and a liar. "Donald Trump may have accelerated the process, but he didn't cause it," they write of the politics-as-warfare mentality. "The weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarizationone that extends beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and culture." The authors fault the Republican establishment for failing to stand up to Trump, even if that meant electing his opponent, and they seem almost wistfully nostalgic for the days when power brokers in smoke-filled rooms kept candidacies restricted to a club whose members knew how to play by the rules. Those supporting the candidacy of Bernie Sanders might take as much issue with their prescriptions as Trump followers will. However, the comparisons they draw to how democratic populism paved the way toward tyranny in Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and elsewhere are chilling. Among the warning signs they highlight are the Republican Senate's refusal to consider Barack Obama's Supreme Court nominee as well as Trump's demonization of political opponents, minorities, and the media. As disturbing as they find the dismantling of Democratic safeguards, Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that "a broad opposition coalition would have important benefits," though such a coalition would strike some as a move to the center, a return to politics as usual, and even a pragmatic betrayal of principles.The value of this book is the context it provides, in a style aimed at a concerned citizenry rather than fellow academics, rather than in the consensus it is not likely to build. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

We tend to think of democracies dying at the hands of men with guns. During the Cold War, coups d'état accounted for nearly three out of every four democratic break­downs, and more re­cently, military coups toppled Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in 2013 and Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014. In these cases democracy dissolved in spectacular fashion, through military power and coercion. But there is another way to break a democracy. It is less dra­matic but equally destructive. In Venezuela, for example, Hugo Chávez was a political outsider who railed against what he cast as a corrupt govern­ing elite, promising to build a more "authentic" democracy that used the country's vast oil wealth to improve the lives of the poor. Skillfully tapping into the anger of ordinary Venezuelans, many of whom felt ignored or mistreated by the established political parties, Chávez was elected president in 1998. As a woman in Chávez's home state of Barinas put it on election night, "Democracy is infected. And Chávez is the only antibiotic we have." When Chávez launched his promised revolution, he did so democratically. In 1999, he held free elections for a new constituent assembly, in which his allies won an overwhelming majority. It wasn't until 2003 that Chávez took his first clear steps toward authoritarianism, stalling a referendum that would have recalled him from office. In 2004, the government blacklisted those who had signed the recall petition and packed the supreme court. The chavista regime grew more repressive after 2006, closing a major television station, arresting or exiling opposition politicians, judges, and media figures on dubious charges, and eliminating presidential term limits so that Chávez could remain in power indefinitely. After Chávez's death a year later, his successor, Nicolás Maduro, won another questionable reelection. It was only when a new single-party constituent assembly usurped the power of Congress in 2017, nearly two decades after Chávez first won the presidency, that Venezuela was widely recognized as an autocracy. This is how democracies now die. Blatant dictatorship--in the form of fascism, communism, or military rule--has dis­appeared across much of the world. Military coups and other violent seizures of power are rare. Most countries hold regular elections. Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected gov­ernments themselves. Like Chávez in Venezuela, elected leaders have subverted democratic institutions in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine. Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box.   How vulnerable is American democracy to this form of breakdown? The foundations of our democracy are certainly stron­ger than those in Venezuela, Turkey, or Hungary. But are they strong enough? Answering such a question requires stepping back from daily headlines and breaking news alerts to widen our view, drawing lessons from the experiences of other democracies around the world and throughout history. We know that extremist demagogues emerge from time to time in all societies, even in healthy democracies. The United States has had its share of them, including Henry Ford, Huey Long, Joseph McCarthy, and George Wallace. An essential test for democracies is not whether such figures emerge but whether political leaders, and especially political parties, work to prevent them from gaining power in the first place--by keeping them off mainstream party tickets, refusing to endorse or align with them, and when necessary, making common cause with rivals in support of democratic candidates. Once a would‑be authoritarian makes it to power, democra­cies face a second critical test: Will the autocratic leader subvert democratic institutions or be constrained by them? America failed the first test in November 2016, when we elected a president with a dubious allegiance to democratic norms. How serious is the threat now? Many observers take comfort in our Constitution, which was designed precisely to thwart and contain demagogues like Donald Trump. Our Madisonian system of checks and balances has endured for more than two centuries. It survived the Civil War, the Great Depression, the Cold War, and Watergate. Surely, then, it will be able to survive Trump. We are less certain. Historically, our system of checks and balances has worked pretty well-- but not, or not entirely, because of the constitutional system designed by the founders. Democracies work best-- and survive longer-- where constitutions are reinforced by unwritten democratic norms. Two basic norms have preserved America's checks and balances in ways we have come to take for granted: mutual toleration, or the understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals, and forbearance, or the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives. The erosion of our democratic norms began in the 1980s and 1990s and accelerated in the 2000s. By the time Barack Obama became president, many Republicans, in particular, questioned the legitimacy of their Democratic rivals and had abandoned forbearance for a strategy of winning by any means necessary. Donald Trump may have accelerated this process, but he didn't cause it. The weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarization-- one that ex-tends beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and culture. And if one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history, it's that extreme polarization can kill democracies. There are, therefore, reasons for alarm. Not only did Americans elect a demagogue in 2016, but we did so at a time when the norms that once protected our democracy were already coming unmoored. But if other countries' experiences teach us how democracies can die at the hands of elected officials, they also teach us that breakdown is neither inevitable nor irreversible. Many Americans are justifiably frightened by what is happening to our country. But protecting our democracy requires more than just fright or outrage. We must be humble and bold. We must learn from other countries to see the warning signs-- and recognize the false alarms. We must be aware of the fateful missteps that have wrecked other democracies. And we must see how citizens have risen to meet the great democratic crises of the past, overcoming their own deep-seated divisions to avert breakdown. History doesn't repeat itself. But it rhymes. The promise of history, and the hope of this book, is that we can find the rhymes before it is too late.   Reprinted from HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE Copyright © 2018 by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. Published by Crown Publishers, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC. Excerpted from How Democracies Die by Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.