Review by Choice Review
Neiberg (US Army War College) views the Potsdam Conference not as the beginning of the Cold War but as the end of a "Thirty Years War" that began in 1914. The Allies deliberated at Potsdam to avoid the mistakes of Versailles, not to settle any emerging conflicts among them. As proof, Neiberg explores the influence that history and each participant's understanding of the past had on the conference. This thematic approach, centered on comparisons of 1919 with 1945, is provocative but often repetitious and dismissive of the unique events of WW II. Neiberg's portraits of the Big Three and descriptions of the ruins of Berlin and the souvenirs taken by British and US officials are colorful and will interest students and general readers but provide little for scholars. An analysis of the conference's decisions does not occur until the last chapters, but Neiberg demonstrates that the compromises reached on Germany and Poland, though not to everyone's liking, ensured that another war would not erupt there, as it had in 1939. Cooperation also prevailed on China and Japan. Everyone left pleased, with no real sense of the Cold War to come. Summing Up: Recommended. General readers and undergraduates only. --Lorraine M. Lees, Old Dominion University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
In July 1945, three Allied leaders-Harry S. Truman, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill-met at the Potsdam Conference in Germany to establish the structure of a postwar world order. Many observers disliked the outcome, but Neiberg (The Blood of Free Men), professor of history at the U.S. Army War College, explains why he approves of it in this thoughtful, mildly controversial account. Truman, vice president until F.D.R.'s death three months earlier, knew little of world affairs but proved a quick study. Churchill, voted out of office before the conference ended, "baffled and worried his own cabinet officers." While acknowledging "Stalin's brutality," Neiberg sympathizes with him; aware that Russia did most of the fighting and suffering, the Soviet leader came to Potsdam "not to make deals but to settle scores." In the end, Stalin got most of what he wanted: hegemony over Eastern Europe, reparations, and generous territorial gains in exchange for attacking Japan, as the war in the Pacific continued. Neiberg points out that WWII did not lead to a third world war, and that Stalin's concentration on politics over economics at the conference eventually doomed the Soviet Union. Neiberg's insightful history makes a case that Potsdam worked much better than Versailles had in 1919. Photos. Agent: Geri Thoma, Writers House (May) © Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.
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Review by Library Journal Review
Here, Neiberg (Stimson Chair, Dept. of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War Coll.; Dance of Furies) takes a long overdue look at the Potsdam Conference between U.S. President Harry S. Truman; Soviet leader Joseph Stalin; and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and later Clement Attlee succeeding Churchill, at the end of World War II. In a departure from the few other books available on the Potsdam Conference, Neiberg approaches the event not as the beginning of the postwar period, but as the end of the period of all-out war that started in 1914. He examines the effect of the different ways the principals of this conference look at history, which varied widely between the three men. Finally, he also examines the "great man" theory of history and how it may not apply in this instance. Neiberg, a specialist in World War I history, has succeeded on all three counts, writing an intriguing and readable book about a conference that still has a huge impact on today's world but has been relegated to footnotes for much too long. VERDICT A must-have account for everyone from students of world history at the undergraduate and graduate levels to knowledgeable recreational readers.-John Sandstrom, New Mexico State Univ. Lib., Las Cruces © Copyright 2015. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
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Review by Kirkus Book Review
A military historian analyzes the significance of the final conference of the World War II allies.In July 1945, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam to determine policy for the occupation of Europe and the conclusion of the war against Japan. The conference was originally expected to include the "Big Three" of the Teheran and Yalta conferences, but Franklin Roosevelt had died and been succeeded by the inexperienced Harry Truman, and in midconference, Churchill was unexpectedly turned out of office and replaced by the Labour Party chief Clement Attlee. Stalin was therefore the best prepared of the three and held most of the cards as his armies occupied Eastern Europe and much of Germany. Neiberg (History/U.S. Army War College; The Blood of Free Men: The Liberation of Paris, 1944, 2012, etc.) thoroughly canvasses the multiplicity of issues taken up by the conferees. He does not report the meetings in detail but concentrates on exploring several themes underlying the proceedings, particularly how visions of history weighed on the participants and how "strategic environments and historical understandings limited and shaped the range of options open to [these] so-called 'great men.' " Neiberg parts company with historians who view Potsdam as the beginning of the Cold War, pointing out that most participants left the conference optimistic about the prospects for continued cooperation among the allies. Instead, the author views it as a successful ending to the European conflicts that began in 1914. Neiberg's casual acceptance of the reordering of Eastern Europe is troubling, as this was achieved only by displacing millions and placing the governments firmly under Stalin's thumb. Nevertheless, this is a solid account of the conference, concisely summarizing its results and significance without excessive indulgence in entertaining personal anecdotes. Fills a hitherto surprisingly empty niche in the World War II library. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
