Camelot's court Inside the Kennedy White House

Robert Dallek

Large print - 2013

Presidential historian Dallek analyzes the brain trust whose contributions to the successes and failures of Kennedy's administration-- including the Bay of Pigs, civil rights, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam-- were indelible. He delivers a striking portrait of a leader whose wise resistance to pressure and adherence to principle offers a cautionary tale for our own time.

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Subjects
Published
New York, NY : HarperLuxe, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers [2013]
Language
English
Main Author
Robert Dallek (author)
Edition
First HarperLuxe edition
Physical Description
xvi, 735 pages (large print) : illustrations ; 23 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 671-732).
ISBN
9780062278555
  • Introduction
  • Chapter 1. John F. Kennedy: Prelude to a Presidency
  • Chapter 2. Robert Kennedy: Adviser-in-Chief
  • Chapter 3. "A Ministry of Talent"
  • Chapter 4. "Never Rely on the Experts"
  • Chapter 5. "Roughest Thing in My Life"
  • Chapter 6. Advice and Dissent
  • Chapter 7. "The Greatest Adventure of Our Century"
  • Chapter 8. "If We Listen to Them, None of Us Will Be Alive"
  • Chapter 9. "Mankind Must Put an End to War"
  • Chapter 10. "The Two of You Did Visit the Same Country, Didn't You?"
  • Epilogue: "What He Is Slated to Become Depends on Us"
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Acknowledgments
Review by Choice Review

John F. Kennedy's best biographer sheds fresh light on the leading national security challenges of his presidency. Focusing on Cold War imperatives and dilemmas, Dallek (retired, Boston Univ.) dissects Kennedy's interactions with his inner circle of military and civilian experts. In an echo of David Halberstam, Dallek describes how the "best and the brightest" surrounding Kennedy saw through a glass darkly. Few advisers gave the president consistently worthwhile counsel, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff on virtually every issue proved wrongheaded, complicating Kennedy's policy toward Cuba, pursuit of a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, and engagement in Vietnam. Kennedy bungled the Bay of Pigs invasion in good measure by deferring to those with greater experience than he had as a novice leader. He would become more assertive over time, though in forging Vietnam policy he remained trapped by fears of domestic political fallout if he pursued the course that evidence and his instincts told him he should follow. Impressively researched and lucidly argued, Camelot's Court reminds readers that there are no experts in shaping public policy, just fallible individuals sifting often conflicting evidence and choosing among less than ideal options. Summing Up: Highly recommended. All levels/libraries. M. J. Birkner Gettysburg College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by New York Times Review

Dallek, who has written a number of presidential biographies, here turns his gaze to the New Frontiersmen, arguing that their advice often disappointed Kennedy. The president "never doubted that advisers were eager to help," Dallek writes, but he believed in the admonition of his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, that "only members of his family could be fully trusted to act in the unselfish interest of their son or brother." Kennedy's apprehensions were not unwarranted. Many of the ally audacious he chose, like McGeorge Bundy, ended up championing America's entry into Vietnam. (Under-secretary of State George W. Ball was a notable exception.) Dallek reminds us of the sociologist David Riesman's perceptive observation that the "arrogance and hubris" that made Bundy a "perfect dean" at Harvard could be "very dangerous" when it came to decisions of great consequence. Kennedy was wary of a big commitment to Vietnam, Dallek suggests, particularly in the wake of his failure to "vet the Bay of Pigs invasion sufficiently" and loose talk by the Joint Chiefs of Staff about using nuclear weapons against China. But his reluctance to come down on one side or the other opened the way to Lyndon Johnson's tragic and "unequivocal determination to use U.S. power to preserve South Vietnam's autonomy, arguing that this is what Kennedy would have done." Dallek's portraits of advisers including Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Walt Rostow are lapidary, and it is difficult to quarrel with his judgments.

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [October 27, 2013]
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

Non-experts are likely to have a hard time assessing what significant new facts are revealed in this meticulous but well-trod account of J.F.K.'s tenure in the White House. Dallek (An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963) walks the reader through the basics: Joseph Kennedy Sr.'s ambitions; his congressional years; and his years in the White House dealing with the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cuba. Kennedy's relationship with his advisers, dubbed "the best and the brightest" (Robert McNamara, Ted Sorenson, McGeorge Bundy, et al.), has also been thoroughly described elsewhere. The conclusions Dallek reaches are less than profound or original: "The affection for [J.F.K.] generated by his persona and the tragedy of his assassination have encouraged positive assessments of his leadership." And despite the book's length, there are important omissions: Dallek's discussion of Kennedy's sexual appetites in the first chapter relies heavily on the 2012 tell-all memoir of intern Mimi Alford, but readers are given no basis against which to assess the reliability of her account. Dallek may well have strong reasons for relying on her, but, inexplicably, he doesn't tell us what they are. (Oct.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.

(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Library Journal Review

Dallek (An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963) adds new insights beyond those in his excellent 2003 biography of JFK. Here is a compelling view of the president's often frustrating interactions with cabinet members and high-placed government officials. Kennedy encouraged this "ministry of talent" to speak their minds, but their advice was often ignored as JFK gained the confidence to rely on his own instincts, learning that the best-intentioned advisers could present bad options. Dallek discusses Kennedy's major challenges: U.S.-Soviet relations, nuclear disarmament, Castro's Cuba, Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, civil rights. His chief adviser and confidant was Robert F. Kennedy, who is depicted in detail, as are many others whom JFK either relied upon or mistrusted (e.g., figures from the CIA or military). As expected, Dallek focuses on the brinksmanship of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He weighs whether Vietnam was an important or peripheral Cold War front. Dallek concludes that Kennedy realized that since he could not control events in nearby Cuba, he would certainly not be able to do so in faraway Vietnam; he would likely have found a way out of Vietnam had he served a second term. VERDICT Readers who keep up with the body of work on JFK will appreciate Dallek's page-turning style. Historians will value his excellent scholarship as he, in effect, revisits David Halberstam's classic, The Best and the Brightest.-Karl Helicher, Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, PA (c) Copyright 2013. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review

The author of An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 19171963 (2003) returns with descriptions and assessments of the fallen president's principal advisers. Dallek (The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 19451953, 2010, etc.) begins with some quick chapters about JFK's pre-presidential life before commencing his voyage. The president's brother Robert, the attorney general, emerges as the key adviser, reappearing continually in the narrative, especially during the most crucial issues--the missile crisis of 1962 and the civil rights agenda (which, as Dallek notes, took a back seat to foreign affairs). The author introduces each adviser with a description of his (yes, all were men) background and notes that the new president put into his Cabinet--and into his non-Cabinet advisory groups--Republicans and others who annoyed the left wing of his own party. The author shows us the roles that each played and the reputation that he had among the others and with the president. Arthur Schlesinger, for example, was more at the fringes than popular understanding would have it; the Joint Chiefs of Staff were continually at war with the White House on potential actions in Cuba, Laos, Vietnam and elsewhere. (Unsurprisingly, they favored military action.) Deputy National Security Adviser Walt Rostow emerges as the most hawkish of the bunch, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the least decisive and/or consistent. Dallek examines each of JFK's crises in detail, focusing on what the advisers were (or were not) telling him, and he notes several times that their failure to reach consensus was a serious problem. The author spares no one. He chides JFK for his womanizing, LBJ for his ego and McNamara for his credulousness. Here is perhaps the only account of the 1963 March on Washington that does not mention King's speech. More than a little admiring of Arthur, but there's cleareyed criticism of his Round Table.]] Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.