Mind and cosmos Why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false

Thomas Nagel, 1937-

Book - 2012

The modern materialist approach to life has conspicuously failed to explain such central mind-related features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, and value. This failure to account for something so integral to nature as mind, argues philosopher Thomas Nagel, is a major problem, threatening to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology. Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist histo...ry, either. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such. Nagel's skepticism is not based on religious belief or on a belief in any definite alternative. In Mind and Cosmos, he does suggest that if the materialist account is wrong, then principles of a different kind may also be at work in the history of nature, principles of the growth of order that are in their logical form teleological rather than mechanistic. In spite of the great achievements of the physical sciences, reductive materialism is a world view ripe for displacement. Nagel shows that to recognize its limits is the first step in looking for alternatives, or at least in being open to their possibility.--Publisher description.

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Subjects
Published
New York : Oxford University Press c2012.
Language
English
Main Author
Thomas Nagel, 1937- (-)
Physical Description
x, 130 p. ; 22 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN
9780199919758
  • Preface
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Antireductionism and the Natural Order
  • 3. Consciousness
  • 4. Cognition
  • 5. Value
  • 6. Conclusion
  • Index
Review by Choice Review

According to Nagel (New York Univ.), the traditional mind-body problem in philosophy bears on explanations in the physical sciences, including evolutionary biology. Indeed, he holds that this problem, if properly appreciated, "must change our conception of the place of the physical sciences in describing the natural order." In particular, he contends that the reality of minds challenges a reductionist materialist account of the origin of minds, including the standard account from neo-Darwinian evolutionary biologists. Nagel introduces an alternative of "natural teleology" that avoids theology while acknowledging "a cosmic predisposition to the formation of life, consciousness, and the value that is inseparable from them." The book's chapters aim to lend some plausibility to this alternative by attending to the problems for materialism that are raised by consciousness, cognition, and value. Nagel seeks to avoid not only materialism, but also dualism and idealism. The book is accessible to a wide audience, as it avoids the kind of technical detail found in typical philosophical works on this topic. Summing Up: Recommended. Libraries supporting work on the philosophy of mind; upper-level undergraduates and above. P. K. Moser Loyola University Chicago

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.