Revolutionary summer The birth of American independence

Review by Choice Review

With his customary literary elegance and historical insight, Ellis (emer., Mount Holyoke College) weaves a complex and informative story on the beginnings of American independence in 1776, highlighting the intricate interweaving of the political and military dimensions of the Revolutionary War beginning at the Siege of Boston and ending with George Washington's final escape from the British army at White Plains, NY, in October 1776. For example, while the Continental Congress was declaring independence and states were creating new constitutions, British General William Howe's formidable invasion of New York was simultaneously unfolding. Ellis's emphasis throughout is how a problematic consensus for political independence materialized amidst such moments of extreme military peril, and how the summer of 1776 established the "strategic framework" of the entire war. While generations of scholars have well plumbed these critical months of 1776, students of the American Revolution will profit from Ellis's analysis and argument that the revolutionary summer was indeed the point of no return in what became a protracted war that the British could not win politically and the Americans could not win militarily. Summing Up: Highly recommended. General readers, undergraduates, graduate students, researchers, and faculty. D. L. Preston The Citadel

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.

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Review by New York Times Review

IF you know the musical "1776," you know the plot of Joseph J. Ellis's breezy new book. It's a stirring and conventional story. A handful of famous men struggle to create a republic against insurmountable odds. In the long run, their greatest challenge is the problem of slavery. But the most immediate threat is the military might of Britain. Toward the end of June 1776, as the Continental Congress nears a vote on American independence, the first of 427 royal ships carrying 1,200 cannons, 32,000 soldiers and 10,000 sailors appears off Long Island. Things look dire, a point made repeatedly in the musical by a soldier bearing gloomy reports from George Washington, the commander of the Continental Army. In Congress, the Pennsylvanian John Dickinson, a respected spokesman for the rights of British Americans, calls for delay, arguing that independence is a dangerous step in the absence of a national government and European allies. But the passion of John Adams, the wisdom of Benjamin Franklin and the eloquence of Thomas Jefferson carry the cause of independence to fruition in early July. Weeks later, Gen. William Howe and his brother, Adm. Richard Howe, eager to promote reconciliation, fail to exploit their overwhelming advantage, allowing humiliated patriot forces to escape into New Jersey. All is not lost. Out of the ashes of defeat, Americans rise committed to the national institutions that will sustain their glorious cause until the British give up and go home. "Revolutionary Summer" achieves its major goal: to undermine the popular myth that the birth of the United States was an "Immaculate Conception," a victory won by local militias rather than by "a standing army of regular soldiers." Government mattered in 1776. Ellis outlines this argument through a series of individual sketches, many of them familiar to readers of his Pulitzer Prize-winning "Founding Brothers" and subtle biographies of Adams, Jefferson and Washington. No one is better at explicating the role of personal character in public life, particularly the ways in which a preoccupation with honor, or reputation, informed 18th-century gentlemen's approach to power. "Revolutionary Summer," however, purports to be a history of national origins, not a collective biography of men who apparently talked only to one another. Make no mistake: the founding fathers earned the fame they coveted by making consequential decisions. But in the summer of 1776 they were concerned about much more than the British Army. The War for Independence was also a civil war within the British Empire and an episode in a continuing conflict over the fate of North America. Ellis's book is not wrong; it's just incomplete and superficial. Even as he explodes the notion that volunteers won the war, he underscores an equally pervasive idea that the actions of Congress and the American Revolution were one and the same. It simply won't do to talk about a revolutionary summer in which the only voices are those of prominent white men and the recollections of 15-year-old Joseph Plumb Martin, written decades later. Ellis includes a handful of paragraphs on women, enslaved Africans and working-class artisans. But they read like generic concessions to critics who have chastised him for celebrating already celebrated white men rather than the rest of North America's diverse population. The point Ellis misses is that attention must be paid to the people outside Congress not from a desire to make history more inclusive but because their voices were loud and their choices important, not least in their impact on the actions of the men inside Congress. Incorporating more people would fundamentally change Ellis's story, making it messier and less predictable. The "conspicuous consensus" on independence that emerged in Congress occurred nowhere outside of New England. Nor, again, were the maneuvers of the British Army the only challenges confronting members of Congress. It seemed obvious to many Americans that a state of war had existed with Britain since shots were fired at Lexington on April 19, 1775. Everywhere ad hoc committees were creating new political institutions, agreeing with Thomas Paine in his best-selling "Common Sense" that monarchy, not George III, was the basic problem. Honest men could govern themselves better than "the Royal Brute of Britain" could; on the day Americans proclaimed a new charter of government in which "THE LAW IS KING," they should demolish a symbolic crown and scatter its pieces "among the people whose right it is." This stunning proposition horrified other Americans. Just as thousands were choosing independence because it promised revolution in favor of natural rights and self-government, so thousands were choosing the British Empire because they dreaded a democratic revolution that they feared would degenerate into anarchy and popular tyranny. Many believed the imperial tensions reflected inept administration rather than structural failure. Ellis writes that "most probably, a poll of the American population" in September 1776 "would have revealed a citizenry more politically divided and receptive" to Richard Howe's peace terms "than the Continental Congress or its diplomatic representatives." It is a point he fails to develop. Adams spoke for a small percentage of the population. So did Dickinson. The Howe brothers, moreover, were right to expect widespread support for a British Empire that had long championed Protestantism, commerce and liberty. Loyalists encompassed a wide variety of people who believed the British constitution more likely to secure their rights and protect their interests than new republican, or worse democratic, schemes. They were not just wealthy merchants and imperial officials. They were enslaved Africans in Virginia, where the royal governor, John Murray, fourth Earl of Dunmore, had offered freedom to those who would fight for George III. They were ordinary men and women who distrusted colonial aristocrats or revolutionary mobs to govern fairly. Many Americans fought and died for their king; tens of thousands emigrated rather than live in the new republic. Still others tried to take advantage of the "family quarrel" among the British. William Howe, who had served in North America during the French and Indian War, understood that the Iroquois in upstate New York were formidable players who would most likely ally with the British. So did Washington, which is why he would dispatch Gen. John Sullivan and several thousand men to destroy Iroquois villages in 1779. IN short, what made the summer of 1776 revolutionary was the range of options, the cacophony of voices, the increasing resort to violence, the growing sense that nothing was safe. Americans like to believe that their revolution as well as their independence was a moderate affair in which the founding fathers were in control of events rather than the other way around. Unfortunately, "Revolutionary Summer" reinforces that perception. On July 9, 1776, George Washington ordered the Declaration of Independence read aloud to units of the Continental Army assembled on the Commons in New York City. Soldiers then joined civilians in toppling and decapitating a two-ton equestrian statue of George III. Washington was dismayed. Although his men had acted out of "zeal in the public cause," they had given "the appearance of riot" and should "in future" leave "these things" to the "proper authority." The general did not punish any individuals. In a summer when no one could agree on what constituted proper authority, more than statues might lose their heads. Anything was possible. Ellis undermines the popular myth that local militias won the Revolution. Government mattered in 1776. Andrew Cayton teaches American history at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. He is the author of "Love in the Time of Revolution: Transatlantic Literary Radicalism and Historical Change, 1793-1818."

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [June 30, 2013]

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Review by Booklist Review

A specious coherence marks narratives of 1776 in which the Declaration of Independence inevitably occurs while the Continental army's doughty defense of New York ensures that independence would become fact. Events are not, however, so tidily told, avers historian Ellis, who restores contingency to his account of the storied summer and fall of 1776. Identifying a central problem of the historical situation Was there any realistic chance for the British to win? Ellis recounts efforts of moderates within each warring party. On the American side was the rout of anti-independence John Dickinson by the radical John Adams, while Ellis portrays the British side as misunderstanding the colonial rebellion. The commanders George III sent believed in reconciliation with the Americans, and so William Howe conducted the battles of New York cautiously, negotiated futilely with a Ben Franklin serenely sure of American success, and never delivered the decisive blow against George Washington's army. Even had Howe destroyed the Continental army, Ellis suggests that the British still would have confronted strategic failure against an enemy determined to continue the war. With cogent argument and compact prose, Ellis augurs to attract the history audience. HIGH-DEMAND BACKSTORY: Ellis commands a 100,000-plus print run for his latest installment on the American Revolution, tapping his popularity built on such standards as American Sphinx (1997), Founding Brothers (2000), and First Family (2010).--Taylor, Gilbert Copyright 2010 Booklist

From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.

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Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

If we must have another work on this shop-worn subject, Pulitzer and National Book Award-winner Ellis (for Founding Brothers and American Sphinx, respectively) is the one to write it-his latest is now the definitive book on the revolutionary events of the summer of 1776. Ellis's prose is characteristically seductive, his insights frequent, his sketches of people and events captivating, and his critical facility always alive, even when he's praising Washington and faulting British military strategy. Lightly applying what we've learned from our own recent wars, Ellis argues that Washington knew what, for example, the North Vietnamese later understood: "His goal was not to win the war but rather to not lose it." Thanks to Washington's preservation of the Continental Army, which he accomplished through both sheer luck and brilliant command on Long Island and Manhattan in these critical summer months, the former colonies held on to a chance to win their independence. Another brilliantly told story, carried along on solid interpretive grounds, by one of our best historians of the early nation. 8 pages of color photos & 3 maps. 125,000-copy announced first printing. (June 4) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.

(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

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Review by Library Journal Review

From May to October 1776 the Continental Army defended New York City and the surrounding region while the Continental Congress declared American independence and struggled to govern a group of noncohesive, autonomous states. With revolutionary-period expertise and extensive knowledge of the founders, Ellis (lecturer, Commonwealth Honors Coll., Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst; Founding Brothers) contends that American independence was born during this "long summer." He artfully documents the interconnectivity between largely improvised political and military events and discusses the motives and strategies of key players in the context of 18th-century ideologies and circumstances, all of which, he argues, established the framework for the Revolutionary War. He explains Washington's ill-advised, ill-fated decision to defend New York City and environs, and Howe's unreasonable decision not to annihilate the Continental Army, which might have crushed the independence movement. These decisions resulted in a prolonged war that superior British armed forces could not win, and that determined colonials would not lose. Ellis concludes that a decade of British imperial policies, topped with sending an enormous military and naval force to New York, guaranteed British defeat by intensifying American opposition to the expanded authority of Parliament. VERDICT This thought-provoking, well-documented historical narrative is packed with insightful analysis. It will attract general and academic readers.-Margaret -Kappanadze, Elmira Coll. Lib., NY (c) Copyright 2013. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

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Review by Kirkus Book Review

Pulitzer Prizewinning historian Ellis (First Family: Abigail and John Adams, 2010, etc.) writes book after book on the American Revolutionary period. Practice makes perfect. The author's latest alternates between 1776 colonial politics during which the Continental Congress, dominated by John Adams, finally put aside efforts at compromise and opted for independence and the fighting where George Washington's army marched from triumph in the siege of Boston to catastrophe in New York. Ellis delivers few surprises and no cheerleading but much astute commentary. He points out with no small irony that the Continental Congress was at its best in 1776 when thoughtful men debated the benefits of liberty versus the consequences of war with the world's most powerful nation and came to the right decision. Only in the following years, faced with governing the colonies and supplying the army, did it reveal its incompetence. When British forces withdrew from Boston in March, colonial rebels declared a great victory, but Washington worried. Sieges and fighting behind fortifications (i.e., Bunker Hill) were simple compared with standard 18th-century warfare, which required soldiers to maneuver under fire and remain calm amid scenes of horrific carnage. He suspected that his largely untrained militia army would do badly under these circumstances, and events in New York proved him right. Luckily, British Gen. William Howe, despite vastly superior forces, refused to deliver a knockout blow. He would never get another chance. Kevin Phillips' 2012 tour de force, 1775, delivered a massive argument for that year as the key to American independence. A traditionalist, Ellis sticks to 1776 and writes an insightful history of its critical, if often painful, events.]] Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

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Chapter 1 Prudence Dictates By the spring of 1776, British and American troops had been killing each other at a robust rate for a full year. While the engagements at Lexington and Concord had been mere skirmishes, the battle at Bunker Hill had been a bloodbath, especially for the British, who lost more than 1,000 men, nearly half their attack force. The American dead numbered in the hundreds, a figure inflated by the fact that all the wounded left on the field were dispatched with bayonets by British execution squads enraged at the loss of so many of their comrades. Back in London, one retired officer was heard to say that with a few more victories like this, the British Army would be annihilated. Then, for the next nine months, a congregation of militia units totaling 20,000 troops under the command of General George Washington bottled up a British garrison of 7,000 troops under General William Howe in a marathon staring match called the Boston Siege. The standoff ended in March 1776, when Washington achieved tactical supremacy by placing artillery on Dorchester Heights, forcing Howe to evacuate the city. Abigail Adams watched the British sail away from nearby Penn's Hill. "You may count upwards of 100 & 70 sail," she reported. "They look like a forrest." By then the motley crew of militia was being referred to as the Continental Army, and Washington had become a bona fide war hero. In addition to these major engagements, the British navy had made several raids on the coastal towns of New England, and an ill-fated expedition of 1,000 American troops led by Benedict Arnold, after hacking its way through the Maine wilderness in the dead of winter, suffered a crushing defeat in the attempt to capture the British strong- hold at Quebec. Though most of the military action was restricted to New England and Canada, no reasonable witness could possibly deny that the war for American independence, not yet called the American Revolution, had begun. But if you widen the lens to include the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, the picture becomes quite blurry and downright strange. For despite the mounting carnage, the official position of the congress remained abiding loyalty to the British Crown. The delegates did not go so far as to deny that the war was happening, but they did embrace the curious claim that George III did not know about it. Those British soldiers sailing away from Boston were not His Majesty's troops but "ministerial troops," meaning agents of the British ministry acting without the knowledge of the king. While everyone in the Continental Congress knew this was a fanciful fabrication, it was an utterly essential fiction that preserved the link between the colonies and the crown and thereby held open the possibility of reconciliation. Thomas Jefferson undoubtedly had these motives in mind when he crafted the following words a few months later: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient reasons; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." One might argue that those wounded American boys who were bayoneted to death on Bunker Hill amounted to something more than light and transient reasons. Washington himself, once he learned of those atrocities, let it be known that he had lost all patience with the moderates in the congress who were--it became one of his favorite phrases-- "still feeding themselves on the dainty food of reconciliation." Though he made a point of reminding all his subordinates that the army took its orders from the Continental Congress--civilian control was one of those articles of faith that required no discussion--Washington did not believe he could send brave young men to their deaths for any cause less than American independence. That was what "The Cause" had come to mean for him and for the army. His civilian superiors down in Philadelphia were straggling behind him on the patriotic path, but Washington simply presumed that, sooner or later, they would catch up. In the meantime, however, during the final months of 1775, the military and political sides of the American Revolution were not aligned. There were, in effect, two embodiments of American resistance to British imperialism, two epicenters representing the American response to Parliament's presumption of sovereignty. The Continental Army, under Washington's command, regarded American independence as a foregone conclusion, indeed the only justification for its existence. The Continental Congress regarded American independence as a last resort, and moderate members under the leadership of John Dickinson from Pennsylvania continued to describe it as a suicidal act to be avoided at almost any cost. It was clear at the time, and became only clearer in retrospect, that the obvious strategy of the British government should have been to exploit the gap between these two positions by proposing some reconfiguration of the British Empire that gave the American colonists a measure of control over their domestic affairs in return for a renewed expression of American loyalty to the king. Two years later, the British ministry actually proposed just such an arrangement, but by then it was too late. Too many men had died or been maimed for life, too many women had been raped, too many lives had been altered forever. Nothing less than complete American independence would do. How had it come to this? A comprehensive historical account would need to spend many pages reviewing the constitutional arguments over the preceding decade that began with the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765. A more succinct distillation of political history would cast the core of the constitutional argument as a conflict over the question of sovereignty. The seminal argument on the British side was most clearly and forcefully made by the great British jurist William Blackstone, who, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), insisted in his most authoritative tone that there must in every state reside "a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii ; or the rights of sovereignty reside." In the British Empire, that supreme authority was Parliament. Once you accepted this argument, it followed logically and necessarily that Parliament possessed the authority to levy taxes and make laws for the American colonies. The colonists had resisted that constitutional interpretation, resting their case on the semi-sacred Whig principle that no British citizen could be taxed or required to obey any law that was passed without his consent. And since the American colonists were not represented in Parliament, the statutes passed by that body were not binding on them, who needed to obey only the laws passed by their own colonial legislatures. By the early 1770s, then, the argument had reached a logical and legal impasse in which two conflicting views of the British Empire were forced to coexist: the resoundingly imperial view, in which sovereignty resided in Parliament; and the American view, in which consent was the ultimate priority and sovereignty resided in multiple locations, the only common American allegiance being to the king. The British model took its inspiration from European empires of the past, chiefly the Roman Empire. The American model had no precedents in the past, but fore- shadowed what, a century later, became the British Commonwealth. In 1774 the British government decided that this impasse was intolerable, and in response to a wanton act of destruction in Boston Harbor called the Tea Party, it decided to impose martial law on Massachusetts. In retrospect, this was the crucial decision, for it transformed a constitutional argument into a military conflict. And it raised to relief the competing visions of a British Empire based on either coercion or consensus. But at the time--that is, early in 1775--voices on both sides of the Atlantic urged caution, fully aware that they had more to lose than to gain by a war and wholly committed to avoid it at all costs. On the British side, the arguments to change course came from two of the most prominent members of Parliament. In the House of Lords, no less a leader than William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, the acknowledged architect of the British victory in the French and Indian War, rose to condemn the decision to militarize the conflict. He recommended the withdrawal from Boston of all British troops, who could only serve as incendiaries for a provocative incident that triggered a war. The British government should then negotiate a political settlement in which "the sacredness of their property remain[s] inviolate and subject to their own consent." Pitt was arguing that the American colonies were too valuable to lose, and that the British government would be well advised to give them everything they were asking for. Edmund Burke rose in the House of Commons to make many of the same points, though Burke's emphasis was on the Whig values that the American colonists embraced and on the more menacingly coercive values that the British ministry was advocating. As Burke saw it, the Americans had the better part of the argument, and if a war should ensue, they were likely to win. So the essence of political wisdom was to avoid such a war and the painful consequences it would entail. Pitt and Burke were two of the most eloquent and respected members of Parliament, and taken together, by early 1775, they were warning the British ministry that it was headed toward a war that was unwise, unnecessary, and probably unwinnable. Voices on the other side of the Atlantic also counseled caution and compromise. Within the Continental Congress, most of the moderate delegates came from the middle colonies, chiefly Pennsylvania and New York. For at least two reasons this made excellent sense: first, the full wrath of British policy had been directed at Massachusetts, and while the residents of Philadelphia and New York felt obliged to make common cause with their brethren in Boston, that feeling did not translate into a willingness to be carried over the abyss into some brave new world of American independence; second, the population of the middle colonies was more diverse ethnically, politically, and religiously than New England's, more a demographic stew in which Germans, Scotch-Irish, and French Huguenots coexisted alongside a Quaker elite to create a social chemistry that put a premium on live-and-let-live toleration. As a result, the political as well as the seasonal climate was milder southwest of the Hudson. If the lingering vestiges of Calvinism gave New Englanders like John Adams a sharp edge, prominent leaders in the middle colonies tended to resemble smooth stones that skipped across the surface of troubled waters. It was no accident that Benjamin Franklin would become the self-invented paragon of benevolent equanimity only after moving from Boston to Philadelphia. The epitome of this moderate mentality in the Continental Congress was John Dickinson. Physically as well as psychologically, Dickinson was the opposite of Adams: tall and gaunt, with a somewhat ashen complexion and a deliberate demeanor that conveyed the confidence of his social standing in the Quaker elite and his legal training at the Inns of Court in London. His early exposure to the cosmopolitan world of British society had convinced him that the British Empire was a transatlantic family bound together by mutual interests and mutual affections. Unlike Adams, who regarded Parliament's efforts to impose taxes on the colonies as a systematic plot to enslave them, Dickinson believed these impositions were temporary aberrations, merely another family quarrel, waves that would pass under the ship. During the early years of the imperial crisis, Dickinson was perhaps the most prominent advocate for colonial rights within the empire, chiefly because of a series of pamphlets titled Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer (1768), which argued that Parliament not only lacked the authority to tax the colonists but also could not regulate trade for he purpose of raising revenue. Alongside Adams, he was generally regarded as the most impressive constitutional thinker on the American side, and his selection as a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1774 was a foregone conclusion. But whereas Adams believed that the denial of Parliament's authority must inevitably lead to American withdrawal from the British Empire, Dickinson clung to the conviction that there must be some middle course that preserved colonial rights but averted American independence, which he regarded as an extremely dangerous course. The British were certainly not going to permit the colonists to go in peace, which meant a war that the Americans could not hope to win: We have not yet tasted deeply the bitter Cup called Fortune of War . . . A bloody battle lost . . . Disease breaking out among our troops unaccustomed to the Confinement of Encampment . . . The Danger of Insurrection by Negroes in the Southern Colonies . . . Incidential Proposals to disunite . . . False hopes and selfish Designs may all operate hereafter to our Disadvantage. This was not an unrealistic vision. (Indeed, everything that Dickinson foresaw came to pass.) There was every reason, then, to find a way out of the impasse short of independence. And so, while Dickinson was resolute in his support of the beleaguered citizens of Massachusetts, to include the raising of money and men for a Continental Army, his fondest hope was for the appointment of a peace commission that would travel to London and negotiate some kind of sensible compromise. Though such a commission was never appointed, the outline of a Dickinsonian compromise was reasonably clear. The British minis- try would recognize the sovereignty of the colonial legislatures over all questions of taxation and legislation. The colonists would voluntarily consent to Parliament's regulation of trade, not for the purpose of raising a revenue but to ensure a privileged commercial relationship between the colonies and Great Britain. The colonists would also pro- fess their loyalty to the king and their desire to remain within the protective canopy of his paternal affection. It was, in effect, a return to the status quo ante that existed in 1763, before the British ministry had attempted to impose its misguided imperial reforms. As long as the imperial crisis remained a constitutional conflict, the Dickinsonian compromise provided an eminently viable solution, indeed the obvious answer that British statesmen like Burke and Pitt were prepared to embrace. But once the fighting started in April 1775, and even more so after Bunker Hill, the shift from a constitutional to a military conflict altered the political chemistry forever. Moderates on both sides of the Atlantic were swept to the sidelines, and the obvious compromise became a casualty of war. Excerpted from Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence by Joseph J. Ellis All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.

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