The nine Inside the secret world of the Supreme Court

Jeffrey Toobin

Book - 2008

As the Supreme Court continues to rule on important issues, it is essential to understand how it operates. Based on exclusive interviews with the justices themselves and other insiders, this is a timely "state of the union" about America's most elite legal institution. From Anthony Kennedy's self-importance, to Antonin Scalia's combativeness, to David Souter's eccentricity, and even Sandra Day O'Connor's fateful breach with President George W. Bush, this book offers a rare personal look at how the individual style of each justice affects the way in which they wield their considerable power. Toobin shows how--since Reagan--conservatives were long thwarted in their attempts to control the Court by some ...of the very justices they pressured Presidents to appoint. That struggle ended with the recent appointments of John Roberts and Samuel Alito, and Toobin relays the behind-the-scenes drama in detail, as well as the ensuing 2007 Court term.--From publisher description.

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Subjects
Published
New York : Anchor Books c2008.
Language
English
Main Author
Jeffrey Toobin (-)
Edition
1st Anchor Books ed
Item Description
"With a new afterword"--Cover.
Physical Description
xii, 452 p. ; 20 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (p. [427]-430) and index.
ISBN
9781400096794
  • Prologue: The steps
  • Part one. The Federalist war of ideas
  • Good versus evil
  • Questions presented
  • Collision course
  • Big heart
  • Exiles return?
  • What shall be orthodox
  • Writing separately
  • Cards to the left
  • The year of the rout
  • Part two. To the brink
  • Over the brink
  • Perfectly clear
  • Part three. "A particular sexual act"
  • "A law-profession culture"
  • Before speaking, saying something
  • The green brief
  • "Our executive doesn't"
  • "A great privilege, indeed"
  • Part four. "'G' is for God
  • Retiring the trophy
  • "I know her heart"
  • Dinner at the Just Desserts Café
  • "I am and always have been ..."
  • Phanatics?
  • Epilogue: The steps--closed.
  • Afterword to the Anchor edition.
Review by New York Times Review

THE farewell ceremony for Chief Justice William Rehnquist at the United States Supreme Court in September 2005 offers the kind of monumental tracking shot authors adore. Neatly and conveniently arrayed that day on the marble steps leading into the building, standing, by tradition, in reverse order of seniority, the justices line up. As some of Rehnquist's former law clerks (his soon-to-be successor, John Roberts, among them) carry his casket past his former colleagues, Jeffrey Toobin follows the procession, freezing on each of the justices, then introducing them in turn. But to anyone who watches the court, or watches those who watch it, Toobin's descriptions afford something else, arguably even more interesting: the chance to ponder which of those justices talked to him for this book, and which did not. And talk to him some of them clearly did. Without their off-the-record whispers, there would be no "inside" story of any "secret" world to tell in "The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court." Of course, the myth is that the justices sit sealed on their Olympian perches, forever mum. In truth, some talk when it suits them, to toot their own horns, unburden their souls, allay their loneliness or justify something they've done. They talk very selectively: the more eminent and powerful the reporter or the publication, the more likely such conversations are. One can usually guess who's gabbing, for among those who follow such things, their penchants are well known. But there are other hints, like a certain kindness of tone in whatever ends up on the air or the printed page. With that in mind, let's accompany Toobin up those marble steps. First there's Stephen Breyer, with what Toobin calls his "gregarious good nature." Odds are he spoke, a fair amount. Then Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "frail" and "shy" and, Toobin says, with only marginal influence on her colleagues. Maybe, but she'd have said precious little. Clarence Thomas, we learn, had gotten old and fat since his famously bloody confirmation battle. No way. David Souter "detested Washington" and "cared little what others thought of him." Probably not, but he's quirky enough to have tossed off a tidbit or two. Then Anthony Kennedy, far more worldly and influential than the "conventional, even boring" burgher he first appeared to be. Almost certainly yes. Antonin Scalia looked "lost and lonely" that day: absolutely not. Then Sandra Day O'Connor, about to entrust her seat to President George W. Bush, whom she considered "arrogant, lawless, incompetent and extreme." Her fingerprints - or voice prints - practically leap off the page: how else could Toobin write something so incendiary so confidently? And finally there's John Paul Stevens, "respected by his colleagues, if not really known to them." Highly unlikely. Reading Toobin's smart and entertaining book, these hunches quickly solidify. Sprinkled throughout are quotes, facts, anecdotes, insights and interior monologues that could only have come from particular justices - most conspicuously, O'Connor, Breyer and Kennedy - along with flattering adjectives about each. Toobin, of course, never names names. Try imagining any branch of government - the White House, say, or the State Department - covered solely on the basis of public events and printed releases, with nothing about its inner workings. It's inconceivable. But that's essentially how the Supreme Court beat works. Reporters assigned there rarely venture beyond oral arguments, briefs and decisions. Almost never do they stray from their cubicles. Part of this is perfectly sensible: the court makes most of its news through its opinions, and interpreting them, often heaps of them, at once, on tight deadlines, is damnably (and, maybe, deliberately) difficult. Those who do it well are rare, and they have little time to spare. But it's not the only reason for sticking to the handouts. Going beyond them, getting into the court's internal operations and culture, is nearly impossible. And examining the justices critically, grading the quality and propriety and intellectual honesty of their work, is dangerous: you risk losing whatever tiny chance you have that one of them will talk to you in a pinch or throw you an occasional crumb. So almost no one even tries. No other reporters are as passive as Supreme Court reporters. Details about the drama and passion and pettiness of the place - in other words, about the way it does its work, our work - emerge only years after the fact, and only (as with the posthumous papers of Justice Harry Blackmun) when they are made available to the public. Baghdad bureau chiefs and White House correspondents change every few years for a reason: over time reporters become entrenched or co-opted or burned out. But because covering the court is so difficult, or because everyone likes things as they are, reporters there enjoy an aberrational kind of tenure. Some are there for decades, becoming almost adjuncts of the court, absorbing its elitism, acting as cheerleaders or apologists or scolds, feeding the cult of personality that surrounds its members. Others become quasi justices themselves, handing down clever opinions on opinions rather than ever picking up a phone and asking a few questions. The cartel is not only closed, but, as television news has withered, it is also shrinking. And scholars aren't much help. Many top law professors once clerked on the court; cherishing their relations with the justices, along with the power to pull strings from Cambridge or New Haven or Palo Alto to land similar positions for their students, few dig deeply into court affairs. It all works very neatly; the only ones hurt are the American people, who know little about nine individuals with enormous power over their lives. That is why, every decade or so, an enterprising and intelligent outsider like Toobin can come along and shine a much-needed spotlight on the place. He's pedigreed (Harvard Law School), well connected (The New Yorker, CNN) and visible, the kind of person immured justices like to say they know. Most important, he's not in one of those cubicles. He has an independence and perspective the lifers don't. He's not in awe of the place, not prone to covering it in hushed tones or to writing endlessly about red velvet curtains or black robes. So, not surprisingly, "The Nine" is engaging, erudite, candid and accessible, often hard to put down. Toobin is a natural storyteller, and the stories he tells - how a coalition of centrist justices saved Roe v. Wade; why Rehnquist, despite having loathed the rights granted to criminal suspects by Miranda v. Arizona, eventually declined to overturn the decision; how right-wing firebrands deep-sixed the Supreme Court candidacies of Alberto Gonzales and Harriet Miers - are gripping. But its greatest surprise is that there are few great surprises. Toobin writes about the court more fluidly and fluently than anyone, but his buddies on the bench didn't tell him much we don't already know. LIKE "Supreme Conflict," Jan Crawford Greenburg's recent examination of the same subject, Toobin seeks to plumb the court's deepest mystery: why a tribunal so stuffed with Republicans (there have been only two Democratic nominees in the last 40 years) hasn't shifted more radically rightward. He offers many explanations. Souter, appointed by the first President Bush, was to conservatives a colossal miscalculation. Rehnquist got tired, then sick. Breyer lobbied effectively from the left, or what's left of the left, while Scalia's extremism and blustery condescension miffed those in the middle. Kennedy became enraptured by foreign travel and more liberal foreign jurisprudence. Gay clerks came out of the closet. O'Connor was clearly Toobin's most important source. She's also - readers can decide if it's coincidental - his hero: the justice, he argues, who through her pragmatic, seat-of-the-pants jurisprudence single-handedly kept the court close to the American mainstream, particularly on matters like reproductive freedom and affirmative action. The Rehnquist court was really the O'Connor court, Toobin writes early on. But he's only warming up: before long, the first female justice has shoved aside Eleanor Roosevelt, Margaret Sanger, Harriet Beecher Stowe and Susan B. Anthony to become "the most important woman in American history." Give him another 60 pages, and she's surpassed most of the men as well. This is despite what Toobin himself concedes was her ignoble role in Bush v. Gore, the case that decided the 2000 presidential election. Beat reporters and academics initially denounced the court's involvement in that case, its hastiness to enter the political thicket and the half-baked and strained decision that resulted; but invested in the image of the court as a principled and apolitical institution (and perhaps afraid of offending anyone), they quickly and predictably backed off. Yet even after writing an entire book about that case six years ago, Toobin remains white-hot about it, calling it "one of the lowest moments in the court's history," one that revealed the worst of just about everyone involved. Here he does name names, as no beat reporter has ever done or would ever do, at least nibbling some of the hands that fed him. Only Stevens and Souter are spared. To Toobin's credit, he does not exempt O'Connor. A lifelong Republican - in her memos to Rehnquist, she routinely referred to her party as "we" and "us" - O'Connor played tennis with Barbara Bush, watched approvingly while George W. Bush rose as a "compassionate conservative," looked "stricken" to fellow partygoers on election night 2000 when Al Gore appeared to have won. She determined early on in the litigation to stop the Florida recount, and in the five-to-four decision that followed, her vote was decisive. But her reasoning, as Toobin notes, was more visceral than legal - she hated untidiness, blamed Florida voters for being too stupid to follow instructions and thought Americans wanted the matter settled. She was wrong on both the facts and the law. It was an egregious performance, one that historians will skewer. Or maybe not, given who usually writes these histories. Amid a torrent of criticism, O'Connor clearly held off-the-record conversations with reporters, trying to justify what she had done. Toobin does not mention this, nor the more general issue of the justices' surreptitious ties to the press. Perhaps it's too much to expect. Or perhaps he was just too busy taking down all of O'Connor's ire, because she spends an awful lot of "The Nine" either annoyed, affronted or downright appalled by the events of the past few years. She was appalled, for instance, by former Attorney General John Ashcroft, whom she considered extreme, polarizing, moralistic and - to use her favorite word - "unattractive." She was appalled by how the Bush administration pandered to the religious right in the Terri Schiavo case. She was appalled by the nomination of Harriet Miers. And she's been appalled, too, by Bush's stances on affirmative action, the war on terror and the war in Iraq. And how did she feel when Bush brushed off the report of the Iraq Study Group, to which she belonged? She was appalled. And she was really, really appalled that the lower-court judge whose dissent in one crucial case she deemed "repugnant" - he'd have upheld a Pennsylvania law requiring wives to notify husbands before getting abortions - was the very man Bush picked to replace her: Samuel Alito. A person is welcome to her opinions, but given O'Connor's crucial role in putting Bush in office, such constant off-the-record carping is really a bit much. Toobin, naturally, doesn't challenge her on any of it; when justices talk - and especially when they vent - you just let your tape recorder roll and hope the red light is flickering. But all this spinning makes one appreciate Thomas and Scalia; whatever one thinks of them or their jurisprudence, they speak their pieces in public - for attribution. The book includes beautifully written essays on each of the justices, woven artfully into the narrative. The one on Thomas manages to be both sympathetic and devastating. There's the reclusive Souter, who'd never heard of Diet Coke or of the other "Supremes" (the ones with Diana Ross), and the grandiloquent Kennedy, who toils most over those passages in his opinions he thinks The New York Times will pick up. The book is filled with pithy phrases, crystalline distillations and fine tidbits: the impertinent notes Breyer and Thomas pass one another during oral arguments; O'Connor's efforts to marry off the bachelor Souter; Souter weeping - and contemplating resignation - after the Bush v. Gore decision. But there are significant gaps. Toobin calls relations between the justices "cordial" but, frustratingly, offers only a few elaborations. How Ginsburg and O'Connor, the court's first two women, got along surely warrants more than a sentence or two. Why were O'Connor and Stevens the only colleagues the dying Rehnquist allowed into his home? And who most regularly persuades whom (if, on such a factionalized court, there's any persuasion going on at all)? Can it be true, as Greenburg has written, that at least initially it was not Scalia who influenced Thomas, but the other way around? Much of Toobin's book is based on oral arguments, briefs and opinions - nothing especially "secret" or "inside" about that Sometimes, he actually strays quite far from the court. And he devotes lots of space to musty, antiquarian topics: Warren Burger's vanity, the doomed nomination of Robert Bork, Bill Clinton's attempt to woo Mario Cuomo into a court appointment Going through "The Nine" is a bit like reading one of those Roger Angeli essays on a recent World Series: the writing is exquisite, but the game's been over awhile. Despite the importance of Roberts and Alito, Toobin takes far too long to reach them, then tells us far too little about what kind of men, and justices, and colleagues, they are turning out to be. He had a year to study them and might have told us much the beat reporters couldn't or wouldn't or, in any case, haven't. Describing the body language on the court's last day this past June (Souter seething, Breyer rolling his eyes, Alito staring at Breyer, Roberts's jaw muscles twitching) doesn't really do the trick. Considering the secrecy shrouding the place, just about Toobin's only remaining reportorial option was to try what Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong did in "The Brethren" a generation ago : canvass former law clerks, three or four of whom pass through each chamber every year. They are, as Toobin writes, not nearly as important as they think they are; after all, they're not privy to their bosses' deliberations. And they can be very full of themselves, priggish and protective, even proprietary, about the court. Just ask Edward Lazarus, who in 1998 published an account of his year clerking for Justice Blackmun ; for his breach of omertà, his fellow clerks shunned him at Blackmun's funeral. But there are many, many clerks; they heard - and still hear - a lot; and for all the sycophants and careerists, kingmakers and aspiring federal judges among them, some are surprisingly independent and outspoken, believing that excessive deference to even the most necessarily private branch of government ill serves our democracy. Toobin says he spoke to 75 of them, but anyone writing a book like this simply has to telephone them all, even if 9 of every 10 hang up in a huff. I wish Toobin had done this, because it would have made his book even better. When it comes to covering the United States Supreme Court as a living, breathing, human institution rather than as a collection of icons, "The Nine" is state of the art. But it's an art in need of a renaissance. Toobin plumbs a mystery: why a court so loaded with Republicans hasn't shifted more to the right. David Margolick is a contributing editor at Vanity Fair and the author of "Beyond Glory: Joe Louis vs. Max Schmeling, and a World on the Brink." He once covered legal affairs for The Times.

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [October 27, 2009]
Review by Booklist Review

With every nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court and every decision on the hot-button issues of abortion, gay rights, and affirmative action, it is apparent that the nation's highest court has not escaped the turmoil of deep and growing political divisions. Drawing on interviews with the justices and other insiders, best-selling author Toobin weighs in with an absorbing look at the politics and personalities behind the men and women who adjudicate our most compelling issues. Conservative power brokers have moved to exert more influence on the Supreme Court and its ability to have more lasting impact than the Congress and the presidency. Toobin looks back over the tenure of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the most stable in recent years, the considerable influence of moderate Sandra Day O'Connor, and the growing clout of the more conservative members. Toobin details the behind-the-scenes machinations to determine what cases are heard and under what circumstances, as well as who writes the majority opinion and the dissent, all factors that affect the framing of debate on issues. He also relays the politics and personalities of the justices: Rehnquist, who for 30 years was a regular at a poker game among the Washington power elite; Clarence Thomas, traveling with his wife and grandnephew across country in an RV; David Souter, never accepting gifts; Antonin Scalia, bombastic and opinionated but disappointed at his inability to have a greater impact; and O'Connor's eventual disillusionment with the Bush administration and the Republican Party. A compelling look at the power and the politics behind the Supreme Court.--Bush, Vanessa Copyright 2007 Booklist

From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

It's not laws or constitutional theory that rule the High Court, argues this absorbing group profile, but quirky men and women guided by political intuition. New Yorker legal writer Toobin (The Run of His Life: The People v. O.J. Simpson) surveys the Court from the Reagan administration onward, as the justices wrestled with abortion, affirmative action, the death penalty, gay rights and church-state separation. Despite a Court dominated by Republican appointees, Toobin paints not a conservative revolution but a period of intractable moderation. The real power, he argues, belonged to supreme swing-voter Sandra Day O'Connor, who decided important cases with what Toobin sees as an "almost primal" attunement to a middle-of-the-road public consensus. By contrast, he contends, conservative justices Rehnquist and Scalia ended up bitter old men, their rigorous constitutional doctrines made irrelevant by the moderates' compromises. The author deftly distills the issues and enlivens his narrative of the Court's internal wranglings with sharp thumbnail sketches (Anthony Kennedy the vain bloviator, David Souter the Thoreauvian ascetic) and editorials ("inept and unsavory" is his verdict on the Court's intervention in the 2000 election). His savvy account puts the supposedly cloistered Court right in the thick of American life. (A final chapter and epilogue on the 2006-2007 term, with new justices Roberts and Alito, was unavailable to PW.) (Sept. 18) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Library Journal Review

Forty percent of cases that reach the U.S. Supreme Court produce unanimous decisions. It is the others that pose problems, especially those involving issues that the elected branches of government have failed to resolve. In a sense, the Court serves as political umpire, with its decision making done in secret. The world of the Supreme Court has been probed in books like Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong's The Brethren (about the Burger Court). Toobin (Opening Arguments) follows their pattern with the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, basing his work on interviews with the justices and 75 law clerks (conducted on a not-for-attribution basis). Toobin writes like a skillful literary critic as he attempts to understand the character and values of each justice, their outlook on life, and their jurisprudence. He makes a convincing case that the Rehnquist Court was really Sandra Day O'Connor's moderate Court-she was the swing vote for moderation. Toward the end, Rehnquist largely gave up on transforming the Court in his image. The future direction of the Court, i.e., whether it goes extremist or remains more moderate, is clearly in the hands of the next President. Toobin himself seems hopeful that Justice Stephen Breyer may further promote moderation. Beautifully written, this is an essential purchase for all libraries interested in the contemporary Supreme Court. (The final chapter, on the 2006-07 term, was not available for review.)-William D. Pederson, Louisiana State Univ., Shreveport (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review

Abortion, gay rights, disputed presidential elections and wartime powers have appeared on the Supreme Court docket under chief justices Rehnquist and Roberts, but this occasionally enlightening, often injudicious account focuses more on prickly egos. CNN senior legal analyst and New Yorker staff writer Toobin (Too Close to Call: The Thirty-Six-Day Battle to Decide the 2000 Election, 2001, etc.) raises red flags in noting that he conducted confidential interviews "with the justices and more than seventy-five of their law clerks." All the justices--even press-hostile Clarence Thomas and Washington-allergic David Souter? Since these interviews were "on a not-for-attribution basis," how can we judge, for example, the claim that Sandra Day O'Connor found the presidency of George W. Bush "arrogant, lawless, incompetent, and extreme"? This vague sourcing is regrettable, because much about the justices' personalities and deliberations in the last 20 years appears on the record. Moreover, Toobin displays a gift for narrative and abundant insights into how justice--and justices--get made. We learn that in the waning years of the Rehnquist Court, the justices' isolation meant they influenced each other not in chambers, but in public questions during oral arguments. Over the last two decades, Toobin informs us, even the most conservative justices have grown increasingly tolerant toward gay clerks. In another tidbit, we hear that Mario Cuomo tantalized Bill Clinton with his interest in the vacancy that ultimately went to Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Despite periodic attempts at fairness, Toobin's views color his characterizations. Liberal Stephen Breyer has "an almost messianic belief in the power of reason," while more right-leaning justices are dismissed as crusty (the late Byron White) or "famously pugnacious" (Antonin Scalia). Toobin's surprise that Dubya would appoint justices of his own ideological stripe seems disingenuous. Surely such a well-informed writer is aware of the confirmation reverses suffered by LBJ and Nixon in the 1960s and, at a greater extreme, FDR's court-packing scheme of 1937. A smart brief about the high court that suffers from sometimes dubious and occasionally inadmissible historical evidence. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

1 THE FEDERALIST WAR OF IDEAS For a long time, during the middle of the twentieth century, it wasn't even clear what it meant to be a judicial conservative. Then, with great suddenness, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, judges and lawyers on the right found a voice and an agenda. Their goals reflected and reinforced the political goals of the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Earl Warren, who served as chief justice of the United States from 1953 to 1969, exerted a powerful and lasting influence over American law. The former California governor, who was appointed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, put the fight against state-sponsored racism at the heart of his agenda. Starting in 1954, with Brown v. Board of Education , which outlawed segregation in public education, the justices began more than a dozen years of sustained, and usually unanimous, pressure against the forces of official segregation. Within the legal profession in particular, Warren's record on civil rights gave him tremendous moral authority. Warren and his colleagues, especially William J. Brennan Jr., his close friend and strategist, used that capital to push the law in more liberal directions in countless other areas as well. On freedom of speech, on the rights of criminal suspects, on the emerging field of privacy, the Warren Court transformed American law. To be sure, Warren faced opposition, but many of his Court's decisions quickly worked their way into the permanent substructure of American law. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , which protected newspapers that published controversial speech; Miranda v. Arizona , which established new rules for interrogating criminal suspects; even Griswold v. Connecticut , which announced a right of married people to buy birth control, under the broader heading of privacy-all these cases, along with the Warren Court's many pronouncements on race, became unassailable precedents. Richard M. Nixon won the presidency in part by promising to rein in the liberalism of the Court, but even though he had the good fortune to name four justices in three years, the law itself wound up little changed. Under Warren E. Burger, whom Nixon named to succeed Warren, the Court in some respects became more liberal than ever. It was under Burger that the court approved the use of school busing, expanded free speech well beyond Sullivan , forced Nixon himself to turn over the Watergate tapes, and even, for a time, ended all executions in the United States. Roe v. Wade , the abortion rights decision that still defines judicial liberalism, passed by a 7-2 vote in 1973, with three of the four Nixon nominees (Burger, Lewis F. Powell, and Harry A. Blackmun) in the majority. Only Rehnquist, joined by Byron R. White, appointed by John F. Kennedy, dissented. Through all these years--from the 1950s through the 1970s-the conservatives on the Court like White and Potter Stewart did not differ greatly from their liberal colleagues. The conservatives were less willing to second-guess the work of police officers and to reverse criminal convictions; they were more willing to limit remedies for past racial discrimination; they deferred somewhat more to elected officials about how to organize and run the government. But on the big legal questions, the war was over, and the liberals had won. And their victories went  beyond the judgments of the Supreme Court. The Warren Court transformed virtually the entire legal culture, especially law schools. *** It was not surprising, then, that on the day after Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in 1980, Yale Law School went into mourning. On that day, Steven Calabresi's torts professor canceled class to talk about what was happening in the country. The mood in the room was one of bewilderment and hurt. At the end, the teacher asked for a show of hands among the ninety first-year students before him. How many had voted for Carter and how many for Reagan? Only Calabresi and one other student had supported the Republican. The informal poll revealed a larger truth about law schools at the time. Most professors at these institutions were liberal, a fact that reflected changes that had taken place in the profession as a whole. The left-leaning decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts had become a reigning orthodoxy, and support among faculty for such causes as affirmative action and abortion rights was overwhelming. But even law schools were not totally immune from the trends that were pushing the nation's politics to the right, and a small group of students like Calabresi decided to turn these inchoate tendencies into something more enduring. Along with Lee Liberman and David McIntosh, two friends from Yale College who had gone on to law school at the University of Chicago, Calabresi decided to start an organization that would serve as a platform to discuss and advocate conservative ideas in legal thought. They considered several names that would showcase their erudition-"The Ludwig von Mises Society," and "The Alexander Bickel Society"-but they settled on a more elegant choice. They called themselves the Federalist Society, after the early American patriots who fought for the ratification of the Constitution in 1789. Calabresi's guide on the Yale Law School faculty was Professor Robert Bork. Liberman and McIntosh started a Federalist branch at Chicago and recruited as their first faculty adviser a professor named Antonin Scalia. The idea for a conservative legal organization was perfectly timed, and not just because of the Republican ascendancy in electoral politics. In this period, liberalism may have been supreme at law schools, but it was hardly an intellectually dynamic force. In the 1960s, liberal scholars at Yale and elsewhere were writing the law review articles that gave intellectual heft to the decisions of the Warren Court, but by the eighties, the failures of the Carter administration turned many traditional Democrats away from the practical realities of law to a more exotic passion--advocating (or decrying) a movement known as Critical Legal Studies. Drawing heavily on the work of thinkers like the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and the French poststructuralist Jacques Derrida, CLS devotees attacked the idea that law could be a system of neutral principles, or even one that could create a fairer and more just society. Rather, they viewed law mainly as a tool of oppression that the powerful used against the weak. Whatever its ultimate merits, CLS was singularly inconsequential outside the confines of law schools, its nihilism and extremism rendering it largely irrelevant to the work of judges and lawmakers. At law schools, then, the field was largely open for a vigorous conservative insurgency. So the Federalist Society both reflected and propelled the growth of the conservative movement. It held its first national conference in 1982, and by the following year there were chapters in more than a dozen law schools. Recognizing the intellectual potential of the society, conservative organizations like the John M. Olin and Scaife foundations made important early grants that allowed the Federalists to establish a full-time office in Washington. The Reagan administration began hiring Federalist members as staffers and, of course, appointing them as judicial nominees, with Bork and Scalia as the most famous examples. (Bork and Scalia both went on the D.C. Circuit in 1982. Calabresi himself went on to be a professor of law at Northwestern.) The young Federalists who started organizing in the early eighties did not merely strive to recapitulate the tactics of their conservative elders. The prior generation, those who waged their decorous battle against the extremes of the Warren Court, preferred "judicial restraint" to "judicial activism." For conservatives like Justices Stewart or John Marshall Harlan II, who were two frequent dissenters from Warren Court decisions, the core idea was that judges should defer to the democratic branches of government and thus resist the temptation to overturn statutes or veto the actions of government officials. But the new generation of conservatives had more audacious goals. Indeed, they did not believe in judicial restraint, and they represented a new kind of judicial activism themselves. They believed that constitutional law had taken some profoundly wrong turns, and they were not shy about demanding that the courts take the lead in restoring the rightful order. *** With the election of Ronald Reagan, conservative ideas suddenly had important new sponsors in Washington. Reagan was elected on promises of shrinking the federal government, which he proposed to do by cutting the budgets for social programs. Many in the Federalist Society sought a legal route to the same goal. Back in 1905, the Supreme Court had said in Lochner v. New York that a law that set a maximum number of hours for bakers was unconstitutional because it violated the bakers' freedom of contract under the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of "liberty" and "property." By the 1940s, the Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme Court had repudiated the " Lochner era," and for decades no one had seriously suggested that there might be constitutional limits on the scope of the federal government's power. Then, suddenly, in the Reagan years, some conservatives started questioning that wisdom and asserting that much of what the federal government did was unconstitutional. (The second event ever sponsored by the Federalist Society was a speech at Yale in 1982 by Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago Law School in favor of Lochner v. New York .) While Reagan was arguing that Congress should not pass regulations, the Federalists were saying that, under the Constitution, Congress could not . Edwin Meese III, Reagan's attorney general in his second term, provided a framework for the emerging conservative critique of the Warren and Burger era when he called for a "jurisprudence of original intention." The words of the Constitution, he said, meant only what the authors of the document thought they meant. Or, as the leading "originalist," Robert Bork, put it, "The framers' intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise from which constitutional analysis may proceed." According to Bork, the meaning of the words did not evolve over time. This was an unprecedented view of the Constitution in modern times. Even before the Warren Court, most justices thought that the words of the Constitution were to be interpreted in light of a variety of factors, beyond just the intentions of the framers. As the originalists' greatest adversary, William Brennan, observed in 1985, "the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs." In large measure, the debate over original intent amounted to a proxy for the legal struggle over legalized abortion. No one argued that the authors of the Constitution intended for their words to prohibit states from regulating a woman's reproductive choices; to Bork and Scalia, that ended the debate over whether the Supreme Court should protect a woman's right to choose. If the framers did not believe that the Constitution protected a woman's right to an abortion, then the Supreme Court should never recognize any such right either. In the Roe decision itself, Harry Blackmun had acknowledged that the words of the Constitution did not compel his decision. "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy," Blackmun had written, but the Court had over time "recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." The interpretive leap of Roe was Blackmun's conclusion for the Court that "this right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." And it was this conclusion above all that the new generation of conservatives in Washington during the Reagan years began trying to persuade the Court to reverse. *** One of those young lawyers was Samuel A. Alito Jr., who was just six years out of law school when he joined the staff of the Justice Department shortly after Reagan was inaugurated in 1981. Four years later, he was presented with a classic dilemma for a committed legal conservative: how best to persuade the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade -all at once or a little bit at a time? In 1982, Pennsylvania had tightened its restrictions on abortion, including requiring that women be prevented from undergoing the procedure without first hearing a detailed series of announcements about its risks. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had declared most of the new rules unconstitutional--as violations of the right to privacy and the rule of Roe v. Wade . Alito had joined the staff of the solicitor general, the president's chief advocate before the Supreme Court, and he was assigned the job of suggesting how best to attack the Third Circuit's decision and persuade the Supreme Court to preserve the Pennsylvania law. Around that time, over the Reagan administration's objection, a majority of the justices had reaffirmed their support of Roe . The question for Alito was what to do in light of the justices' intransigence. In a memo to his boss on May 30, 1985, Alito wrote, "No one seriously believes that the Court is about to overrule Roe . But the Court's decision to review [the Pennsylvania case] may be a positive sign." He continued, "By taking these cases, the Court may be signaling an inclination to cut back. What can be made of this opportunity to advance the goals of bringing about the eventual overruling of Roe v. Wade and, in the meantime, of mitigating its effects?" Alito wound up recommending an aggressive line of attack against Roe. "We should make clear that we disagree with Roe v. Wade and would welcome the opportunity to brief the issue of whether, and if so to what extent, that decision should be overruled," he wrote; at the same time, the Justice Department should defend the Pennsylvania law as consistent with Roe and the Court's other abortion decisions. The solicitor general filed a brief much in line with what Alito recommended, but the case, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists , turned out to be a clear defeat for the Reagan administration. In a stinging, almost contemptuous opinion, written by Blackmun, the Court rejected the Pennsylvania law, declaring, "The States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies." In a plain message to the conservative activists now in charge at the Justice Department, he wrote, "The constitutional principles that led this Court to its decisions in 1973 still provide the compelling reason for recognizing the constitutional dimensions of a woman's right to decide whether to end her pregnancy." Raising the rhetorical stakes, Blackmun went on to quote Earl Warren's words for the Court in Brown v. Board of Education : "It should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them." To Blackmun, the war on Roe was morally little different from the "massive resistance" that met the Court's desegregation decisions a generation earlier. But while Roe commanded a majority of seven justices in 1973, the decision in Thornburgh was supported by only a bare majority of five in 1986. So within the Reagan administration, the lesson of the case was obvious--and one that conservatives took to heart. They didn't need better arguments; they just needed new justices. From the Hardcover edition. Excerpted from The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court by Jeffrey Toobin All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.