Getting to yes Negotiating agreement without giving in

Roger Fisher, 1922-2012

Book - 2011

"Since it was first published in 1981, Getting to Yes has become a central book in the Business Canon: the key text on the psychology of negotiation. Its message of "principled negotiations"--finding acceptable compromise by determining which needs are fixed and which are flexible for negotiating parties--has influenced generations of businesspeople, lawyers, educators and anyone who has sought to achieve a win-win situation in arriving at an agreement. It has sold over 8 million copies worldwide in 30 languages, and since it was first published by Penguin in 1991 (a reissue of the original addition with Bruce Patton as additional coauthor) has sold over 2.5 million copies--which places it as the #10 bestselling title overall... in Penguin Books, and #3 bestselling nonfiction title overall. We have recently relicensed the rights to Getting to Yes, and will be doing a new revised edition--a 30th anniversary of the original publication and 20th of the Penguin edition. The authors will be bringing the book up to date with new material and a assessment of the legacy and achievement of Getting to Yes after three decades"--

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Subjects
Published
New York : Penguin 2011.
Language
English
Main Author
Roger Fisher, 1922-2012 (-)
Other Authors
William Ury (-), Bruce Patton
Edition
Third edition, revised edition
Physical Description
xxix, 204 pages : illustrations ; 20 cm
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN
9780143118756
Contents unavailable.
Review by Kirkus Book Review

The findings of the Harvard Negotiation Project on the subject of getting what you need--not necessarily what you initially want--in negotiations from the humblest landlord-tenant dispute to complex international crises. Harvard Law professor Fisher, an armchair-negotiator in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs, 1972), was active in negotiating the hostage release; Ury, a Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law, helped direct the Negotiation Project. The recommended procedure, as they explain it, has four basic steps: separate the people from the problem; address underlying interests and needs rather than becoming deadlocked into rigid positions; consider multiple options for solution; and insist that the outcome be based on an objective criterion rather than the triumph of one party's will. This is the style of negotiating that has become most popular recently; it stresses something for everybody, or a win-win stance, rather than how-to-outwit. But the Fisher-Ury method is a little more detailed and thoughtful than most attempts at designing a successful negotiating approach, so it ultimately inspires more confidence. In the area of considering interests rather than positions, for example, they stress that the Israelis and Arabs were hopelessly deadlocked as long as each of them insisted on total control of the Sinai. When negotiators took into account Israel's primary interest in security and Egypt's overriding interest in sovereignty, the Camp David accord was made possible by giving Egypt the Sinai itself but demilitarizing crucial areas. On a more mundane level, a librarian solved a dispute of two patrons over an open window (fresh air vs. draft) not by leaving the window half open--which would have satisfied no one--but by opening a window in an adjoining room. Fisher and Ury also have some ideas on what to do if the other guy is more powerful, or ""won't play,"" or uses dirty tricks (e.g., negotiate about the rules of the game). Insofar as possible--not all cases, it's acknowledged, lend themselves to the approach--this gives the reader a better handle on winning agreement than just about any other guide around. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Chapter 4: Invent Options for Mutual Gain The case of Israel and Egypt negotiating over who should keep how much of the Sinai Peninsula illustrates both a major problem in negotiation and a key opportunity. the pie that leaves both parties satisfied. Often you are negotiating along a single dimension, such as the amount of territory, the price of a car, the length of a lease on an apartment, or the size of a commission on a sale. At other times you face what appears to be an either/or choice that is either markedly favorable to you or to the other side. In a divorce settlement, who gets the house? Who gets custody of the children? You may see the choice as one between winning and losing- and neither side will agree to lose. Even if you do win and get the car for $12,000, the lease for five years, or the house and kids, you have a sinking feeling that they will not let you forget it. Whatever the situation, your choices seem limited. option like a demilitarized Sinai can often make the difference between deadlock and agreement. One lawyer we know attributes his success directly to his ability to invent solutions advantageous to both his client and the other side. He expands the pie before dividing it. Skill at inventing options is one of the most useful assets a negotiator can have. Yet all too often negotiators end up like the proverbial children who quarreled over an orange. After they finally agreed to divide the orange in half, the first child took one half, ate the fruit, and threw away the peel, while the other threw away. the fruit and used the peel from the second half in baking a cake. All too often negotiators "leave money on the table" - they fail to reach agreement when they might have, or the agreement they do reach could have been better for each side. Too many negotiations end up with half an orange for each side instead of the whole fruit for one and the whole peel for the other. Why? DIAGNOSIS As valuable as it is to have many options, people involved in a negotiation rarely sense a need for them. In a dispute, people usually believe that they know the right answer - their view should prevail. In a contract negotiation they are equally likely to believe that their offer is reasonable and should be adopted, perhaps with some adjustment in the price. All available answers appear to lie along a straight line between their position and yours. Often the only creative thinking shown is to suggest splitting the difference. inventing of an abundance of options: (1) premature judgment; (2) searching for the single answer; (3) the assumption of a fixed pie; and (4) thinking that "solving their problem is their problem." In order to overcome these constraints, you need to understand them. Premature judgment Inventing options does not come naturally. Not inventing is the normal state of affairs, even when you are outside a stressful negotiation. If you were asked to name the one person in the world most deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize, any answer you might start to propose would immediately encounter your reservations and doubts. How could you be sure that that person was the most deserving? Your mind might well go blank, or you might throw out a few answers that would reflect conventional thinking: "Well, maybe the Pope, or the President." pounce on the drawbacks of any new idea. Judgment hinders imagination. sense is likely to be sharper. Practical negotiation appears to call for practical thinking, not wild ideas. on the other side. Suppose you are negotiating with your boss over your salary for the coming year. You have asked for a $4,000 raise; your boss has offered you $1,500, a figure that you have indicated is unsatisfactory. In a tense situation like this you are not likely to start inventing imaginative solutions. You may fear that if you suggest some bright half-baked idea like taking half the increase in a raise and half in additional benefits, you might look foolish. Your boss might say, "Be serious. You know better than that. It would upset company policy. I am surprised. that you even suggested it." If on the spur of the moment you invent a possible option of spreading out the raise over time, he may take it as an offer: "I'm prepared to start negotiating on that basis." Since he may take whatever you say as a commitment, you will think twice before saying anything. piece of information that will jeopardize your bargaining position. If you should suggest, for example, that the company help finance the house you are about to buy, your boss may conclude that you intend to stay and that you will in the end accept any raise in salary he is prepared to offer. Searching for the single answer In most people's minds, inventing simply is not part of the negotiating process. People see their job as narrowing the gap between positions, not broadening the options available. They tend to think, "We're having a hard enough time agreeing as it is. The last thing we need is a bunch of different ideas." Since the end product of negotiation is a single decision, they fear that freefloating discussion will only delay and confuse the process. the second is premature closure. By looking from the outset for the single best answer, you are likely to short-circuit a wiser decision-making process in which you select from a large number of possible answers. The assumption of a fixed pie A third explanation for why there may be so few good options on the table is that each side sees the situation as essentially either/or - either I get what is in dispute or you do. A negotiation often appears to be a "fixed-sum" game; $100 more for you on the price of a car means $100 less for me. Why bother to invent if all the options are obvious and I can satisfy you only at my own expense? Thinking that "solving their problem Is their problem" A final obstacle to inventing realistic options lies in each side's concern with only its own immediate interests. For a negotiator to reach an agreement that meets his own self-interest he needs to develop a solution which also appeals to the self-interest of the other. Yet emotional involvement on one side of an issue makes it difficult to achieve the detachment necessary to think up wise ways of meeting the interests of both sides: "We've got enough problems of our own; they can look after theirs." There also frequently exists a psychological reluctance to accord any legitimacy to the views of the other side; it seems disloyal to think up ways to satisfy them. Shortsighted self- concern thus leads a negotiator to develop only partisan positions, partisan arguments, and one-sided solutions.... Excerpted from Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In by Roger Fisher, William Ury, Bruce Patton All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.