The Battle of Waterloo

Eminent British military historian Black narrates Napoléon's final defeat in 1815 amid an analysis of military methods of the period. Reviewing theories for deployment of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, Black recounts their practical results in the Napoleonic Wars, rating the 1812 Battle of Borodino as the harbinger of Waterloo. In both, Napoléon adopted the frontal assault, but at Waterloo, Black argues, his poor coordination between the infantry and cavalry probably denied the French a victory in the battle's early hours, when the initial attack pierced Wellington's line but was thrown back. If a critic of Napoléon's battlefield decisions, Black is not a facile one; he underscores options available to Napoléon during the daylong carnage's changing tactical situation; they finally vanished when the Prussian army arrived and crushed the French right flank. Black's consideration of Wellington's command performance is equally subtle and supports the British general's pithy quotation of Waterloo as the nearest-run thing you ever saw. Incorporating the international political context, Black's incisive appraisal taps the enduring interest in this ghastly, decisive battle.--Taylor, Gilbert Copyright 2010 Booklist

Cool British resolve defeats heavy-handed Gallic bluster in this probing study of the famous battle. University of Exeter military historian Black gives a lucid, if sometimes disjointed, narrative of the 1815 Waterloo campaign, set within a canny analysis of the grand strategy of the Napoleonic wars and of technological and organizational developments in 18th-century warfare. The author is disdainful of Napoleon's generalship in his last battle. In Black's reckoning, the French emperor is overconfident and lethargic, sitting in the rear and launching masses of infantry, artillery, and cavalry in unimaginative frontal assaults. Wellington, by contrast, is brave, shrewd, and energetic, always up front and under fire, encouraging his men and waiting for an opening to counterattack. Black paints a well-balanced portrait of the time, moving easily from the level of operations where generals plan and blunder to the firing line where common soldiers slaughter each other. He's at his most provocative in assessing Waterloo's world-historical import. Wellington's triumph is often judged a victory of reaction over revolution, but Black argues the opposite:the British, he cogently insists, were the era's real agents of change and progress, clearing away the "dead end"of Napoleon's bloody adventurism. (Mar. 16) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

There has been an almost untold number of books written about the Battle of Waterloo, and, with the bicentennial just around the corner (2015), there will be countless more. Enter prolific British military historian Black (history, Univ. of Exeter; War: A Short History) with an interesting approach to the battle, placing it in the broader context of its era. Black presents a short account of Waterloo set against the canvas of world events during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, focusing on the changing nature of warfare, in part a result of major power shifting across Europe at the time. Napoleon faced an entirely different alliance of enemies when he left exile on Elba to retake power than when he had originally left France for Elba. Tactics that were successful before proved not to be so at Waterloo, and Black emphasizes the military modernization occurring with the Allies who fought Napoleon there. The author also devotes some time to the subsequent treatment of the battle in the countries that had been engaged there. VERDICT One of the better short accounts of this crucial battle, done with a nice adjustment of approach. Recommended.-David Lee Poremba, Windermere, FL (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

Chapter One EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WARFARE AND THE CHALLENGE OF REVOLUTION At waterloo, the army that apparently encapsulated change, the French army of the Emperor Napoleon, was stopped by another, the British army of Arthur, Duke of Wellington, that was essentially an eighteenth- century force in its composition, culture, and methods. This contrast needs emphasizing because it undercuts much of the standard analysis of military history, with its repeated stress on the positive consequences of change and its ranking of military capability in terms of the welcoming of change. This is an issue that is pertinent for warfare and that we will also address more generally in Chapter . Waterloo, of course, was more than an eighteenth-century victory over the Napoleonic aftermath of the French Revolution, yet that description captures an important aspect of the battle. It is therefore appropriate to begin by considering eighteenth-century ancien régime (old regime, pre-1789) warfare before turning to the impact of the French Revolution, which broke out in 1789. The space this book devotes to conflict before the Napoleonic Wars might appear surprising, but it is important to remember that standard modern linear perceptions of warfare as a condition experiencing continual change, with past episodes appearing anachronistic due to very different conditions, notably weaponry, were not pertinent for the period of this book and, indeed, are of only limited value for modern warfare. By modern battle standards, both ancien régime and French Revolutionary/Napoleonic combat relied on close-quarter fighting by soldiers who could see each other. In terms of the proximity of the combatants, Waterloo encapsulated this point, even if gunpowder smoke ensured that they could not see clearly, and indeed this smoke led both to confusion and to a high level of unpredictability at the level of individual combatants. This confusion and unpredictability affected the accounts they left and help explain discrepancies between them. In Europe, the weapons of the various armies (and navies) of the period were similar, and differences between the weapons did not generally account for victory or defeat. The key infantry deployment was linear, as the standard weapon, a flintlock musket equipped with a bayonet, led to long, thin linear formations based on a shoulder-to- shoulder drill designed to maximize firepower. This ensured that casualty rates could be extremely high, particularly as a result of the exchange of fire at close quarters between lines of tightly packed troops. Low muzzle velocity led often to wounds without the victim being knocked over, but these wounds were dreadful, because, the more slowly a projectile travels, the more damage it does as it bounces off bones and internal organs. As a result, the real point of drill and discipline was defensive: to prepare a unit to remain intact, and tractable to its commander, in the face of death and injuries and regardless of the casualties. Waterloo provided numerous instances of this, notably from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., with the British squares exposed to deadly French artillery fire in support of repeated cavalry attacks. Despite the bayonets on the firearms carried by infantry, hand-to-hand fighting on the eighteenth-century battlefield was relatively uncommon, and most casualties were caused by shot, which indeed remained the case at Waterloo. The hand-to-hand fighting that occurred at Waterloo reflected the breakdown of conventional tactics, notably in the struggle for particular strongpoints such as La Haie Sainte. Alongside the relative infrequency of hand-to-hand fighting, the accuracy of muskets and, indeed, of most musketeers was limited, which led to deployment at close range. In 1985, the historian Arthur Ferrill discussed how the Macedonian leader Alexander the Great (r. 336--323 b.c.), popularly regarded as the greatest general in antiquity, c Excerpted from The Battle of Waterloo by Jeremy Black All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.