The myth of the rational voter Why democracies choose bad policies

This engaging and provocative volume describes why democracy gives us far less than its promise. Countering existing theories of rationally ignorant voters, Caplan (economics, George Mason Univ.) argues persuasively that voters are irrational, registering systematically biased beliefs--and consequently votes--against markets and other sound economic policy metrics. For example, the average American overwhelmingly favors increasing the minimum wage and disfavors free trade and immigration. This counters the near unanimous agreement among economists that a minimum wage hurts the least skilled, that trade barriers make us poorer on net, and that increasing immigration makes the US richer. The result is bad economic policy by politicians who must appeal to their constituency to get elected and stay in office. Despite this reviewer's (at least partial) disagreement with Caplan's theory (he is not fully convincing that voters are not simply impulsive and face high learning costs), and certainly with his remedy (that people who think like Caplan should control economic policy making), this is a compelling book, offering readers a well-written and well-argued competing theory for why democracy fails and why we should limit what is done through the political process. Summing Up: Highly recommended. All levels. M. Steckbeck Campbell University

Caplan, an associate professor of economics, believes that empirical proof of voter irrationality is the key to a realistic picture of democracy and, thus, how to approach and improve it. Focusing on how voters are systematically mistaken in their grasp of economics-according to Caplan, the No. 1 area of concern among voters in most election years-he effectively refutes the "miracle" of aggregation, showing that an uninformed populace will often vote against measures that benefit the majority. Drawing extensively from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, Caplan discusses how rational consumers often make irrational voters, why it?s in politicians? interest to foment that irrationality, what economists make of the (non) existence of systematic bias and how social science?s "misguided insistence that every model be a ?story without fools,? " has led them to miss the crucial questions in politics, "where folly is central." Readers unfamiliar with economic theory and its attendant jargon may find themselves occasionally (but only momentarily) lost; otherwise the text is highly readable and Caplan?s arguments are impressively original, shedding new light on an age-old political economy conundrum. (June) Copyright 2007 Reed Business Information.