The terror years From al-Qaeda to the Islamic State

Lawrence Wright, 1947-

Book - 2016

"Eleven powerful pieces first published in The New Yorker recall the path terror in the Middle East has taken from a more peaceful time in 1990s Israel to the recent beheadings of reporters by ISIS.With the Pulitzer Prize-winning The Looming Tower, Lawrence Wright became generally acknowledged as one of our major journalists writing on terrorism in the Middle East. This collection draws on several articles he wrote while researching that book as well as many that he's written since, following where and how Al Qaeda and its core cult-like beliefs have morphed and spread. They include: a picture of Saudi Arabia under the control of the religious police; the Syrian film industry, then compliant at the edges but already exuding a feel...ing of the barely masked fury that erupted into civil war; Israel and Hamas waging war over Gaza. Others continue to look into Al-Qaeda as it forms a master plan for its future, experiences a rebellion from within the organization, and spins off a growing web of terror in the world. The American response is covered in profiles of two FBI agents and a head of the CIA. It ends with the recent devastating capture and beheadings by ISIS of four American journalists and how our government handled the situation"--

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Subjects
Published
New York : Alfrred A. Knopf 2016.
Language
English
Main Author
Lawrence Wright, 1947- (author)
Edition
First edition
Physical Description
xiii, 366 pages ; 25 cm
ISBN
9780385352055
  • Prologue
  • The Man Behind Bin Laden
  • The Counterterrorist
  • The Agent
  • The Kingdom of Silence
  • The Terror Web
  • Captured on Film
  • The Master Plan
  • The Spymaster
  • The Rebellion Within
  • Captives
  • Five Hostages
  • Epilogue
  • Index
Review by Choice Review

The Terror Years is not a scholarly work. Written in an engaging style, it should be of interest to the general reader. However, Wright provides insights into the terrorist mindset and those involved in counterterrorism that should be of interest to both scholars and analysts. The chapters on al Zawahiri, Bin Laden's second in command, the terror web, and the rebellion within are particularly relevant in that they provide important insights into factors leading individuals to become radicalized. Similarly, the chapter focusing on Saudi Arabia provides important insights into aspects of Saudi culture that appeared to promote radicalism. Chapters entitled "The Counterterrorist" and "The Spymaster" provide reasoned analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of efforts to address the terrorist threat. The vignette focusing on the capture of five hostages highlights in graphic detail the difficulties faced by the US in addressing relatively narrow terrorist acts. Although the book provides few specific suggestions for addressing terrorism, the epilogue provides some insightful analysis regarding what apparently does not work as a means of containing terror. Summing Up: Recommended. All readership levels. --Christopher W. Herrick, Muhlenberg College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by New York Times Review

AS THE WARS in Afghanistan and Iraq have begun to dwindle, however fitfully, in the national rearview mirror, they have come to be regarded not as, respectively, "the war of necessity" and "the war of choice," or "the right war" and "the wrong war," but rather as the two leading specimens of a catastrophically mistaken era of intervention. Realist scholars like Michael Mandelbaum and critics of American power like Andrew Bacevich tell us that the failure of such "nation building" efforts was foreordained - and richly deserved. If that's right, perhaps the time has finally come to abandon our reformist mission civilisatrice. J. Kael Weston may be better suited to answer this question than any man alive. He spent seven harrowing years on the front lines of both wars as a State Department official serving as a political adviser to American troops. Some readers may recognize his name, for Weston is the civilian hero of "Little America," Rajiv Chandrasekaran's book about Obama's counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan - a diplomat of great bravery, erudition and heart who befriended Afghans and stood up to his own superiors. The author of "The Mirror Test" is recognizably that figure. Weston chose to spend three years in the Mad Max inferno of Falluja, much of it in a tiny post where he was the only civilian embedded with two dozen Marines. He had a front-row seat for the slaughter that ensued when American forces were ordered, in 2004, to retake the city from insurgents, obliterating much of it in the process. Weston essentially assigned himself the job of finding local partners willing to work with Americans to rebuild Falluja in exchange for endless stacks of American money, and, even more urgently, to function as the city's informal government. That, as Weston knew, is how counterinsurgency wars are won - not by killing bad guys but by defeating their cause in the minds of ordinary citizens. Counterinsurgency is a battle for political legitimacy - and the insurgents fought back remorselessly. Virtually every Iraqi courageous or crazy enough to join Weston's cause was murdered. But Weston also describes America's unwitting connivance with its enemies. In the fall of 2005, United States special forces troops in their ubiquitous Black Hawk helicopters swooped in to kidnap a young Falluja woman, Sara al-Jumaili, thought to be the girlfriend of an insurgent kingpin. They had not, of course, asked anyone about the political consequences of doing so. All Falluja assumed Sara had been seized in order to be raped at an American base. The city was up in arms. In a desperate act that he describes as insubordination, Weston wrote to George Casey, the commanding officer in Iraq: "It is 1651 [4:51 p.m.] on Thursday. If Sara al-Jumaili is not released before Friday prayers, Marines and civilians will die." Sara was released, but too late to prevent a disaster. Sheikh Hamza, Falluja's revered grand mufti and Weston's most prized recruit to local governance, had refused to publicly denounce the Americans, knowing that doing so would unleash a spasm of violence. One month later, Sheikh Hamza was gunned down outside his mosque. All of Weston's efforts had been for naught. He was enraged - at political leaders in Washington, diplomats in Baghdad, special forces commanders in Tampa Although counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq - the surge - is widely considered a success, Weston shows us, in miniature, how the military imperative of killing terrorists consistently trumped the political one of empowering local actors. Today, of course, Iraq has a dysfunctional Shia-dominated government threatened by the Sunni terrorists of ISIS. "The Mirror Test" is a memoir, not a policy paper. Weston writes of the consuming guilt he felt after he authorized a mission that led to the death of 31 Marines in a helicopter crash. Large portions of the book are devoted to his travels back home, visiting the grave sites in a search for expiation, or working with wounded vets. Here Weston seems to be fulfilling an obligation to himself rather than to the reader. The emotional core of "The Mirror Test" is Weston's profound love for the Marines, whose stoic warrior culture and bottomless commitment to one another he embraces. This reverence, however, blurs the book's intellectual outlines, since Weston's buddies don't share either his horror of the wars or his commitment to putting politics and diplomacy first. Like President Obama, whom he greatly admires, Weston considered the Iraq war an appalling mistake but Afghanistan the right war. Once he arrived in Khost Province, a lawless region bordering on Pakistan, Weston found, to his genuine delight, that the Afghans seemed to be open to American help in a way the Iraqis were not. Even enemies received him, if often stonily. Weston visited a madrasa run by a notoriously fundamentalist and anti-American imam. He befriended students there by speaking to them honestly, and by urging that they receive English and computer classes. He insisted, to the horror of his Marine guards, on meeting with allegedly reformed Taliban. Yet Weston could not persuade Washington, or Kabul, to turn his daring initiatives into policy. And his superior under President Obama, Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, lost the argument for a diplomacy-first policy. In Khost, Weston learns of a "Captain Barr," a Marine commander from years earlier whom the Afghans still remembered with love. No doubt "Kael Weston" is another such name preserved among both Iraqis and Afghans. Yet what Weston built endures only in memory. The Afghan cause may have been just, unlike the Iraqi one, but the American solution has not worked in either place. Future Westons - and one hopes there will be many - will have to work on a more modest scale, with fewer Marines. LAWRENCE WRIGHT HAS reached the stage of journalistic eminence at which his magazine work is collected in an anthology. "The Terror Years" consists of 11 articles about terrorism that originally appeared in The New Yorker. In those pieces, Wright found people to talk to - relatives of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahri - whom others had missed, and wove his research, in the New Yorker way, into a fine tapestry of personal experience and unobtrusive reflection. Whether we need to read them for a second time, however, is another matter. Wright has the good manners not to paste in contemporary reflections in order to pretend, as anthologists often do, that the parts somehow cohere into a whole. They don't; they're magazine articles. That said, while the passage of time has rendered some of the pieces old hat, others are edged with retrospective significance. In "Captured on Film," Wright offers a group portrait of the Syrian film scene. In this "stifled and paralyzed country," directors while away endless hours in Damascene cafes, surviving on measly stipends from the National Film Organization, wondering just how far they can raise their voices, just how much they can slip past the censors. But Syria is no longer stifled; it's shredded. Yesterday's genteel melancholy is today's unimaginable luxury. Maybe filmmakers still linger in the Raw da Cafe; but the truth about Syria now lies beyond the reach of satire, of allegory, of fiction itself. It is worth noting that Syria has descended into nightmare not in the aftermath of American intervention, but in its absence. Perhaps the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions really were a terrible, irremediable mistake, but it is a delusion to imagine that these profoundly damaged places will survive, much less thrive, on their own. Americans have learned all too well that they can't do everything in the Middle East; they are now also learning the dangers of doing nothing. JAMES TRAUB is the author of "John Quincy Adams: Militant Spirit." He is a columnist and contributor at foreignpolicy.com.

Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [September 11, 2016]
Review by Booklist Review

During his tenure as a staff writer for the New Yorker, Wright (Thirteen Days in September, 2014) has built a reputation as a leading authority on Middle East terrorism, in part for his acclaimed study on al-Qaeda, The Looming Tower (2006), which garnered a Pulitzer Prize. The research that Wright did for the 10 essays contained in his latest work, all of which first appeared in the magazine, also contributed to Wright's deeper insight into the jihadist mindset, including its latest embodiment in ISIS. In The Man behind Bin Laden Wright recounts his return to Egypt, where he taught English decades earlier, to investigate the background of Bin Laden's sidekick Ayman al-Zawahiri, describing a country embroiled in post-9/11 political turmoil. The Counterterrorist profiles John O'Neill, the former FBI head of counterterrorism who sadly and ironically died in the 2001 attacks shortly after he became the World Trade Center's security chief. Other pieces on Saudi Arabia, ISIS violence, and Israel round out a brilliant volume that is a must-read for anyone looking for greater illumination of the baffling world of religious extremism.--Hays, Carl Copyright 2016 Booklist

From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review

Suffering, violence, and tense intrigue run through these dispatches from the frontlines of the "war on terror," culled from the author's New Yorker articles. Pulitzer-winning journalist Wright (Thirteen Days in September) investigates every facet of the shadowy conflict, including Washington officialdom, terrorist cells, and the lives and deaths of the war's victims, from Syria to lower Manhattan. The pieces include profiles of al-Qaeda mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri as his militancy is forged under torture in Egyptian prisons; FBI counterterrorism agent Ali Soufan, who used sympathy and cagey questioning rather than waterboarding to get information; and Egyptian Islamist Dr. Fadl (as he's commonly known), a leading theorist of jihad who renounced violence in 2008. Quieter but equally searching pieces explore the plight of Syrian filmmakers walking a tightrope between expression and government co-optation; the author's experience training journalists in Saudi Arabia, where they are stifled by theocratic dictatorship; and the heartbreak of families of five American hostages held by ISIS. Wright mixes engrossing procedural writing on organizing and fighting terrorism with vivid firsthand reportage. (Surveying veiled Saudi women, he writes, "It felt to me that all the women had died, and only their shades remained.") He writes with empathy for every side while clearly registering the moral catastrophes that darken this pitiless struggle. Agent: Andew Wylie, Wylie Agency. (Aug.) © Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.

(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Library Journal Review

Pulitzer Prize winner Wright (staff writer, The New Yorker; The Looming Tower), in this collection of riveting pieces first published in The New Yorker, traces the path of terror from al-Qaeda to the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). The book is based on the author's astute observations on many facets of the terror network in the Arab Middle East. Wright describes how al-Qaeda's philosophy spread and morphed into the ideology and practices of ISIS today. In the chapter "The Kingdom of Silence," the author provides a fascinating account of Saudi society and government. This is important because the Saudi regime and its myriad formal and informal institutions have been the incubator and propagator of an ideology that has sustained many of the current terrorist movements in the Middle East. The American angle is covered through the profiles of two FBI agents and a CIA station chief. The work concludes with a description of the capture and beheadings of four American journalists and aid workers by ISIS. VERDICT This informative book will appeal to all readers interested in the genesis and development of terrorist movements. [See Prepub Alert, 2/29/16.]-Nader Entessar, Univ. of South Alabama, Mobile © Copyright 2016. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.

(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review

Pulitzer Prize winner Wright (Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David, 2014, etc.) pulls together 10 in-depth pieces he originally wrote for the New Yorker and fashions them, somewhat updated and otherwise revised, into a cohesive book. Three of the 10 chapters constitute portraits that became part of The Looming Tower (2006), one of the most compelling investigative books published in the aftermath of 9/11. One of those three focuses on the life of Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian terror planner who at the time served as the chief lieutenant to Osama bin Laden. The other two pieces focus on agents in the FBI. The first, John O'Neill, a counterterrorism expert, more or less predicted the 9/11 attacks, but he could not persuade his superiors to react appropriately. After leaving the FBI, he became security chief at the World Trade Center and died during the attacks on the towers. The other profile explores the life of Ali Soufan, one of the few Arabic-speaking Muslims in the FBI. Like O'Neill, Soufan had gained insights into the terrorist network that planned 9/11, but he could not gain the support of the tragically negligent CIA. In the other chapters, Wright displays his top-notch reporting in stories about a disintegrating Syria, the never-ending conflicts between Israelis and Palestinians, the faith-based beliefs that undergird al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, and the massive failures of American intelligence agencies. In another chapter, Wright focuses on Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence during portions of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies. One of the most chilling passages in this nicely linked anthology occurs in the Prologue, in which Wright discusses his role as a screenwriter for the 1998 movie The Siege. He had no idea that the fictional plot would foreshadow 9/11 and that The Siege would morph from box-office failure to the most-rented movie in the U.S. a few years later. Fans of Wright will have already encountered these pieces, but the collection represents yet more great work from a dedicated journalist. Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.

The Man Behind bin Laden In March 2002, a band of horsemen journeyed through the province of Paktika, in Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border. Predator drones were circling the skies and American troops were sweeping through the mountains. The war had begun six months earlier, and by now the fighting had narrowed down to the ragged eastern edge of the country. Regional warlords had been bought off, the borders supposedly sealed. For twelve days, American and Coalition forces had been bombing the nearby Shah-e-Kot Valley and systematically destroying the cave complexes in the al-Qaeda stronghold. And yet the horsemen were riding unhindered toward Pakistan. They came to the village of a local militia commander named Gula Jan, whose long beard and black turban might have signaled that he was a Taliban sympathizer. "I saw a heavy, older man, an Arab, who wore dark glasses and had a white turban," Jan said four days later. "He was dressed like an Afghan, but he had a beautiful coat, and he was with two other Arabs who had masks on." The man in the beautiful coat dismounted and began talking in a polite and humorous manner. He asked Jan and an Afghan companion about the location of American and Northern Alliance troops. "We are afraid we will encounter them," he said. "Show us the right way." While the men were talking, Jan slipped away to examine a poster that had been dropped into the area by American airplanes. It showed a photograph of a man in a white turban and glasses. His face was broad and meaty, with a strong, prominent nose and full lips. His untrimmed beard was gray at the temples and ran in milky streaks below his chin. On his high forehead, framed by the swaths of his turban, was a darkened callus formed by many hours of prayerful prostration. His eyes reflected the sort of decisiveness one might expect in a medical man, but they also showed a measure of serenity that seemed oddly out of place. Jan was looking at a wanted poster for Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who had a price of $25 million on his head. Jan returned to the conversation. The man he now believed to be Zawahiri said to him, "May God bless you and keep you from the enemies of Islam. Try not to tell them where we came from and where we are going." There was a telephone number on the wanted poster, but Gula Jan did not have a phone. Zawahiri and the masked Arabs disappeared into the mountains. in june of 2001, two terrorist organizations, al-Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamist group al-Jihad, formally merged into one. The name of the new entity--Qaeda al-Jihad--reflects the long and interdependent history of these two groups. Although Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaeda, was the public face of Islamic terrorism, the members of al-Jihad and its guiding figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, provided the backbone of the larger organization's leadership and was responsible for much of the planning of the terrorist operations against the United States, from the assault on American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, and the bombings of the American embassies in East Africa in 1998 and of the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11. Bin Laden and Zawahiri were bound to discover each other among the radical Islamists who were drawn to Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979. For one thing, both were very much modern men. Bin Laden, who was in his early twenties, was already an international businessman; Zawahiri, six years older, was a surgeon from a notable Egyptian family. They were both members of the educated classes, intensely pious, quiet-spoken, and politically stifled by the regimes in their own countries. Each man filled a need in the other. Bin Laden, an idealist with vague political ideas, sought direction, and Zawahiri, a seasoned propagandist, supplied it. "Bin Laden had followers, but they weren't organized," recalls Essam Deraz, an Egyptian filmmaker who made several documentaries about the Soviet-Afghan War. "The people with Zawahiri had extraordinary capabilities--doctors, engineers, soldiers. They had experience in secret work. They knew how to organize themselves and create cells. And they became the leaders." The goal of al-Jihad was to overthrow the civil government of Egypt and impose a theocracy that might eventually become a model for the entire Arab world; however, years of guerrilla warfare had left the group shattered and bankrupt. For Zawahiri, bin Laden was a savior--rich and generous, with nearly limitless resources, but also pliable and politically unformed. "Bin Laden had an Islamic frame of reference, but he didn't have anything against the Arab regimes," Montasser al-Zayat, a lawyer for many of the Islamists, told me. "When Ayman met bin Laden, he created a revolution inside him." five miles south of the chaos of Cairo is a quiet middle-class suburb called Maadi. A consortium of Egyptian Jewish financiers, intending to create a kind of English village amid the mango and guava plantations and Bedouin settlements on the eastern bank of the Nile, began selling lots in the first decade of the twentieth century. The developers regulated everything, from the height of the garden fences to the color of the shutters on the grand villas that lined the streets. They planted eucalyptus trees to repel flies and mosquitoes, and gardens to perfume the air with the fragrance of roses and jasmine and bougainvillea. Many of the early settlers were British military officers and civil servants, whose wives started garden clubs and literary salons; they were followed by Jewish families, who by the end of the Second World War made up nearly a third of Maadi's population. After the war, Maadi evolved into a community of expatriate Europeans, American businessmen and missionaries, and a certain type of Egyptian--typically one who spoke French at dinner and followed the cricket matches. The center of this cosmopolitan community was the Maadi Sporting Club. Founded at a time when Egypt was occupied by the British, the club was unusual for admitting not only Jews but Egyptians. Community business was often conducted on the all-sand eighteen-hole golf course, with the Giza Pyramids and the palmy Nile as a backdrop. As high tea was served to the British in the lounge, Nubian waiters bearing icy glasses of Nescafé glided among the pashas and princesses sunbathing at the pool. High-stepping flamingos waded through the lilies in the garden pond. The Maadi Club became an ideal expression of the founders' vision of Egypt--sophisticated, safe, secular, and ethnically diverse, though still married to British notions of class. The careful regulations could not withstand the pressure of Cairo's burgeoning population, and in the late 1960s another Maadi took root. "We called its residents the 'Road 9 crowd,' " Samir Raafat, a journalist who has written a history of the suburb, told me. "It was very much 'them' and 'us.' " Road 9 runs beside train tracks that separate the tony side of Maadi from the baladi district--the native part of town. Here donkey carts clop along unpaved streets past peanut vendors and yam salesmen hawking their wares and fly-studded carcasses hanging in butcher shops. There is also, on this side of town, a narrow slice of the middle class, composed mainly of teachers and low-level bureaucrats who were drawn to the suburb by the cleaner air and the dream of crossing the tracks and being welcomed into the club. In 1960, Dr. Rabie al-Zawahiri and his wife, Umayma, moved from Heliopolis to Maadi. Rabie and Umayma belonged to two of the most prominent families in Egypt. The Zawahiri (pronounced za-wah-iri) clan was creating a medical dynasty. Rabie was a professor of pharmacology at Ain Shams University in Cairo. His brother was a highly regarded dermatologist and an expert on venereal diseases. The tradition they established continued into the next generation; a 1995 obituary in a Cairo newspaper for one of their relatives, Kashif al-Zawahiri, mentioned forty-six members of the family, thirty-one of whom were doctors or chemists or pharmacists; among the others were an ambassador, a judge, and a member of parliament. The Zawahiri name, however, was associated above all with religion. In 1929, Rabie's uncle Mohammed al-Ahmadi al-Zawahiri became the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, the thousand-year-old university in the heart of Old Cairo, which is still the center of Islamic learning in the Middle East. The leader of that institution enjoys a kind of papal status in the Muslim world, and Imam Mohammed is still remembered as one of the university's great modernizers. Rabie's father and grandfather were Al-Azhar scholars as well. Umayma Azzam, Rabie's wife, was from a clan that was equally distinguished but wealthier and also a little notorious. Her father, Dr. Abd al-Wahab Azzam, was the president of Cairo University and the founder and director of King Saud University, in Riyadh. He had also served at various times as the Egyptian ambassador to Pakistan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Another relative was secretary-general of the Arab League. "From the first parliament, more than a hundred and fifty years ago, there have been Azzams in government," Umayma's uncle Mahfouz Azzam, who is an attorney in Maadi, told me. "And we were always in the opposition." Mahfouz was a fervent Egyptian nationalist in his youth. "I was in prison when I was fifteen years old," he said proudly. "They condemned me for making what they called a 'coup d'état.' " In 1945, Mahfouz was arrested again, in a roundup of militants after the assassination of Prime Minister Ahmad Mahir. "I myself was going to do what Ayman has done," he said. Despite their pedigrees, Rabie and Umayma settled into an apartment on Street 100, on the baladi side of the tracks. Later, they rented a duplex at No. 10, Street 154, near the train station. High society held no interest for them. At a time when public displays of religious zeal were rare--and in Maadi almost unheard of--the couple was religious but not overtly pious. Umayma went about unveiled. There were more churches than mosques in the neighborhood, and a thriving synagogue. Children quickly filled the Zawahiri home. The first, Ayman and a twin sister, Umnya, were born on June 19, 1951. The twins were extremely bright, and were at the top of their classes all the way through medical school. A younger sister, Heba, also became a doctor. The two other children, Mohammed and Hussein, trained as architects. Obese, bald, and slightly cross-eyed, Rabie al-Zawahiri had a reputation as being eccentric and absentminded, and yet he was beloved by his students and by the neighborhood children. He spent most of his time in the laboratory or in his private medical clinic. Professor Zawahiri's research occasionally took him to Czechoslovakia, at a time when few Egyptians traveled, because of currency restrictions. He always returned laden with toys for the children. He sometimes found time to take them to the movies at the Maadi Sporting Club, which were open for nonmembers. Young Ayman loved the cartoons and Disney films, which played three nights a week on an outdoor screen. In the summer, the family went to a beach in Alexandria. Life on a professor's salary was constricted, especially with five ambitious children to educate. The Zawahiris never owned a car until Ayman was out of medical school. To economize, the Zawahiris kept hens behind the house for fresh eggs, and the professor bought oranges and mangoes by the crate, which he pressed upon the children as a natural source of vitamin C. Umayma Azzam was a wonderful cook, famous for her kunafa--a pastry of shredded phyllo filled with cheese and nuts and drenched in orange-blossom syrup. She inherited several substantial plots of farmland in Giza and the Fayyum Oasis from her father, which provided her with a modest income. Ayman and his mother shared a love of literature. "She always memorized the poems that Ayman sent her," Mahfouz Azzam told me. Although Ayman maintained the Zawahiri medical tradition, he was actually closer in temperament to his mother's side of the family. "The Zawahiris are professors and scientists, and they hate to speak of politics," Azzam said. "Ayman told me that his love of medicine was probably inherited. But politics was also in his genes." for anyone living in Maadi in the fifties and sixties, there was one defining social standard: membership in the Maadi Sporting Club. "The whole activity of Maadi revolved around the club," Samir Raafat, the historian of the suburb, told me one afternoon as he drove me around the neighborhood. "If you were not a member, why even live in Maadi?" The Zawahiris never joined, which meant that Ayman would be curtained off from the center of power and status. "He wasn't mainstream Maadi; he was totally marginal Maadi," Raafat said. "The Zawahiris were a conservative family. You would never see them in the club, holding hands, playing bridge. We called them saidis. Literally, the word refers to someone from a district in Upper Egypt, but we use it to mean something like 'hick.' " At one end of Maadi, surrounded by green playing fields and tennis courts, is Victoria College, a private British-built preparatory school for boys. The students attended classes in coats and ties. One of its best-known graduates was a talented cricket player named Michel Chalhub; after he became a film actor, he took the name Omar Sharif. Edward Said, the Palestinian scholar and author, attended the school, along with Jordan's future king, Hussein. Zawahiri, however, attended the state secondary school, a modest low-slung building behind a green gate, on the opposite side of the suburb. "It was the hoodlum school, the other end of the social spectrum," Raafat told me. The students of the two schools existed in different worlds, never meeting each other even in sports. Whereas Victoria College measured itself by European standards, the state school had its back to the West. Inside the green gate, the schoolyard was run by bullies and the classrooms by tyrants. A physically vulnerable young boy such as Ayman had to create strategies to survive. Ayman's childhood pictures show him with a round face, a wary gaze, and a flat and unsmiling mouth. He was a bookworm and hated contact sports--he thought they were "inhumane," according to his uncle Mahfouz. From an early age, he was devout, and he often attended prayers at the Hussein Sidki Mosque, an unimposing annex of a large apartment building; the mosque was named after a famous actor who renounced his profession because it was ungodly. No doubt Ayman's interest in religion seemed natural in a family with so many distinguished religious scholars, but it added to his image of being soft and otherworldly. Although Ayman was an excellent student, he often seemed to be daydreaming in class. "He was a mysterious character, closed and introverted," Zaki Mohammed Zaki, a Cairo journalist who was a classmate of his, told me. "He was extremely intelligent, and all the teachers respected him. He had a very systematic way of thinking, like that of an older guy. He could understand in five minutes what it would take other students an hour to understand. I would call him a genius." Excerpted from The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State by Lawrence Wright All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.