Review by Choice Review
Germany's hyperinflation of the early 1920s had devastating economic and political effects, which continue to be felt into the 21st century. Just how the young German republic muddled into policies causing the inflation is well known to specialists but less clear to general readers. Taylor, author of historical best-sellers such as Dresden (2004) and The Berlin Wall (CH, Apr'08, 45-4613), presents the story of the inflation and its ripple effect in the larger context of German and European history from the final months of WW I to the stabilization of the German mark (Rentenmark) at the end of 1923. The story is well told with innumerable anecdotes and well-chosen historical tidbits that form a lively narrative. Specialists will find relatively little that is new here, but Taylor does include a number of little-known testimonies to the chaos and dislocation of inflation, from an article on the topic by Ernest Hemingway to diary entries by a schoolteacher and part-time farmer. The many citations from the contemporary press and memoirs illustrate how various individuals experienced the inflation, from the very rich (Hugo Stinnes) to average folk to foreign visitors to Germany. Summing Up: Recommended. General readers and all levels of students. T. R. Weeks Southern Illinois University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by New York Times Review
FREDERICK TAYLOR'S "The Downfall of Money" promises, on its jacket, to deliver "an economic horror story." A horror it was : We've all seen the photos from Germany with the wheelbarrows full of cash or the children playfully stacking bricks of worthless bills (by late 1923 the mark had deteriorated from a value of 4.2 to the dollar in 1914 to over 4 trillion). The monetary crisis was so traumatic that to this day, it renders the German people thoroughly allergic to price increases. But despite its title, this book is primarily concerned not with money but with everything else the Germans were also concerned with from 1914 to about 1929: military strategy, starvation, assassinations (of people good and bad), putsches (fruitless and fruitful), foreign occupation, riots, strikes and pretty much every other permutation of anarchy and violence. For the first 100 pages or so, Taylor, the author of "Dresden" and "The Berlin Wall," gives us a highly detailed, and somewhat detoured, narrative of the years around World War I. There is little mention of monetary issues, save an occasional reference to the exchange rate. Taylor pays more attention to the economic issues of the 1920s, but even then what he really seems to want to write about is the general craziness that was Weimar Germany. There is much engrossing craziness to cover. Many readers are no doubt familiar with the Treaty of Versailles' war-guilt clause, which shifted blame for a pointless, expensive autopilot of a war entirely onto Germany and its allies. Fewer probably remember how that finger-pointing then ricocheted within Germany itself after the Kaiser was ousted and splintered groups of Communists, Social Democrats and farright nationalists blamed one another for the humiliations of the war and its aftermath. Abused by the vengeful victors, the Germans turned to abusing (and slaughtering) themselves. To be sure, Germany was not simply a victim deserving of sympathy. Taylor documents its plans to visit crushing indemnities and annexations upon its enemies had it prevailed in the war. Everyone, he argues repeatedly, behaved badly. And almost everyone borrowed way too much to bankroll this bad behavior, counting on the other guy's losing in order to get back in the black. The United States, the main creditor to the other victors, comes off looking worse than Americans may care to remember. It was Washington's refusal to forgive the Allies' war debts, after all, that encouraged Britain and France to tighten the screws on the broke and psychically broken Germany (which was effectively paying French and British debts to the United States indirectly). As a result, Uncle Sam collected the nickname "Uncle Shylock." Only toward the end of the book are we introduced to the long-awaited hyperinflation. There Taylor details the less obvious ways in which dizzyingly high prices frayed the social fabric. Women couldn't marry, for example, because their dowry savings had been inflated away. Lifestyle choices became strangely distorted by price changes; unlike food costs, opera ticket prices remained cheap because they were set by the state, encouraging consumption of entertainment instead of calories. Strikes and riots abounded - including, most memorably, a strike by Reich printing house workers when the government finally got serious about stamping out inflation. (If they weren't regularly printing money, they were in danger of losing their jobs.) There are, Taylor suggests, parallels between the profligate German welfare state of the 1920s and Germany's European Union peers today. But he is frustratingly noncommittal about why the German government pursued the inflationary policies it did - and to what extent they were deliberate or just ad hoc. Uncertainty ruled not only Weimar economic policy, it seems, but also the historians' assessments that followed. CATHERINE RAMPELL is an economics reporter for The Times.
Copyright (c) The New York Times Company [January 5, 2014]
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
British historian Taylor (Dresden) adds to a solid body of work on 20th-century Germany with this chilling account of the human face of hyperinflation in the 1920s Weimar Republic. Many blame the collapse of the German mark on the reparations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, yet Taylor argues that it was the Second Empire's decision to finance WWI primarily by borrowing that led to the economic catastrophe. Postwar uprisings on the left and right further destabilized the country's fragile, young government and diminished confidence in its already-shaky currency. The mark's value began to tumble, and once the fall gained momentum, "the only way now was down." Prices rose 50% a month. Hyperinflation made Germany a "paradise for anyone who owed money"; citizens at all levels of society discovered that their fiscal prudence had been for naught. The result was a "war of all against all" and a society of "starving billionaires," where a doorman received a million-mark tip, a life's savings bought a subway ticket, and a girl's virginity was something to barter. The government eventually managed to sufficiently stabilize the currency and foster a sense of hope, but the disaster had already fatally weakened the mutual trust essential to democracy. The beneficiary would be Hitler. B&w images throughout. Agent: Dan Conaway, Writers House. (Sept.) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved.
(c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved
Review by Kirkus Book Review
A well-organized, fast-moving political narrative situating the absolute breakdown of Germany's currency in 1923 in the double context of the international drive for World War I reparations and the violent effects of internal political extremism. Royal Historical Society fellow Taylor (Exorcising Hitler: The Occupation and Denazification of Germany, 2011, etc.) examines the historical span from the overthrow of the "once unshakeable representatives of the monarchical state" in November 1918 to the end of 1923 at the height of the crisis. The introduction of the "fixed-value Rentenmark" in November 1923 was followed rapidly by the beginning of new negotiations on reparations and apparent stability. Early on, Taylor identifies the major players in his drama. First, Erich Ludendorff, and his military associates, who seized on Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and launched their campaign against the betrayal of the armistice and the "stab-in-the-back" of the Versailles Treaty. Then, the author examines extremists of right and left, out of which the Nazis emerged. The former organized armed units under Ludendorff and assassinated leaders like Matthias Erzberger and Walther Rathenau, whom they associated with the Versailles sellout. The latter took to the streets and organized military units for Soviet-style revolution. Meanwhile, the Allies maintained their embargo on German food supplies and other trade until they were satisfied that reparations were forthcoming. Against this backdrop, Taylor methodically traces the fall of the currency and growth of the debt. By November 1923, a loaf of bread could be bought for 140 billion marks, and the middle class was left with next to nothing. Tax reforms and collections, social welfare cuts, impoverishment of students and government workers all played their part. Taylor's history provides plenty of relevant lessons for today--and not only for Europe.]] Copyright Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
